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Arizona v. Gant
07-542
Ruling Below: State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz. 2007); cert granted, Arizona v. Gant, 128 S.
Ct. 1443 (2008).
The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that evidence seized by police after the defendant was arrested
and the scene secure was inadmissible. The United State Supreme Court had accepted the case
previously, but did not hear oral arguments. Instead the Court remanded the case back to the
Arizona appellate court.
Questions Presented: Does the Fourth Amendment require law enforcement officers to
demonstrate a threat to their safety or a need to preserve evidence related to crime of arrest to
justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's recent
occupants have been arrested and secured?
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee
V.
Rodney Joseph GANT, Appellant
Supreme Court of Arizona
Filed July 25, 2007
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
BERCH, Vice Chief Justice
This case requires us to determine whether
the search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
permits the warrantless search of an
arrestee's car when the scene is secure and
the arrestee is handcuffed, seated in the back
of a patrol car, and under the supervision of
a police officer. We hold that in such
circumstances, a warrantless search is not
justified.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
On August 25, 1999, two uniformed Tucson
police officers went to a house after
receiving a tip of narcotics activity there.
When Defendant Rodney Gant answered the
door, the officers asked to speak with the
owner of the residence. Gant informed the
officers that the owner was not home, but
would return later that afternoon. After
leaving the residence, the officers ran a
records check and discovered that Gant had
a suspended driver's license and an
outstanding warrant for driving with a
suspended license.
The officers returned to the house later that
evening. While they were there, Gant drove
up and parked his car in the driveway. As he
got out of his car, an officer summoned him.
Gant walked eight to twelve feet toward the
officer, who immediately arrested and
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handcuffed him. Within minutes, Gant had
been locked in the back of a patrol car,
where he remained under the supervision of
an officer. At least four officers were at the
residence by this time and the scene was
secure....
After Gant had been locked in the patrol car,
two officers searched the passenger
compartment of his car and found a weapon
and a plastic baggie containing cocaine.
Gant was charged with one count of
possession of a narcotic drug for sale and
one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia for the baggie that held the
drug.
Gant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized from his car, which the superior court
denied. Gant was convicted of both charges
and appealed. The court of appeals held that
the evidence should have been suppressed
and therefore reversed Gant's convictions.
State v. Gant, 202 Ariz. 240, 246, P 18
(App. 2002). After this Court denied review,
the State petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari. The Supreme
Court granted the petition, vacated the court
of appeals' opinion, and remanded to that
court to reconsider its opinion in light of this
Court's opinion in State v. Dean, 206 Ariz.
158 (2003). Arizona v. Gant, 540 U.S. 963
(2003). In Dean, we held that when an
arrestee is not a recent occupant of his
vehicle at the time of the arrest, the reasons
supporting a "warrantless search of the
vehicle-protection of the arresting officers
and preservation of evidence"-no longer
justify the search and therefore the police
must obtain a warrant. 206 Ariz. at 166, PP
32-34.
Following the Supreme Court's remand, the
court of appeals remanded Gant's case to the
trial court to determine whether Gant was a
recent occupant of his car when he was
arrested. After an evidentiary hearing, the
superior court determined that Gant was a
recent occupant and concluded that the
search of his car was thus justified as
incident to his arrest. Gant appealed and the
court of appeals again reversed, finding that
the search of Gant's car was not incident to
his arrest because it was not
contemporaneous with his arrest and did not
satisfy the rationales set forth in Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), for
dispensing with the warrant requirement.
State v. Gant, 213 Ariz. 446, 452, P 18
(App. 2006).
The State petitioned for review, which we
granted because this case presents an
important question regarding vehicle
searches incident to arrest....
II. DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right
of citizens to be free from unreasonable
governmental searches. U.S. Const. amend.
IV. "[S]ubject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions,"
a search is presumed to be unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment if it is not
supported by probable cause and conducted
pursuant to a valid search warrant. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
The Supreme Court has recognized a
"search incident to a lawful arrest" as one of
the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. See, e.g., Chimel, 395
U.S. at 755. The Court justified the search
incident to arrest exception by the need to
protect officers and preserve evidence:
When an arrest is made, it is
reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapons that
the latter might seek to use in order
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to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition,
it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or
destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course,
be governed by a like rule. A gun
on a table or in a drawer in front of
one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer
as one concealed in the clothing of
the person arrested.
Id. at 762-63. Based on the rationales of
officer safety and preservation of evidence,
the Court limited the permissible scope of a
search incident to arrest to the "arrestee's
person and the area 'within his immediate
control"'-that is, "the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence." Id. at 763.
Although the rule has worked reasonably
well in some contexts, it has proved difficult
to apply to automobile searches incident to
arrest, prompting the Supreme Court to
reconsider and redefine the permissible
scope of such a search. See New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981). In Belton,
a police officer stopped a speeding vehicle
and made contact with the driver and three
passengers while all occupants were seated
in the vehicle. Upon smelling marijuana, the
officer ordered the occupants out of the car,
arrested them, and searched each one. As the
driver and passengers stood by, the officer
searched the car's passenger compartment
and found a jacket containing cocaine. Id.
The sole question before the Court in Belton
was the "constitutionally permissible scope"
of an otherwise lawful search of an
automobile incident to arrest, given the
exigencies of the arrest situation. Id. at 455,
457. Noting the lack of consistency among
courts in deciding how much of the
automobile the police could search incident
to arrest and the desirability of a bright-line
rule to guide police officers in the conduct
of their duties, the Supreme Court held that
the area within an arrestee's immediate
control encompassed not only "the
passenger compartment of an automobile"
that the arrestee recently occupied, but also
containers within the passenger
compartment. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458-60.
The State and our dissenting colleagues seek
to bring Gant's case within the Belton rule.
Unlike Belton, however, this case deals not
with the permissible scope of the search of
an automobile, but with the threshold
question whether the police may conduct a
search incident to arrest at all once the scene
is secure. Because Belton does not purport to
address this question, we must determine
whether officer safety or the preservation of
evidence, the rationales that excuse the
warrant requirement for searches incident to
arrest, justified the warrantless search of
Gant's car. Cf Dean, 206 Ari. at 166, PP
32-34 (relying on Chimel rationales in
holding that arrestee was not a recent
occupant of vehicle).
Neither rationale supports the search here.
At the time of the search, Gant was
handcuffed, seated in the back of a locked
patrol car, and under the supervision of a
police officer. The other two arrestees at the
scene were also handcuffed and detained in
the back of patrol cars, and the record
reflects no unsecured civilians in the
vicinity. At least four officers were on the
scene. At that point, the police had no reason
to believe that anyone at the scene could
have gained access to Gant's vehicle or that
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the officers' safety was at risk. Indeed, one
of the officers who searched Gant's car
acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that
the scene was secure at the time of the
search. Therefore neither a concern for
officer safety nor the preservation of
evidence justified the warrantless search of
Gant's car. Absent either of these Chimel
rationales, the search cannot be upheld as a
lawful search incident to arrest.
Nor does this case require this Court to
"reconsider Belton." See Dissent P 27.
Belton dealt with a markedly different set of
circumstances from those present in this
case. The four unsecured occupants of the
vehicle in Belton presented an immediate
risk of loss of evidence and an obvious
threat to the lone officer's safety that are not
present in Gant's case. See Belton, 453 U.S.
at 455-56. Thus, in Belton, Chimel's
justifications were satisfied and the search
was 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." Id. at 457 (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 19). Here, to the contrary, because
Gant and the other two arrestees were all
secured at the time of the search and at least
four officers were present, no exigencies
existed to justify the vehicle search at its
inception. Belton therefore does not support
a warrantless search on the facts of this case.
It is possible to read Belton, as the State and
the Dissent do, as holding that because the
interior of a car is generally within the reach
of a recent occupant, the Belton bright-line
rule eliminates the requirement that the
police assess the exigencies of the situation.
But, if no exigency must justify the
warrantless search, it would seem to follow
that a warrantless search incident to an arrest
could be conducted hours after the arrest and
at a time when the arrestee had already been
transported to the police station. Yet the
Court was careful in Belton to distinguish
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15
(1977), in which it had rejected an argument
that a search of a footlocker more than an
hour after the defendants' arrests could be
justified as incidental to the arrest. In doing
so, the Court noted that the search occurred
"after federal agents had gained exclusive
control of the footlocker and long after
respondents were securely in custody; the
search therefore cannot be viewed as
incidental to the arrest or as justified by any
other exigency." Belton, 453 U.S. at 462
(quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15). Such a
distinction would be wholly unnecessary
under the State's interpretation of Belton.
Relying on language in United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the State
next maintains that the Chimel justifications
are presumed to exist in all arrest situations
simply by "the fact of the lawful arrest," id.
at 235, and so it need not show that either
Chimel rationale existed at the time of the
search.
But Robinson does not hold that every
search following an arrest is excepted from
the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement; if it did, the Court's opinions in
the cases following Chimel would hardly
have been necessary. Rather, Robinson
teaches that the police may search incident
to an arrest without proving in any particular
case that they were concerned about their
safety or the destruction of evidence; these
concerns are assumed to be present in every
arrest situation. Once those concerns are no
longer present, however, the "justifications
[underlying the exception] are absent" and a
warrant is required to search. Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964);
accord Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
47 (1970) ("[T]he reasons that have been
thought sufficient to justify warrantless
searches carried out in connection with an
arrest no longer obtain when the accused is
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safely in custody at the station house.").
Similarly, when, as here, the justifications
underlying Chimel no longer exist because
the scene is secure and the arrestee is
handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol
car, and under the supervision of an officer,
the warrantless search of the arrestee's car
cannot be justified as necessary to protect
the officers at the scene or prevent the
destruction of evidence.
The State also argues that the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Thornton, 541
U.S. 615, compels a contrary result. In
Thornton, an officer in an unmarked patrol
car ran a check on the license plate of a
suspicious car and discovered that the plate
was not registered to that car. Before the
officer could pull the car over, Thornton
parked and alighted from the car. The officer
parked his patrol car behind Thornton's car,
exited, and approached him. Thornton
agreed to a pat down search, during which
the officer felt a bulge in Thornton's pocket.
Thornton admitted possessing drugs and
produced bags containing marijuana and
crack cocaine. The officer arrested and
handcuffed Thornton and placed him in the
back of the patrol car. The officer then
searched Thornton's car and found a gun. Id.
at 618.
Although the facts in Thornton resemble
those in the case before us, the case is
distinguishable. Thornton never claimed that
being placed in the patrol car removed the
Chimel justifications for the search; rather,
he challenged the lawfulness of the search of
his car on the ground that he was out of his
car before his encounter with the police
began. Id. at 619. Thus the Supreme Court's
opinion addressed only whether the Belton
rule applies when an officer does not initiate
contact with a vehicle's occupant until after
the occupant has left the vehicle. Id. at 617,
622 n.2. The answer to that question turned
on whether, having stepped out of his car,
Thornton was a recent occupant for purposes
of Belton when he was arrested. See id. at
622-24. The Supreme Court concluded that
he was [a recent occupant]....
Thornton's holding was carefully limited to
the question presented, the Supreme Court
did not address whether, even if an arrestee
is a recent occupant, a search of the
arrestee's vehicle is nonetheless unlawful if
concerns for officer safety or destruction of
evidence-the Chimel justifications-no
longer exist at the time of the search. See id.
at 622 n.2, 624 n.4.
Amici Arizona Law Enforcement Legal
Advisors' Association and Arizona
Association of Chiefs of Police assert that,
as a result of our holding, police officers
will not secure arrestees until after they have
searched the passenger compartment of an
arrestee's vehicle, thus jeopardizing the
officers' safety. We presume that police
officers will exercise proper judgment in
their contacts with arrestees and will not
engage in conduct that creates unnecessary
risks to their safety or public safety in order
to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. In this technological
age, when warrants can be obtained within
minutes, it is not unreasonable to require
that police officers obtain search warrants
when they have probable cause to do so to
protect a citizen's right to be free from
unreasonable governmental searches.
We recognize the importance of providing
consistent and workable rules to guide
police officers in making decisions in the
field. Belton sought to address this concern
by creating a bright-line rule regarding the
scope of automobile searches incident to
arrest. The Supreme Court has not, however,
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adopted a bright-line rule for determining
whether a warrantless search of an
automobile is justified to begin with. In the
absence of such a rule, we look to the
circumstances attending the search to
determine whether a warrant was required.
See Dean, 206 Ariz. at 166, P 34 (examining
"the totality of the facts" in determining the
necessity for a warrant). When, based on the
totality of the circumstances, an arrestee is
secured and thus presents no reasonable risk
to officer safety or the preservation of
evidence, a search warrant must be obtained
unless some other exception to the warrant
requirement applies.
The State has advanced no alternative
theories justifying the warrantless search of
Gant's car, and we note that no other
exception to the warrant requirement
appears to apply. The officers did not have
probable cause to search Gant's car for
contraband, as is required by the automobile
exception. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52.
No evidence or contraband was in plain
view. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 465 (1971). Moreover, the officers
testified that they had no intention of
impounding Gant's car until after they
searched the passenger compartment and
found the contraband. Thus the search
cannot be characterized as an inventory
search. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 372 (1976). There being no other
exception to the warrant requirement
justifying the search of Gant's car, the
warrantless search was unlawful.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
warrantless search of Gant's car was not
justified by the search incident to arrest
exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. The evidence obtained
as a result of the unlawful search must
therefore be suppressed. We reverse the
judgment of the superior court and
AFFIRM the judgment of the court of
appeals suppressing the evidence, but
VACATE the opinion of the court of
appeals.
BALES, Justice, dissenting
[Brief restatement of the facts.]
Because I believe that the majority's
reasoning and conclusion are inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), I
respectfully dissent. Although there may be
good reasons to reconsider Belton, doing so
is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court,
even if later developments have called into
question the rationale for its decision. See
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
Belton itself was an extension of the Court's
holdings in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969), and United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973). In Chimel, the Court
held that, incident to a lawful arrest, police
may properly search the arrestee and the
area within the arrestee's "immediate
control" without a warrant. 395 U.S. at 763.
Although "Chimel searches" are justified by
general concerns for officer safety and the
preservation of evidence, see id., in
Robinson the Court held that such searches
are permissible regardless of whether, in the
circumstances of a particular case, "there
was present one of the reasons supporting
the" exception to the warrant requirement,
414 U.S. at 235.
The Court in Belton considered the
application of Chimel and Robinson when
police arrest an occupant or recent occupant
of an automobile. There, an officer stopped
a car and, having reason to believe the
occupants unlawfully possessed marijuana,
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ordered the driver and his three companions
out of the car and placed them under arrest.
453 U.S. at 455-56. After searching each
individual, the officer then searched the
car's passenger compartment, where he
discovered a jacket on the back seat. Id. at
456. He opened one of the jacket pockets
and found cocaine. Id.
Belton upheld the officer's search of the
jacket as a valid search incident to arrest
even though it occurred after the defendant
had been removed from the car and could
not reach the jacket. Id. at 462-63. The
Court first extended the Chimel exception to
the passenger area of a car by adopting the
"generalization" that an arrestee might reach
within this area to grab a weapon or destroy
evidence. Id. at 460. Having defined the area
of the suspect's "immediate control" to
include the passenger compartment, the
Court went on to hold that "when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment" and "the
contents of any containers found within." Id.
The search authorized by Belton does not
depend on a case-specific determination that
there may be weapons or evidence in the
automobile. Indeed, the Court noted that its
holding would allow searches of containers
that "could hold neither a weapon nor
evidence of the criminal conduct for which
the suspect was arrested." Id. at 461. The
Court nonetheless concluded that the lawful
arrest itself justified the search. Quoting
Robinson, the Court noted that "[t]he
authority to search the person incident to a
lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the
need to disarm and to discover evidence,
does not depend on what a court may later
decide was the probability in a particular
arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would ... be found." Id.
In holding that the search of Gant's
automobile violated the Fourth Amendment,
the majority's analysis conflicts with Belton
in three respects. The majority concludes
that the search was not incident to Gant's
arrest because the Chimel concerns for
officer safety and preservation of evidence
were not present. See Op. P 13 ("Absent
either of these Chimel rationales, the search
cannot be upheld as a lawful search incident
to arrest.").
The validity of a Belton search, however,
clearly does not depend on the presence of
the Chimel rationales in a particular case.
Indeed, in Belton, the New York Court of
Appeals, much like the majority here, held
that the search could "not be upheld as a
search incident to a lawful arrest where there
is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a
confederate might gain access to the article."
453 U.S. at 456. In reversing the state court
and upholding the search, the Court in
Belton did not question the state court's
finding that the jacket was inaccessible.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Belton,
pointedly noted that "the Court today
substantially expands the permissible scope
of searches incident to arrest by permitting
police officers to search areas and containers
the arrestee could not possibly reach at the
time of arrest." Id. at 466.
Justice Brennan explicitly made the
argument that the majority adopts here.
"When the arrest has been consummated and
the arrestee safely taken into custody, the
justifications underlying Chimel's limited
exception to the warrant requirement cease
to apply: at that point there is no possibility
that the arrestee could reach weapons or
contraband." Id. at 465-66. While these
observations have force, if they did not
persuade a majority of the Supreme Court in
Belton, I do not think it is appropriate for
our Court to effectively rewrite Belton as
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embracing them now.
Belton is also inconsistent with the
majority's focus on the Chimel rationales at
the time of the search. See Op. PP 13-14. In
Belton itself the search did not take place
until after the officer had already removed
the defendant from the car. 453 U.S. at 456.
The Court did not consider whether one of
the Chimel rationales was present at the time
of the search; instead, the Court noted that
the search was justified by the arrest itself.
Id. at 461. That the jacket was within the
passenger compartment in which Belton
"had been a passenger just before he was
arrested," meant that it was within his
"immediate control" for purposes of the
search incident to arrest. Id. at 462
(emphasis added).
Because a Belton search is justified by
circumstances that the Supreme Court
thought generally exist upon the arrest of the
occupant of a vehicle, the validity of the
search does not depend on particularized
concerns for officer safety or preservation of
evidence at the time of the search. Thus,
Belton rejected the argument that the search
of the jacket in that case was improper
because it did not occur until after the
officer had reduced it to his "exclusive
control." Id. at 461 n.5. Recognizing the
implications of the Court's reasoning,
Justice Brennan noted, "Under the approach
taken today, the result would presumably be
the same even if [the officer] had
handcuffed Belton and his companions in
the patrol car before placing them under
arrest . . . ." Id. at 468.
The point noted by Justice Brennan in his
dissent has been recognized by nearly every
appellate court that has since considered the
issue: Belton implies that warrantless
searches may be conducted even when the
arrestee has been handcuffed and locked in a
patrol car....
That the Chimel rationales need not be
present in a particular case does not, as the
majority contends, mean that police may
conduct warrantless searches hours after an
arrest. See Op. P 15. Belton upheld the
warrantless search of a vehicle's passenger
compartment "as a contemporaneous
incident" of the occupant's arrest. 453 U.S.
at 460 (emphasis added). In so ruling, the
Court distinguished United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), as not
involving a search incident to an arrest, see
453 U.S. at 461-62. The post-arrest search in
Belton was justified because it was
incidental to the arrest, not because other
exigencies were present that were absent in
Chadwick. Thus, although Belton does not
require a warrantless search to occur
simultaneously with the arrest, it must occur
within some temporal proximity.
The majority also departs from Belton's
determination that searches in this context
should be guided by a "straightforward rule"
that does not depend on case-by-case
adjudication. See 453 U.S. at 458-59. The
majority concludes that a Belton search is
not justified unless, "based on the totality of
the circumstances," there is a "reasonable
risk to officer safety or the preservation of
evidence." Op. P 23. Such an inquiry can
only be made on a case-specific basis,
initially by officers in the field and, if a
search is later challenged, post-hoc by
reviewing courts. This approach is at odds
with the core premise of Belton. See
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615,
622-23 (2004) ("The need for a clear rule,
readily understood by police officers and not
depending on differing estimates of what
items were or were not within reach of an
arrestee at any particular moment, justifies
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the sort of generalization which Belton
enunciated.").
The bright-line rule embraced in Belton has
long been criticized and probably merits
reconsideration. Belton created a significant
exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement by making a
generalization about the exigencies of
arrests involving automobiles and then
allowing searches whether or not the
concerns justifying the exception were
present in any particular case. Belton thus
rests on a "shaky foundation," id. at 624
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part), that has
become even more tenuous over time. Police
officers routinely secure suspects by
handcuffing them before conducting Belton
searches. Id. at 628 (Scalia, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
But even if Belton were to be reconsidered,
the approach adopted by the majority is only
one of several possible alternatives.
Although the majority revives a case-by-
case approach focusing on the presence of
the Chimel rationales at the time of the
search, it would also be possible to imagine
a bright-line limitation to Belton's bright-
line exception. For example, one could
argue that a Belton search is never justified
as "incident to arrest" if it occurs after a
suspect is handcuffed outside the vehicle. Or
perhaps Belton should be limited so it
continues to allow searches of the passenger
compartment but not containers found
therein, see Thornton, 541 U.S. at 634
(Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting),
or even replaced by a rule "built on firmer
ground," id. at 625 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part), that would allow
warrantless searches when "it is reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest might be found in the vehicle," id. at
632 (Scalia, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
If Gant had developed an argument under
Article 2, Section 8, of the Arizona
Constitution, we might properly have
considered whether, as a matter of state law,
to reject or modify the Belton rule. Several
other state courts have done so. . . . Here,
however, we are faced only with arguments
based on the Fourth Amendment.
We can add our voice to the others that have
urged the Supreme Court to revisit Belton.
We cannot, however, take it upon ourselves
to re-examine Belton's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment. Because Belton allows
the search of Gant's vehicle, I respectfully
dissent.
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"High Court to Rule on Warrantless Search of Vehicle"
Los Angeles Times
February 26. 2008
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to rule on
whether police officers are free to search a
parked vehicle whenever they arrest a driver
or a passenger [in Arizona v. Gant].
Prosecutors, including Los Angeles County
Dist. Atty. Steve Cooley, asked the high court
to set "a clear, bright-line rule" that permits
officers to search a vehicle whenever an arrest
is made, even if the handcuffed person has
been taken away.
In the past, the court has focused on the
danger faced by officers when they stop a
vehicle and make an arrest. In a 1981
decision, the court said officers may search a
vehicle when they arrest an occupant so as to
check for weapons. These searches were
reasonable, the justices said, because the
officers may be in danger if weapons are
hidden in the vehicle. Most prosecutors and
judges interpreted that decision as giving
police ample authority to search vehicles after
an arrest.
But the Arizona Supreme Court took a
different view in a case in which Tucson
police had arrested a man who was standing
near his parked car.
Rodney Gant lived at a suspected drug house
that had been under observation. Police knew
he had an outstanding warrant for driving with
a suspended license, and arrested him when he
pulled up in his car. He was handcuffed
outside his car and put in the back of a patrol
car. Officers then searched his vehicle and
found a gun and a bag of cocaine.
In a 3-2 decision, the Arizona high court threw
out the evidence against Gant and said the
search of his car was a violation of the 4th
Amendment and its ban on "unreasonable
searches and seizures."
The majority said that since Gant was
handcuffed in a patrol car, the officers faced
no danger from weapons hidden in his car.
Officers could have obtained a search warrant,
but only if they could show a magistrate that
they had probable cause to believe drugs were
in the car.
Arizona Atty. Gen. Terry Goddard appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court last fall. He argued
that the state high court's opinion-if allowed
to stand-sets "an unworkable and dangerous
test" that would confuse police, prosecutors
and judges.
Officers would be uncertain whether they
could search a vehicle when the arrested
occupant was outside the vehicle and
handcuffed, he said.
The Los Angeles County district attorney and
the National Assn. of Police Organizations
also urged the court to take up Arizona vs.
Gant and to clarify the law on vehicle
searches.
The court was not expected to hear the case
until the fall.
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"Court: Search Warrant Required for Traffic Stops"
East Valley Tribune
July 26, 2007
Jill Redhage
The Arizona Supreme Court ruled
Wednesday that police officers aren't
allowed to search a vehicle without a
warrant, if a suspect has been arrested and
the scene has been secured.
The decision comes in the case of a Tucson
man, Rodney Joseph Gant, whom police
arrested in 1999 on suspicion of a license
violation. Gant was in the back of a police
car when officers searched his vehicle and
found cocaine. He was later charged with
drug possession.
Gant claimed under the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution that when officers
searched his vehicle without a warrant, it
violated his protection against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Law enforcement officers are allowed to
search a person or a vehicle without a
warrant if it's necessary to secure a weapon
or preserve evidence that could be destroyed
by a suspect.
But if no danger to the officer or the
evidence exists, then an officer must get a
warrant before searching a vehicle and its
contents, the court decided.
During the case, two law enforcement
associations argued that the ruling could
tempt officers to search vehicles before
securing arrestees, thus jeopardizing their
safety.
The court replied, "We presume that police
officers will exercise proper judgment in
their contacts with arrestees and will not
engage in conduct that creates unnecessary
risks to their safety or public safety in order
to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement."
The court noted that warrants can be
obtained within minutes over the telephone.
"It is not unreasonable to require that police
officers obtain search warrants when they
have probable cause to do so to protect a
citizen's right to be free from unreasonable
governmental searches," wrote Vice Chief
Justice Rebecca White Berch.
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"Warrant Ruling Not a Concern to Pima Officers"
Tucson Citizen
July 28, 2007
David L. Teibel
A state Supreme Court ruling this week
limiting the ability of law officers in Arizona
to conduct warrantless searches of a vehicle is
not of great concern to Pima County sheriffs
commanders who have been complying with
similar state Court of Appeals rulings since
late last year.
"I don't think it's a major problem," said
Bureau Chief George Heaney, head of the
sheriff s Operations Bureau.
"We put out some training bulletins to make
sure our deputies were in compliance with
appellate court decisions," Heaney said.
The state Supreme Court ruled Wednesday
that it violates Fourth Amendment rights for
police to search an arrested person's car
without a warrant when the scene is secure
and the person is handcuffed, seated in a
patrol car and under an officer's supervision.
The state high court's 3-2 ruling in a Tucson
case represents a dramatic departure in how
such everyday circumstances involving traffic
stops and other common situations have been
handled by law enforcement, The Associated
Press reported.
A lawyer who argued the case on behalf of the
state said the ruling may be appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court but that Arizona police
must comply with it unless and until it is
overturned.
Relying on interpretations on past rulings by
federal and state appellate courts, some police
agencies have felt free to conduct post-arrest
searches of vehicles' passenger compartments
to check for weapons that could pose a threat
to officers and for criminal evidence that
could be destroyed.
"Courts in the past gave officers lots of
leeway in warrantless searches" of vehicles
incident to an arrest, Heaney explained.
There still are ways to look into a car without
a warrant that law officers can use, Heaney
said.
When a car is impounded, the officer must
inventory the contents, and a weapon or
criminal evidence can be spotted then, seized
and used in trial, he said.
Also, any evidence of a crime or a weapon
still can be seized if it is in plain view, Heaney
said.
He said law officers still can do a cursory
search of a car if there are other people in it
who may have a weapon or contraband, and in
the case of some crime investigations, such as
a kidnapping, officers still can search a
potential suspect vehicle-the back of a van or
in the trunk of a car-for victims. And, he
said, the officer can seize criminal evidence
and weapons found during such searches.
"In this technological age, when warrants can
be obtained within minutes, it is not
unreasonable to require that police officers
obtain search warrants when they have
probable cause to do so to protect a citizen's
right to be free from unreasonable
governmental searches," Vice Chief Justice
Rebecca White Berch wrote for the majority,
AP reported.
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Heaney agreed that when there is probable
cause an officer can always telephone a judge
and ask for a "telephonic warrant."
But, he said, "In some cases it takes several
hours to find a judge; other cases, one to
several hours.
"It's going to cost us more time, and that's the
cost of doing business today," Heaney said.
Tucson police for the most part would not
comment on the state Supreme Court ruling.
"It is on our agenda for senior staff to discuss
early next week as to effect," said Sgt. Mark
Robinson, a police spokesman.
"Any legal ruling that affects police procedure
is of concern to us," Robinson said.
In the case that produced the ruling, police on
Aug. 25, 1999, seized cocaine and drug
paraphernalia after Rodney Gant got out of his
parked car and was arrested about 10 feet
away by officers who had earlier learned that
Gant was named on an arrest warrant for
driving with a suspended license.
Gant had been handcuffed and placed in a
locked patrol car under police supervision by
the time police searched his car.
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"High Court to Weigh Ariz. Case on Car Searches"
Arizona Republic
August 30, 2003
Billy House
The U.S. Supreme Court this fall will hear
appeals in an Arizona case and two others
pitting the freedoms and privacy of
motorists against law enforcement efforts to
search cars.
"Will the court have terrorism and post-
September 11 in mind? Certainly," said
Tracey Maclin, a professor at the Boston
University School of Law. "The court, like
the executive branch, can't help but think of
September 11 ."
The Arizona case addresses whether police
can automatically search a vehicle without a
warrant if its recent occupant was arrested
outside of the car.
The two others, Maryland vs. Pringle and
Illinois vs. Lidster, will address whether all
occupants of a car can be arrested when
drugs are found in a passenger compartment,
and the validity of arrests made at police
roadblocks where all motorists are stopped.
Traffic-related incidents are the most
common police-citizen encounters. As a
result, they represent some of the best
opportunities for police to stop criminal
activity before it happens.
But experts differ on how increased
homeland security pressures might affect the
court's decisions in these three cases that
will revisit the Fourth Amendment's ban
against unreasonable search and seizure.
Some say the court's eventual ruling in
Arizona vs. Gant, in particular, could pave
new legal ground, either by giving police
greater latitude in conducting warrantless
searches of empty cars after arrests or
spelling out stricter limits on what police
can do.
Arguments in the case have been set for
Nov. 5.
At issue is the 1999 arrest and conviction of
Rodney Gant, 30, on drug charges.
According to court papers, Tucson officers
knew there was an outstanding arrest
warrant for Gant when they saw him park
his car in a driveway.
Gant already had left his car and started
walking toward police when they arrested
him and placed him in the back of a patrol
car. The officers then searched Gant's car,
where they found a handgun and a plastic
bag filled with cocaine.
The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits
warrantless searches without probable cause.
But the Supreme Court in a 1981 case, New
York vs. Belton, held that police may search
the entire passenger area of a stopped
vehicle as a "contemporaneous incident" to
a lawful arrest for any weapons or any
evidence. The reasoning was that is a way to
guard the officer's safety and to preserve
any evidence.
At trial, Gant claimed no such exception to
the warrant requirement existed.
But the trial court denied the motion, and
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Gant was convicted of drug charges.
However, the Arizona Court of Appeals
later ordered that evidence suppressed,
finding that the Belton case did not apply
because police did not initiate the contact
with Gant before he left his car and that
Gant was not even aware of the police
presence.
Thus, that court reasoned, the search of the
car was not "incident" to the arrest and was
unconstitutional.
In its appeal, Arizona says this subjective
inquiry about a suspect's awareness of the
police presence before leaving their car
places too much uncertainty into the issue of
whether later car searches should proceed.
Maclin, who is helping represent the
American Civil Liberties Union and the
National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers in support of Gant, says a clearer,
bright-line rule needs to be handed down by
the court.
"We propose a different rule: Belton only
applies when the police seize an individual
while inside the car," he said.
But Joel Bertocchi, a Chicago lawyer who
has submitted legal arguments on behalf of
the National Association of Police
Organizations, said that a suspect in these
situations often might be accompanied by
"confederates or friends at the scene." While
the suspect might not be in the area of the
car, he said his friends could still be, "and
might have an advantage over the officer."
The police proposal, he said, would permit
the warrantless searches of cars even if their
recent occupants were not aware of the
police presence when they got out.
Robert Krauss, a Florida chief assistant
attorney general who has filed arguments on
behalf of 13 states, emphasized that "none of
this happens unless someone is arrested."
In Arizona, state Assistant Attorney General
Eric Olsson said he believes the state Court
of Appeals focused too much on a suspect's
supposed state of mind, which he said "is
unworkable and wrong."
However, he declined to speculate how the
Supreme Court might rule.
On the other side, Olsson said some might
argue that justices on the high court might
not like "all the pressure on the
Constitution" that their previous decisions in
car-search cases has produced.
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"High Court Sidesteps Key Arizona Drug Case"
Arizona Republic
October 21, 2003
Billy House
WASHIN GTON-Disappointing both sides,
the U.S. Supreme Court on Monday
canceled arguments in an Arizona drug case
involving rules for searching cars, sending it
back to the state's Court of Appeals.
Arguments had been set here for Nov. 5 in
Arizona vs. Gant, billed as an important
case nationally to clarify whether police can
search a suspect's car without a warrant if
the suspect is no longer in the car when
arrested.
Instead, the Supreme Court vacated an
Arizona Court of Appeals ruling that threw
out the car search evidence leading to the
1999 arrest in Tucson of Rodney Gant, 30.
The nation's high court ordered the state
appeals court to reconsider that decision in
light of a more-recent Arizona Supreme
Court decision in another car search case,
State vs. Dean.
Lawyers for Gant, the state and more than a
dozen other states said Monday that they
were disappointed.
"This issue will have to be decided
someday," said Robert Krauss, a Florida
chief assistant attorney general who filed
arguments on behalf of 14 other states
supporting Arizona's claim that the search
of Gant's car was constitutional.
The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits
warrantless car searches without probable
cause. But the Supreme Court in a 1981 case
held that police may search the passenger
compartment of a stopped vehicle as a
"contemporaneous incident" to a lawful
arrest for any weapons or other evidence.
The reasoning is that this is a way to guard
the officer's safety and to preserve any
evidence.
But in the Gant case, the Arizona Court of
Appeals found that Gant already had left his
car and was not even aware of the police
presence when they arrested him.
Thus, officer safety and evidence protection
were not found to be reasons to uphold the
warrantless car search, which had resulted in
the discovery of a plastic bag filled with
cocaine.
Lawyers for the state, in their appeal, said
the Arizona Appeals Court placed too much
emphasis on the suspect's supposed
unawareness of police in the area. Arizona
and other states, joined by the federal
solicitor general, said a clearer legal rule is
needed as to when such warrantless car
searches may occur.
Florida's Krauss noted that other cases with
similar questions have been popping up
across the nation.
Gant's lawyer, Thomas Jacobs of Tucson,
said the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
represented a significant blow to his client's
case.
Arizona Assistant Attorney General Eric
Olsson said he has "mixed feelings" about
Monday's decision.
But, he said, the Supreme Court's
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instruction that the case be reconsidered in
light of the state's own recent Dean case
likely means evidence against Gant will be
reinstated. In the Dean case, the state
Supreme Court focused on how much time
and distance had elapsed between when the
occupant left the car and when the police
search began.
"He (Gant) was a very recent occupant of
that automobile," Olsson noted.
496
Van De Kamp v. Goldstein
07-854
Ruling Below: Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 482 F.3d 1170, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7141
(9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3104 (2008).
Goldstein was convicted of murder in 1980 based partially on testimony from a jailhouse
informant named Fink. Fink testified that he was not receiving any benefit in exchange for his
testimony and never had received any benefits in the past. Unbeknownst to the prosecutors and the
defense attorneys, Fink had received several reduced sentences in exchange for testimony;
information that other deputy district attorneys in the office knew. After serving 24 years in
prison, Goldstein was released and has now filed a suit for wrongful conviction. The appellants,
Van De Kamp and Livesay, were the District Attorney and the chief deputy at the time of
Goldstein's conviction. Goldstein claims Van De Kamp and Livesay are liable for not establishing
a system of information sharing and proper training within the District Attorney's office. Van De
Kamp and Livesay moved to have the claim dismissed, claiming absolute prosecutorial immunity.
The District court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the actions were administrative rather
than prosecutorial, and thus were not entitled to the protections of prosecutorial immunity. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Questions Presented: (1) Where absolute immunity shields an individual prosecutor's decisions
regarding the disclosure of informant information in compliance with Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) made in the course of preparing
for the initiation of judicial proceedings or trial in any individual prosecution, may a plaintiff
circumvent that immunity by suing one or more supervising prosecutors for purportedly
improperly training, supervising, or setting policy with regard to the disclosure of such informant
information for all cases prosecuted by his or her agency? (2) Are the decisions of a supervising
prosecutor as chief advocate in directing policy concerning, and overseeing training and
supervision of, individual prosecutors' compliance with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) in the course of preparing for the initiation of
judicial proceedings or trial for all cases prosecuted by his or her agency, actions which are
"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process" and hence shielded from
liability under Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)?
Thomas Lee GOLDSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
City of Long Beach; County of Los Angeles; John Henry Miller;
William Collete; Logan Wren; and William Maclyman, Defendants, and
John VAN DE KAMP and Curt LIVESAY, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided March 28, 2007
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[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
HENDERSON, District Judge:
In this case, we are asked to determine
whether an elected district attorney and his
chief deputy are entitled to absolute
immunity from suit based on allegations that
they failed to develop policies and
procedures, and failed to adequately train
and supervise their subordinates, to fulfill
their constitutional obligation of ensuring
that information regarding jailhouse
informants was shared among prosecutors in
their office. See Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972). For the reasons
discussed in this opinion, we hold that they
are not, and we therefore affirm the opinion
of the district court.
I. Background
After serving twenty-four years in prison,
Plaintiff-Appellee Thomas Lee Goldstein
was released on April 2, 2004, following
this Court's affirmance of the district court's
order granting Goldstein's petition for
habeas relief Goldstein has now filed a
complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 based on his wrongful conviction for
murder. Although he has sued several
individuals and entities, including the City
of Long Beach, the County of Los Angeles,
and four officers of the Long Beach Police
Department, only his claims against
Defendants-Appellants John Van De Kamp
and Curt Livesay are at issue in this appeal.
Van De Kamp was the Los Angeles County
District Attorney at the time Goldstein was
prosecuted and convicted, and Livesay was
his chief deputy.
The claims relevant to this appeal stem from
the testimony at Goldstein's 1980 criminal
trial of Edward Floyd Fink, a jailhouse
informant. Fink testified that Goldstein
confessed the murder to him while both
were being detained in the Long Beach City
Jail. Goldstein alleges that this testimony
was false, as was Fink's testimony that he
was not receiving any benefits for testifying
against Goldstein and had never received
any benefits for assisting law enforcement in
the past. Fink had, in fact, been acting as an
informant for the Long Beach Police
Department for several years and had
received multiple reduced sentences in
return. Although other deputy district
attorneys in the Los Angeles County District
Attorney's Office were aware of the benefits
provided to Fink in exchange for his
testimony against Goldstein, this critical
impeachment evidence was never shared
with the deputy district attorneys
prosecuting Goldstein's case, allegedly
because no system of sharing such
information existed in the District
Attorney's Office at the time and because
deputy district attorneys were not adequately
trained or supervised to share such
information. As a result, evidence that could
have been used to impeach Fink was not
shared with Goldstein's defense counsel, in
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963).
Several years prior to Goldstein's arrest and
conviction, the Supreme Court explained
that prosecutors' offices have a
constitutional obligation to establish
"procedures and regulations . . . to insure
communication of all relevant information
on each case [including promises made to
informants in exchange for testimony in that
case] to every lawyer who deals with it."
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. Thus, Goldstein
alleges that Van De Kamp and Livesay are
liable under § 1983 because, as
administrators of the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office, they violated his
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constitutional rights by purposefully or with
deliberate indifference failing to create a
system that would satisfy this obligation.
Goldstein further alleges that Van De Kamp
and Livesay violated his constitutional rights
by failing to adequately train and supervise
deputy district attorneys to ensure that they
shared information regarding jailhouse
informants with their colleagues.
Van De Kamp and Livesay sought dismissal
of the claims against them, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), based on
an assertion of absolute prosecutorial
immunity. The district court denied their
motion on March 8, 2006, finding that Van
De Kamp and Livesay's alleged conduct
was administrative rather than prosecutorial
and, therefore, not entitled to the protections
of absolute immunity. Van De Kamp and
Livesay filed a timely notice of interlocutory
appeal on April 5, 2006.
III. Discussion
Courts have recognized two types of
immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
qualified immunity and absolute immunity.
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268
(1993). Only absolute immunity is at issue
in this appeal, as Van De Kamp and Livesay
failed to make an alternative argument in the
district court that the claims against them
should be dismissed based on qualified
immunity.
As its name implies, absolute immunity is an
absolute bar to liability. Qualified immunity,
on the other hand, shields officials from
suits for damages only when their alleged
conduct either does not violate a
constitutional right or violates a
constitutional right that was not "clearly
established," meaning that a reasonable
person in the official's position would not
have known "his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted." Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001).
"The presumption is that qualified rather
than absolute immunity is sufficient to
protect government officials in the exercise
of their duties." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478, 486-87 (1991). The official seeking
absolute immunity therefore bears the
burden of demonstrating that it is warranted,
and the Supreme Court has been "quite
sparing in its recognition of claims to
absolute official immunity." Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
A prosecutor is entitled to absolute
immunity under § 1983 for conduct that is
"intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process," Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976), and
"occur[s] in the course of his [or her] role as
an advocate for the State," Buckley, 509
U.S. at 273. However, conduct is not
shielded by absolute immunity simply
because it is performed by a prosecutor. Id.
To the contrary, a prosecutor is entitled only
to qualified immunity "if he or she is
performing investigatory or administrative
functions, or is essentially functioning as a
police officer or detective." Broam v.
Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citing Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). Thus,
when determining whether absolute
immunity applies, courts must examine "the
nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it."
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229.
Applying this functional analysis, the
Supreme Court has held that prosecutors are
absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for
decisions to initiate a particular prosecution,
to present knowingly false testimony at trial,
and to suppress exculpatory evidence.
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1mbler, 424 U.S. at 431 & n.34. Prosecutors
also enjoy absolute immunity for decisions
not to prosecute particular cases, Roe v. City
& County of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578,
583-84 (9th Cir. 1997), and for gathering
evidence to present to the trier of fact, as
opposed to gathering evidence to determine
whether probable cause exists to arrest,
Broam, 320 F.3d at 1033.
On the other hand, prosecutors do not have
absolute immunity "for advising police
officers during the investigative phase of a
criminal case, performing acts which are
generally considered functions of the police,
acting prior to having probable cause to
arrest, or making statements to the public
concerning criminal proceedings." Botello,
413 F.3d at 976-77 (citing Burns, 500 U.S.
at 493, and Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274-78).
Nor do government officials have absolute
immunity "for conduct involving
termination, demotion and treatment of
employees." Id. at 976 (citing Forrester, 484
U.S. at 228-30, and Meek v. County of
Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.
1999)). For example, we have held that
absolute immunity does not apply to a
District Attorney's decisions to demote or
fail to promote a deputy attorney, to reassign
the deputy to a different department, or to
bar the deputy from prosecuting any future
murder cases. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d
1168, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004). Unlike the
removal of a deputy attorney from a
particular case, which falls "within the
District Attorney's prosecutorial function"
because it is "intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process," we
determined that these challenged actions
were "personnel decisions" falling "squarely
within the District Attorney's administrative
function. Even the decision not to reassign
Ceballos to future murder cases was a
personnel decision, and was unrelated to any
particular prosecution or ongoing judicial
proceeding." Id. (citing Broam, 320 F.3d at
1028).
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court
has considered whether claims regarding
failure to train, failure to supervise, or
failure to develop an office-wide policy
regarding a constitutional obligation, like the
one set forth in Giglio, are subject to
absolute immunity. The closest we have
come was in Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird
Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675 (9th
Cir. 1984), a case involving allegations that
a supervising district attorney was "liable
under § 1983 for failure to train his
subordinate . . . to preserve exculpatory
evidence, or in the alternative, for permitting
a policy of not preserving exculpatory
evidence to exist in the District Attorney's
Office." Id. at 680. We held that the district
attorney would enjoy absolute prosecutorial
immunity for any allegations based on his
direct involvement in the plaintiffs case. Id.
However, we did not reach the question of
whether absolute immunity would similarly
protect the district attorney on the
supervisory claim or on the claim that he
failed to develop an appropriate policy
because we concluded that the evidence
"fail[ed] to give rise to any inference" that
the district attorney did not adequately train
or supervise his subordinates, or that he
failed to develop an appropriate policy of
preserving evidence. Id. at 680-81.
We also considered supervisory liability of a
district attorney in Genzler, 410 F.3d 630. In
that case, we held that, like prosecuting
attorneys with direct responsibility for a
case, supervisory defendants are entitled to
absolute immunity for "conduct closely
related to prosecutorial decisions in the trial
phase of [the plaintiffs] case," such as a
claim "that the supervisory defendants knew
that [the prosecuting attorney] had granted
[a witness] immunity in exchange for
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perjured testimony favorable to the
prosecution," or a claim "that the
supervisory defendants were aware of and
condoned a ploy to use [a witness's]
perjured testimony to force the recusal of
[the plaintiffs] counsel of choice." Id. at
644.
However, unlike the plaintiff in Genzler,
Goldstein does not contend that Van De
Kamp and Livesay are liable because they
knew about, condoned, or directed any
specific trial decisions made by the deputy
district attorneys prosecuting Goldstein's
criminal case. Goldstein does not, for
instance, assert that Van De Kamp and
Livesay knew that Fink had been granted
immunity for perjured testimony in
Goldstein's particular case, or that they
condoned withholding such information
from Goldstein's criminal defense attorney.
Instead, Goldstein rests his theory of
liability on Van De Kamp and Livesay's
alleged failure to develop a policy of sharing
information regarding jailhouse informants
within the District Attorney's Office and on
their alleged failure to provide adequate
training and supervision on this issue.
Van De Kamp and Livesay are correct that
our holding in Roe, 109 F.3d 578,
establishes that absolute immunity protects
not only decisions made during an
individual prosecution but may also apply to
a policy decision. However, they reach too
broadly in urging us to apply Roe to this
case. Roe concerned challenges to a policy
not to prosecute cases without corroborating
evidence where a particular police officer
was the sole witness to the alleged offense.
Id. at 582. We held that a decision not to
prosecute was intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process and,
therefore, entitled to absolute immunity, and
we agreed with the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit that "there is
'no meaningful distinction between a
decision on prosecution in a single instance
and decisions on prosecutions formulated as
a policy for general application."' Id. at 583
(quoting Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d
1245, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
The determinative factor in Roe was that the
challenged policy involved the discretionary
decision of whether Roe was a credible
enough witness so that prosecutors could
"prosecute his cases without corroborating
evidence in good conscience or with a
reasonable expectation of winning a
conviction. . . . This kind of witness
evaluation falls entirely within a
prosecutor's judicial function regardless of
whether one case or a line of cases is at
issue." Id. at 584. Similarly, the challenged
policy in Haynesworth also related to an
alleged policy regarding which cases to
prosecute: "Appellants aver that they were
victimized by a policy of retaliatory
prosecution-a practice of pursuing criminal
charges against individuals who have
endured wrongful arrests, solely because
they refuse to waive civil suits against the
arresting officers." Haynesworth, 820 F.2d
at 1247. Thus, while Roe and Haynesworth
demonstrate that a policy decision may be
protected by absolute immunity, the critical
factor remains the nature of the challenged
policy and whether it falls "within a
prosecutor's judicial function" or, instead, is
part of a prosecutor's exercise of
administrative or investigative functions.
Roe, 109 F.3d at 584.
In this case, Van De Kamp and Livesay
contend that the challenged conduct was
prosecutorial in function even if it may have
been administrative in form. We disagree. In
the context of determining whether absolute
immunity applies, "prosecutorial" refers
only to conduct that is "intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal
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process." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. Thus, an
act is not "prosecutorial" simply because it
has some connection with the judicial
process or may have some impact at the trial
level. Were that the rule, then prosecutors
would be absolutely immune from any suit
because all actions taken by prosecutors
arguably have some connection to the
judicial process-even those, such as
personnel decisions, that we have explicitly
held fall outside the protections of absolute
immunity. E.g., Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1184.
As the Supreme Court has cautioned,
"[a]lmost any action by a prosecutor,
including his or her direct participation in a
purely investigative activity, could be said to
be in some way related to the ultimate
decision whether to prosecute, but we have
never indicated that absolute immunity is
that expansive." Burns, 500 U.S. at 495.
While it may be possible for an act to be
prosecutorial in function but administrative
in form, we need not decide whether such
conduct would be entitled to absolute
immunity because we conclude that
Goldstein's allegations are administrative
and not prosecutorial in function. Van De
Kamp and Livesay correctly argue that the
specific duty to share information regarding
jailhouse informants arose only because of
their roles as prosecutors. However,
although the challenged conduct may thus
be "to some degree related to trial
preparation," Van De Kamp and Livesay
have failed to demonstrate the required
"close association . . . [with] the judicial
phase of [Goldstein's] criminal trial,"
Genzler, 410 F.3d at 643, or to clearly
established prosecutorial functions such as
deciding whether to prosecute a particular
case. Administrative work cannot be
"retroactively transform[ed]" into the
prosecutorial simply because "the evidence
this work produced" might affect whether a
prosecutor decides to bring a case or, if a
case is brought, how the evidence is
presented at trial. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275-
76. The allegations against Van De Kamp
and Livesay, which involve their failure to
promulgate policies regarding the sharing of
information relating to informants and their
failure to adequately train and supervise
deputy district attorneys on that subject, bear
a close connection only to how the District
Attorney's Office was managed, not to
whether or how to prosecute a particular
case or even a particular category of cases.
Consequently, the challenged conduct is not
prosecutorial in function and does not
warrant the protections of absolute
immunity.
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we hold that the
district court correctly determined that
Goldstein's allegations against Van De
Kamp and Livesay describe conduct in
furtherance of an administrative rather than
prosecutorial function. Van De Kamp and
Livesay have therefore failed to meet their
burden of demonstrating that the allegations
against them are so "intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal
process" that absolute immunity is
warranted. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
Accordingly, the decision of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
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"Justices Accept Question of Prosecutors
as Lawyers or Managers"
New York Times
April 15, 2008
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court
accepted an appeal on Monday that could
help define the boundaries of prosecutorial
immunity in an era when the officials who
head big prosecutors' offices function as
managers as much as they act as hands-on
lawyers.
Under longstanding legal doctrine,
prosecutors are absolutely immune for their
judgments in handling cases, even if a faulty
judgment results in a wrongful conviction.
In this instance, a man wrongfully convicted
of murder on the basis of false testimony by
a jailhouse informant sued the top two
officials of the Los Angeles County district
attorney's office on the ground that they had
failed to set up a proper management system
that could have flagged the problematic
nature of the informant's testimony.
In rejecting the officials' claim of absolute
prosecutorial immunity, the federal appeals
court in San Francisco held that the suit was
related not to the men's role as prosecutors,
but as office managers.
The officials' Supreme Court appeal argues
that this decision circumvented a rule that
has shielded prosecutors from second
guessing by the courts and warns that it
would "encourage a flood of lawsuits" that
would make it difficult for prosecutors to do
their work.
The plaintiff, Thomas L. Goldstein, served
24 years in prison before the Federal District
Court in Los Angeles granted his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. In 2005 he filed a
civil rights suit seeking damages from John
K. Van de Kamp, who at the time of his trial
in 1980 was the Los Angeles district
attorney, and Curt Livesay, who was Mr.
Van de Kamp's chief deputy.
The suit said that because of inadequate
record keeping, the deputy prosecutors who
handled the case were unaware that their star
witness, a jailhouse informant, Edward
Floyd Fink, not only falsely testified that
Mr. Goldstein confessed to him, but also
lied when he said on the stand that he was
not receiving, and had never received, any
benefits for testifying on behalf of the state.
In fact, Mr. Fink had been an informant for
the Long Beach police for years and had in
turn received reductions in his prison
sentence for testifying in earlier trials, as
well as in Mr. Goldstein's case.
Prosecutors are required to inform the
defense of information that could serve to
impeach the credibility of prosecution
witnesses, and the prosecutors would have
had to turn over the information on Mr. Fink
to Mr. Goldstein's lawyers, had they known
about it.
Mr. Goldstein's suit argues that under a
1972 Supreme Court decision, Giglio v.
United States, a prosecutor's office has an
affirmative obligation to maintain a record-
keeping system ensuring that all lawyers in
the office have access to information about
promises to witnesses.
Mr. Van de Kamp and Mr. Livesay argued
unsuccessfully in the lower federal courts
503
that the suit should be dismissed on the basis
of absolute prosecutorial immunity. In their
Supreme Court appeal, Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein, No. 07-854, they argue that "the
dissemination of exculpatory information to
the defense" is a "core prosecutorial
function," distinct from administrative
functions like "hiring procedures and
compensation schedules." The lower courts
were mistaken in viewing their failure to
have a proper record-keeping system as
administrative rather than prosecutorial, they
maintain.
Mr. Goldstein's lawyer argues that "entering
information into and retrieving information
from a data-indexing system" are
"transparently administrative activities" and
that no "floodgates" will open, because most
prosecutors' offices, including Los Angeles,
now have the systems to avoid future
mistakes.
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"A Fight 24 Years in the Making"
Los Angeles Times
April 4, 2006
Henry Weinstein
Just a day after celebrating the second
anniversary of his freedom, Thomas
Goldstein was in court Monday, fighting
what may be a long battle to get
compensation for the 24 years he spent in
prison on a wrongful murder conviction.
At the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in
Pasadena, Goldstein, now 56, watched his
lead lawyer, Ronald 0. Kaye, spar with Los
Angeles County's outside counsel, attorney
David J. Wilson, over Goldstein's right to
sue the Los Angeles County district
attorney's office for his wrongful
imprisonment.
Goldstein was convicted of the 1979
shotgun slaying of John McGinest in Long
Beach on the word of a notorious jailhouse
informant, Edward R. Fink. A judge later
overturned the conviction because of Fink's
credibility problems as well as the
prosecutors' failure to tell Goldstein's
attorney that they had cut a deal to go easy
on Fink in a separate criminal case.
Normally, prosecutors have absolute
immunity from lawsuits for anything they do
in a courtroom. Wilson argued Monday that
this "prosecutorial immunity" protects the
county from liability.
But Kaye asserted that the two deputy
district attorneys who knew about Fink's
deal withheld the information as a matter of
district attorney policy, which would make
the county liable.
Moreover, Goldstein's suit asserts that, in
the late 1970s before he was prosecuted,
"two prosecutorial agencies conducted
inquiries into claims by a jailhouse
informant that he knew of improper conduct
by" individuals in the district attorney's
office regarding confessions allegedly made
to a jailhouse informant.
However, the inquiries and any conclusions
that the agencies reached were not indexed
or widely disseminated in the office,
according to the suit.
In addition, the suit contends that the district
attorney's office "considered the creation of
a system to track the benefits provided to
jailhouse informants ... but no such system
was instituted."
Three judges heard the arguments Monday
but gave no indication how they would rule
or when.
Although Long Beach officials contend that
their officers did nothing wrong, Goldstein's
right to sue the city of Long Beach has
already been clearly established.
Goldstein was freed on April 2, 2004, by a
Long Beach Superior Court judge after the
district attorney's office conceded that it had
no case against him. In the preceding
months, five federal judges had ruled that
Goldstein had been wrongfully convicted,
largely on the word of Fink, who testified
that Goldstein had confessed to the murder
while the two were in the same cell in Long
Beach in 1979.
In 2002, U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert N.
Block said that Fink's testimony "fits the
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profile of the dishonest jailhouse informant."
He cited a lengthy grand jury investigation
in 1990 that documented widespread use by
prosecutors of false testimony from
jailhouse informants in Los Angeles County
during the 1970s and '80s.
The district attorney's office at the time
"failed to fulfill the ethical responsibilities
of a public prosecutor," the grand jury report
states. The scandal led to a dramatic
reduction in the use of such informants.
By the time of Goldstein's trial, Fink already
had three felony convictions. Evidence
unearthed after Goldstein's trial revealed
that a number of people in law enforcement
had doubts about his credibility. The other
key witness against Goldstein recanted years
later.
Eight months after he won his freedom,
Goldstein, represented by Kaye, McLane &
Bednarski, a small Pasadena law firm, filed
a federal civil rights lawsuit, seeking
damages from the city of Long Beach, Los
Angeles County, four police officers and
two former prosecutors.
Last year, U.S. District Judge A. Howard
Matz in Los Angeles rejected the county's
contention that the district attorney's office
is absolutely immune from any possible
liability. The county appealed, leading to
Monday's hearing.
Goldstein's lawyers assert in his civil rights
suit that the district attorney's office had a
policy that permitted the use of testimony
from jailhouse informants that was "false
and fabricated."
But the county, in the brief submitted by
lawyer Wilson, said that if Goldstein's
action against the county "is permitted to go
forward, it will be the first successful action
by a criminal defendant against prosecutors
who handled his case for an injury that
occurred during the trial of the criminal
action."
Kaye countered that Goldstein's claim is just
the type that was envisioned when the
Supreme Court in 1978 ruled that
governmental entities can be sued under
federal civil rights laws for a policy or
custom that violates an individual's federal
rights.
Later this week, Goldstein is scheduled to be
one of the featured speakers at a conference
at UCLA Law School on wrongful
convictions. He already has spoken to
members of Congress and testified before
the state Legislature. Goldstein first tried to
draw attention to the jailhouse informant
problem in a letter he sent to government
officials from prison in 1985.
After the hearing, Goldstein, who now
works as a paralegal in Orange County, said
he would continue to speak out on the issue
wherever he could. "This is my legacy,
something I want to leave behind to make
the system better for everyone," he said.
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"Free at Last: Long Beach Man Released After
25 Years in Prison for Murder"
Long Beach Press-Telegram
April 3, 2004
Tracy Manzer
LONG BEACH-After years of fighting for
his freedom, it took only a two-minute
hearing on Friday for a local judge to
declare Thomas Goldstein a free man.
Of course, it took several hours before
Thomas Lee Goldstein was processed out of
the Long Beach Superior Court by Los
Angeles County Sheriffs deputies, but that
wait was nothing compared to the quarter of
a century that he languished behind bars.
"I'm nervous and anxious and uncertain
about the future, but I'm glad to be out," a
pale Goldstein said as he clutched his
meager belongings-an apple, a sandwich
and his court files-in a plastic grocery
sack.
The next step for the 55-year-old former
Marine is to file a federal civil rights lawsuit
against the city of Long Beach and its Police
Department and the Los Angeles County
district attorney for the wrongful conviction,
Goldstein and his defense attorneys said.
"They had nothing. No fingerprints. No
forensic evidence. No gun," attorney Dale
Rubin declared. "They should be ashamed
of themselves."
It was 1979 when Goldstein, a psychology
major at Long Beach City College attending
school on the G.I. Bill, was arrested and
charged with murder stemming from the
shotgun slaying of John McGinest, who was
gunned down late on November 3 near
Goldstein's home-a rented garage-in
downtown Long Beach.
The short trial that followed relied largely
on the testimony of two men, a jailhouse
informant named Edward Fink and a Long
Beach resident named Loran Campbell, who
recanted his testimony shortly before his
death in 2002, saying that he was influenced
by investigators to identify the former
Marine as the culprit. Goldstein was found
guilty despite the lack of physical evidence,
and was sentenced to 25 years to life in
prison, plus two years for committing a
murder with a gun.
In December, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals tossed out Goldstein's
conviction, finding the informant-who was
rewarded by the district attorney with having
one case against him dropped and charges
reduced on another-and Campbell's
testimony unreliable.
Following the federal court's ruling on
Goldstein's release, the district attorney
began fighting to re-file the murder case,
and Long Beach police picked up Goldstein
from the prison where he had been housed
and had him booked into the local jail.
For the past four months, Goldstein's
defense attorneys have argued that the
prosecution had no case against their client
and that there was no reason to keep him
incarcerated. On Friday, Long Beach
Superior Court Judge James Pierce agreed.
DA Probed
A criminal investigation into the district
attorney's decision not to release Goldstein
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despite the appeals court's ruling is now
pending in federal court.
"What the Long Beach Police Department
and the district attorney did 25 years ago
was not acceptable then, and it's not
acceptable today," said defense co-counsel
Charles Linder. "They should be charged
with robbery for stealing this man's life."
Because of Campbell's death, the
prosecution turned to his stepson, 38-year-
old John Townzen of Cypress, and his
widow, Nellie Campbell of Hawaii, to
corroborate portions of his original
testimony. But both Townzen's recollections
and his mother's statements conflicted with
Campbell's testimony, as well as each
other's statements, suggesting that Campbell
had lied under oath.
Judge Pierce ruled that the district attorney
could not ask the court to allow false
testimony to be put before a jury, stripping
away the prosecution's ammunition. Pierce
also questioned the surviving family
members' ability to identify Goldstein after
Townzen picked two photos-one of them
Goldstein's-out of a police photo lineup,
and the widow chose another man's photo.
Deputy District Attorney Patrick Connolly
was given until Friday morning to decide
whether the people still had a case.
"In light of the previous ruling on the trial
testimony of Loran Campbell, the people are
unable to proceed," Connolly conceded.
Goldstein's defense team immediately called
for a dismissal, and Judge Pierce granted the
request. After 25 years of his life spent
behind bars, Goldstein was a free man. . ..
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"Judges Want a Convicted Killer Freed"
Los Angeles Times
January 29, 2004
Henry Weinstein
Over the last 14 months, five federal judges
have ruled that Thomas Lee Goldstein, a 54-
year-old former Marine imprisoned 24 years
for murder, was wrongly convicted, largely
on the word of an unreliable jailhouse
informant.
Yet even after a Dec. 4 ruling by the U.S.
9th Circuit Court of Appeals that Goldstein
should be released without bail, he remains
in custody of Los Angeles County officials.
Rather than release the inmate, state officials
turned him over to county jailers, who
technically are not covered by the court
order. County prosecutors say they plan to
try Goldstein again. They have not released
him despite efforts by Federal Public
Defender Sean K. Kennedy-who
represented Goldstein before the 9th
Circuit-to have the state held in contempt
of court.
Goldstein, whose case will be considered
again at a hearing today, has maintained all
along that he is innocent. The ruling that he
did not get a fair trial is a stark reminder of a
scandal that long ago faded from the
headlines: the widespread misuse of
jailhouse informants by Los Angeles County
prosecutors in the 1970s and '80s.
Goldstein was a student at Long Beach City
College with a minor criminal record (two
convictions for drunkenness and one for
disturbing the peace) when John McGinest
was killed on a Long Beach street, hit by
four pellets from a shotgun about 10:20 p.m.
Nov. 3, 1979. Goldstein, who lived in a
rented garage near the murder scene, was
arrested two weeks later.
The gun was never found by police. Nor did
they discover whether any money was
missing, although they suggested that
robbery was the motive for the killing. No
fingerprints, blood or other physical
evidence was found to link the murder or the
victim to Goldstein.
Instead, according to the judges who have
reviewed the case, the prosecution rested on
the statements of two problematic witnesses,
both now dead. One was a jailhouse
informant who, in 10 cases over more than a
decade, including seven murders, testified
that people had confessed to crimes while
sharing cells with him.
Prosecutors have until Monday to formally
state their intention to retry Goldstein, who
received a sentence of 27 years to life.
Under the 9th Circuit's ruling, if he isn't
retried, he goes free.
The district attorney's office has declined to
comment on his case in the meantime.
Timothy Browne, the deputy D.A who
prosecuted Goldstein in 1980, is retired. He
said he had little recollection of the case.
The jailhouse informant was Edward Floyd
Fink, a heroin user who in 1980 already had
three prior felony convictions. During his
lengthy criminal career, Fink was eventually
arrested at least 35 times between 1969 and
1991.
509
He told police-and testified in court-that
Goldstein had confessed to the murder when
they were held briefly in the same cell in the
Long Beach city jail. Fink said that
McGinest owed Goldstein money and that
Goldstein shot him after they got into an
argument about it.
At a preliminary hearing and then at trial,
prosecutors listened silently as Fink told his
story, said he was not receiving any benefit
in return for his testimony, and added that he
had never gotten any breaks for his
testimony in prior cases.
That testimony was enough to put Goldstein
in prison and keep him there for more than
two decades. But in 1998, he went to federal
court, arguing that prosecutors had violated
his constitutional rights.
It was not until 2002 that a judge finished
reviewing the case, but when he did, he
concluded that Goldstein was correct. There
was strong evidence that Fink had struck a
deal with prosecutors-that for his
testimony, authorities would drop a petty-
theft charge and get Fink a lighter sentence
on a grand-theft charge.
Prosecutors' failure to tell the defense about
that deal denied Goldstein a fair trial, Chief
U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert N. Block said.
In his November 2002 findings on the case,
Block added that Fink's testimony "fits the
profile of the dishonest jailhouse informant."
He cited a lengthy grand jury investigation
in 1990 that documented the widespread use
by prosecutors of false testimony from
jailhouse informants in Los Angeles County
during the late 1970s and '80s.
The D.A.'s office at the time had "failed to
fulfill the ethical responsibilities required of
a public prosecutor," the grand jury report
said. The scandal led to a dramatic reduction
in the use of such informants.
U.S. District Judge Dickran M. Tevrizian
later reviewed the case and upheld Block's
findings. When the state appealed, 9th
Circuit Judges Betty B. Fletcher, Jerome
Farris and Kim M. Wardlaw unanimously
agreed with Block. Tevrizian was appointed
to the bench by President Reagan, Fletcher
and Farris by President Carter and Wardlaw
by President Clinton.
Deputy Atty. Gen. William H. Davis Jr.,
who defended the Goldstein conviction on
appeal, contended that "Fink's testimony
was corroborated in essential respects."
But Block said prosecutors had failed to
support that assertion "in any respect."
Block noted that another witness "who had
no reason to lie" had testified that he was
present during Fink's conversations with
Goldstein "and heard no 'confession."'
Evidence presented during the appeals
shows that authorities over the years had
extensive doubts about Fink's honesty.
Among the many documents questioning his
reliability is a report by a California
Department of Corrections counselor named
I.B. Benson, who described Fink as a "con
man who tends to handle the facts as if they
were elastic."
A record from the Orange County district
attorney's office called Fink an "unreliable
operator." In a 1982 case in which Fink was
trying to get lenient treatment in return for
testimony that another man, while in his
cell, confessed to murder, a Los Angeles
deputy district attorney said: "Fink is a
Fink."
Although many of those statements came in
the years after Goldstein's trial, they could
be used to discredit Fink's testimony if
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prosecutors were to try Goldstein again.
Goldstein's current lawyer, Dale M. Rubin,
said it "would not satisfy the interests of
justice or the law" for Fink's "perjured
testimony" to be used again to keep his
client in custody.
The second problematic witness in the case,
the federal judges concluded, was Loran B.
Campbell, who told police he had seen a
man carrying a shotgun run past his
apartment the night of the murder.
Police investigators were "impermissibly
suggestive" when they handed Goldstein's
photo to Campbell and asked the witness if
Goldstein was the killer, the judges ruled.
Campbell, the only eyewitness against
Goldstein at the 1980 trial, first told the
police he was "not sure" that Goldstein was
the man he had seen carrying a gun the night
of the murder. Then, at the preliminary
hearing and the trial, he testified that he was
positive of his identification.
Twenty years later, Terry L. Rearick, chief
investigator for the federal public defender's
office, tracked down Campbell in Downey.
Campbell signed a sworn declaration saying
that "the photo of Mr. Goldstein differed
from the person I saw."
"Nonetheless, believing that the police had
arrested the right person based on the
information told to me about the suspect and
believing that the police wanted me to
identify the photograph they had selected, I
put my doubts aside and tentatively
identified the photograph of Mr. Goldstein,"
he wrote.
Campbell said that before he testified at trial
the police "reassured me they had the right
person." He said Long Beach officers told
him that Goldstein "had failed a polygraph
test"-a statement that was untrue-and that
Goldstein had confessed to another person.
"Because the police had convinced me that
they had arrested the right person, I put my
doubts aside and identified Mr. Goldstein at
trial," Campbell said.
He said he "would have come forward on
my own except that I assumed" Goldstein
"had been released a long time ago."
At a federal court hearing in 2002, about 18
months before he died, Campbell said he
had been too "embarrassed" to tell the jury
about his doubts and "a little overanxious"
to help police.
Davis, the deputy district attorney, said
Campbell had concocted his statement in an
act of "buyer's remorse" after learning that
Goldstein was still in prison.
But Block said Campbell had "no
motivation to falsely recant his testimony."
The judge wrote, "If Campbell testified
truthfully when he identified [Goldstein] as
the murderer, he would not now feel
remorse upon learning that the murderer was
still serving his sentence."
The only reason for Campbell to feel guilty
would be "if he knew that he falsely inflated
the strength of his identification" when he
testified, Block wrote.
Six eyewitnesses to the murder testified-
five introduced by the prosecution-but
Campbell was the only one who identified
Goldstein. In fact, four of the witnesses
"described the man as black or Mexican.
[Goldstein] is Caucasian," Block wrote. The
sixth witness, who did say the killer was
Caucasian, was an elderly woman who saw
the murderer from above while looking out
her window and admitted that she could not
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see the features of his face, the judge noted.
One prosecution witness, Kate Meighan,
testified that she saw the murderer's face
from about 60 feet away while he was
running past her window for seven to eight
seconds. Meighan said she had known
Goldstein for some time because she
managed the building where he was renting
a garage and that he was not the man she
had seen.
"Considered collectively," Block wrote,
information that prosecutors withheld from
the defense about Fink's deal and
Campbell's doubts "unquestionably
undermines confidence in the verdict."
In the summary of the case before the
preliminary hearing, the deputy D.A. who
handled it at the time had written a note that
"This case was filed in great haste. Filing
officers assure me that it will get stronger."
Wrote Block, in his review of the case: "It
did not."
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"Grand Jury Criticizes D.A. on Informants"
Los Angeles Times
July 10, 1990
Ted Rohrlich
The Los Angeles County district attorney's
office for many years tolerated suspected
perjury by jailhouse informants as a way to
win murder cases, the county grand jury has
concluded in a report to be made public
today.
The grand jury said that, by doing so, the
district attorney's office "failed to fulfill the
ethical responsibilities required of a public
prosecutor."
The grand jury also criticized the Sheriffs
Department, which runs the county jails, for
improperly placing defendants awaiting trial
in cellblocks with longtime informants,
when it should have known the resulting
"confessions" would be phony.
However, the grand jury concluded its
yearlong investigation into the misuse of
jailhouse informant testimony without
answering the question of whether law
enforcement officials actively solicited
informants to lie, as some informants told
the grand jury.
On this issue, the grand jury threw up its
hands, declaring it did not know whether to
believe the informants.
"Whether or not the informants' testimony
(before the grand jury) is believed, the
conclusion must necessarily be disturbing,"
the panel said in a 153-page report obtained
by The Times. "Either egregious perjurers
have been used as prosecution witnesses or
law enforcement officials committed
shocking malfeasance."
The grand jury returned no indictments. It
did not call for a bar on the use of testimony
by jailhouse informants. Nor did it take a
position on whether they should be given
rewards, which in the past have ranged from
extra food to freedom. However, the report
did criticize the release of violent criminals
in return for their testimony.
"In the interest of proper law enforcement
and prosecutions, the prosecutor must have
the discretion to determine what
consideration is appropriate for assistance,"
the report said. "Prosecutors rightfully point
to serious cases in which informants'
testimony was of major significance in
successful prosecutions."
The only such case the grand jury cited was
the "notorious Manson family case,"
declaring that the "first breakthrough in (the)
case was credited to (a) jailhouse
informant."
The grand jury, however, urged full
disclosure of informants' rewards to judges
and jurors who have to evaluate their
credibility.
It said it found that full disclosures were not
made in an unspecified number of the 150 to
250 cases in Los Angeles County from 1979
to 1988 in which jailhouse informants
testified.
Informants were often given rewards after
the trials at which they testified concluded.
That meant jurors did not learn of the
rewards during the trials and, therefore, were
not given a full picture of the informants'
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motives to lie, the report said.
The grand jury described its inquiry as "the
most comprehensive . . . into this topic that
has ever been conducted."
The report covered much of the same
ground as a series of investigative articles on
the jailhouse informant system that appeared
in The Times starting in late 1988 and
continuing until early this year.
This common ground included assertions by
informants that they used a variety of ploys
to gather confidential information about a
crime so they could persuasively claim that
a cellmate confessed, chiefly in murder
cases; admissions by jailers and detectives
that the Sheriffs Department sometimes
placed known informants next to
defendants; and disclosures that the district
attorney's office repeatedly relied on
informants whom top administrators and
some other prosecutors knew to be
unreliable.
Although the grand jury did not bring
criminal charges of its own against anyone,
it said that it was referring "several matters
that suggest provable criminal cases to the
district attorney for consideration."
The grand jury did not say what type of
cases these were, but the context in which
they were mentioned suggested that they
involve possible perjury by informants,
rather than possible criminal misconduct by
law enforcement officials.
There was no suggestion that the grand jury
sought to determine whether wrongful
convictions had resulted from perjured
testimony.
"The purpose of this grand jury investigation
has not been to make judgments in particular
cases," the report said. "Rather, the focus
has been to conduct an overall inquiry as to
how and why the system went wrong, and to
recommend policies and procedures that will
prevent or curtail the emergence of such
practices in the future."
The grand jury made two formal "findings."
They were that:
"The Los Angeles County district attorney's
office failed to fulfill the ethical
responsibilities required of a public
prosecutor by its deliberate and informed
declination (refusal) to take the action
necessary to curtail the misuse of jailhouse
informant testimony."
"The Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Department failed to establish adequate
procedures to control improper placement of
inmates, with the foreseeable result that
false claims of confessions or admissions
would be made."
The grand jury also criticized the office of
the California attorney general for inaction
on numerous occasions since 1979 when
confronted with evidence of "apparent
abuses concerning jailhouse informants,"
including claims of perjury.
It also criticized "certain judges" who
"exhibited an unusual willingness to rely on
the reputation of a member of the district
attorney's office, rather than on factual
evidence before the court" in acceding to
prosecutors' requests for "apparently
improper temporary releases from
incarceration."
The report covered the period 1979 to 1988,
when John K. Van de Kamp, Robert H.
Philibosian and Ira Reiner served as the
district attorney; Peter J. Pitchess and
Sherman Block served as sheriff, and
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George Deukmejian and Van de Kamp
served as attorney general.
However, no individuals-neither elected
officials nor lesser functionaries-were
criticized by name in the report, which was
prepared by the grand jury's special counsel,
Douglas Dalton, a longtime Los Angeles
criminal defense lawyer.
Dalton succeeded retired California
Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus as special
counsel. Kaus started the $500,000
investigation but was dropped by the grand
jury late last year.
All told, 120 witnesses testified before the
grand jury. They included prosecutors,
police and sheriffs detectives, jailers and
defense attorneys. Hundreds of others
provided information informally, the report
said.
The grand jury investigation began at the
request of two defense lawyer groups,
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
and the Los Angeles Criminal Courts Bar
Assn.
The defense lawyer requests were an
outgrowth of a scandal that broke in
October, 1988, when a longtime informant,
Leslie Vernon White, demonstrated for
sheriffs officials that he could fabricate a
convincing confession from a murder
suspect he had never met. During the
demonstration, White used a jail telephone
and posed as a law enforcement officer to
get inside information on the case. White
later told The Times that he committed
perjury 12 times.
The cases of possible criminal wrongdoing
that the grand jury referred to the district
attorney's office were mentioned only in a
footnote to the report, in a section devoted to
suspected perjury by informants.
The grand jury noted that the district
attorney's office has never prosecuted an
informant for perjury and stated, "In the face
of the extraordinary number of such
apparent instances of perjury and false
information . . . surely some cases would
have warranted successful prosecution. Such
prosecution could have provided a
substantial deterrent (to further perjury)."
The grand jury said it took testimony from
six informants-five of whom admitted
perjuring themselves or providing false
information to law enforcement. Specially
hired grand jury investigators interviewed
19 other informants.
The grand jury noted that courts have
"sometimes lacked adequate factual
information to fully realize the potential for
untrustworthiness which is inherent in
(jailhouse informant) testimony because of
the strong inducements to lie or shape
testimony in favor of the prosecution."
As an example of court credulity, the report
cited a 1984 California Supreme Court
decision that declared that prosecutors are
not legally required to corroborate the word
of a jailhouse informant because informants
have no "direct, compelling motive" to lie.
Among informants, the grand jury found,
there is a "widespread belief that law
enforcement officials solicit fabricated
testimony," sometimes directly and
sometimes through a variety of more subtle
means, such as leaving an informant in a
room with investigative reports concerning
another inmate so he can gather inside
information about the other inmate's case.
While there is no evidence in the report that
the grand jury questioned law enforcement
officers about specific allegations of this
sort, the grand jury did attempt to investigate
informants' accounts of being placed next to
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targeted defendants by sheriffs deputies in
charge of inmate housing.
"The Sheriffs Department denies such a
practice has ever existed," the report said.
"However, the grand jury received evidence
which indicated the placing of inmates for
the gathering of information has occurred."
In the district attorneys' office, the grand
jury found, senior management had
repeatedly refused to establish a central
index on informants to keep track of their
offers to testify and their reliability, despite
requests to do so from subordinates
beginning in 1986.
"Neither a defendant's rights to know about
information affecting the credibility of an
informant, nor a prosecutor's obligation to
disclose such information to a defendant was
ever mentioned during the (district attorney
management) discussion of the pros and
cons of (maintaining) an informant index,"
the grand jury said.
Instead, senior management was concerned
that, if it established an index, it might have
to disclose it to the defense.
In addition, one management official
testified that an informant index was
regarded as a bad idea because it might lead
to discovery by defense attorneys of what he
believed was a "fairly common practice" of
the Sheriffs Department in planting
informants next to suspects when "the
amount of available evidence that we can
present in court is a little on the thin side and
a statement would certainly be helpful."
Instead of establishing an index, the grand
jury reported, top district attorney officials
decided to hold a Saturday seminar for
prosecutors on how to deal with informants.
"The seminar did not appear to address
ethical issues relating to . . . the defendant's
entitlement to know the number of times the
informant testified as a prosecution witness
and the benefits he received," the grand jury
said. ". . . Rather, the seminar appeared to
focus on the use of jailhouse informants as it
relates to winning cases."l
To illustrate the district attorney's use of
informants known to be unreliable, the
grand jury told the story of White, who in
1979 flunked a polygraph test as a would-be
informant for the Long Beach police and
told the district attorney's office that some
of its prosecutors were setting up suspects
and paying off witnesses.
White then filed two lawsuits alleging that
his complaints weren't being taken
seriously. The attorney general's office tried
to investigate but got nowhere when White
changed his story just before he was to have
taken a polygraph. The Department of
Corrections weighed in with its assessment
that White was "a real flake."
But, the grand jury said, White's "career as
an informant was just beginning to
blossom."
516
"Justices Rule Prosecutors May Be
Sued for Non-Court Acts"
The Washington Post
June 25, 1993
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
prosecutors may be liable for overzealous
actions taken while investigating crimes and
in making statements about cases to news
reporters.
Neither kinds of actions, the court said, are
part of prosecutors' courtroom advocacy,
which traditionally has been entitled to
immunity from liability.
The split ruling, which dissenting justices
said could have a chilling effect on law
enforcement, arose from the investigation of
the rape-murder of an 11-year-old
Naperville, Ill., girl.
Prosecutors in Du Page County, just west of
Chicago, had targeted Stephen Buckley as a
suspect; Buckley claimed he was innocent
and that prosecutors had fabricated evidence
against him. After spending three years in
jail on charges that were never proven,
Buckley filed a civil rights suit against
county officials.
The Supreme Court was unanimous in
finding that Buckley could sue the
prosecuting attorneys for damages arising
from statements made at a news conference
when an indictment against him was
announced.
And, by 5 to 4, the court said Buckley could
have a claim arising from the prosecutors'
search for clues and corroboration that might
have given them probable cause to make an
arrest. Specifically, Buckley had alleged that
when laboratory results failed to connect his
boots to a bootprint at the girl's home,
county prosecutors induced a North Carolina
forensic anthropologist to make a positive
identification.
The court's decision reinstates a case
brought by Buckley against former Du Page
County attorney Michael Fitzsimmons and
other prosecutors, which had been dismissed
by a lower court. Buckley's lawyer, Flint
Taylor, said yesterday he is seeking $10
million in damages for violations of
Buckley's civil rights, loss of freedom,
mental anguish and humiliation.
In a larger sense, the ruling in Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons further clarifies when
prosecutors may be forced to pay money
damages for their wrongful actions.
The concept that an official is immune from
liability for injuries caused while on duty
derives from English common law. Through
the years, U.S. courts have allowed some
exceptions to provide redress for individuals
who claim they have been injured as the
result of wrongful government actions.
But it is still rare for an individual to prevail
in an injury suit against prosecutors. Two
years ago, in Burns v. Reed, the court held
that a state prosecutor is absolutely immune
from liability for withholding information
critical to a defendant's rights in a warrant
hearing. But the prosecutor was not immune
for legal advice he gave police in the case.
The justices said then that the test is whether
the prosecutor's conduct is "intimately
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associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process."
Further distinguishing among prosecutorial
functions, the court yesterday said
prosecutors' immunity from civil rights law
largely depends on the law officers'
activities when the alleged injury occurs.
Justice John Paul Stevens, who wrote the
opinion, said that actions taken by a
prosecutor who is preparing for a trial or that
occur during his advocacy for the state are
entitled to absolute immunity.
Out-of-court statements to the press, Stevens
said in a portion of the opinion joined by all
the justices, are not part of the judicial
process, and therefore not protected from
liability.
Buckley alleged that Fitzsimmons, who was
seeking reelection at the time, made false
statements at a news conference announcing
Buckley's arrest and indictment. That,
Buckley claimed, undermined the fairness of
the proceedings against him. (His trial ended
in a hung jury, but because prosecutors
planned to retry him Buckley was not freed
until the forensic anthropologist who was
supposed to be a key witness against him
died of cancer.)
Regarding the claim that prosecutors
"shopped" for an expert to link his boot to a
bootprint on the door of the girl's house, a
five-justice majority said it was an
investigatory function not entitled to
absolute immunity.
"There is a difference between the
advocate's role in evaluating evidence and
interviewing witnesses as he prepares for
trial . . . and the detective's role in searching
for the clues and corroboration that might
give him probable cause to recommend that
a suspect be arrested," Stevens wrote.
"A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider
himself to be, an advocate before he had
probable cause to have anyone arrested," he
said, joined by Justices Harry A. Blackmun,
Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas.
The four justices who dissented from that
portion of the ruling said it could cause
prosecutors to act too cautiously or
otherwise skew decisions when deciding
whether to bring charges against a suspect.
The ruling could spawn unjustified
complaints when "the claimant is clever
enough to include some actions taken by the
prosecutor prior to the initiation of
prosecution," said Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist and Justices Byron R. White
and David H. Souter.
The ruling reversed a decision by the 7th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that the
prosecutors had absolute immunity on both
of Buckley's claims. The high court did not
decide how Buckley would succeed on the
merits of his claim or whether the
prosecutors might be entitled to qualified
immunity; that is, if they could show they
were acting in good faith that their conduct
was not wrong.
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Pearson v. Callahan
07-751
Ruling Below: Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16853 (10th Cir.
Utah, 2007), cert. granted, Pearson v. Callahan, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2865 (2008).
A police informant working for the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force went to Afton Callahan's
home to complete a drug deal. When the sale was finished, the informant signaled the police, who
entered Callahan's home and arrested Callahan. Callahan claims the police violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by not first obtaining a search warrant. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed that
the evidence against Callahan had been illegally obtained, and thus overturned Callahan's
conviction. Callahan then filed a lawsuit against the task force for violating his constitutional rights.
The police claim that they are immune from suit because the rights violated were not clearly
established because of the doctrine of consent once removed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the
police, ruling that the doctrine of consent once removed has not been adopted in the Tenth Circuit.
Questions Presented: (1) Several lower courts have recognized a "consent once removed"
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Does this exception authorize police
officers to enter a home without a warrant immediately after an undercover informant buys drugs
inside (as the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held), or does the warrantless entry in such
circumstances violate the Fourth Amendment (as the Tenth Circuit held below)? (2) Did the Tenth
Circuit properly deny qualified immunity when the only decisions directly on point had all upheld
similar warrantless entries? (3) Should the Court's decision in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)
be overruled?
Afton CALLAHAN, Plaintiff - Appellant,
V.
MILLARD COUNTY; The Central Utah Narcotics Task Force; Servier
County; Piute County; Mt. Pleasant City; Wayne County; Richfield City;
Salina City; Gunnison City; Ephraim City; Cordell Pearson, in his official and
individual capacity; Marty Gleave, in his official and individual capacity; Clark
Thomas in his official and individual capacity; Dwight Jenkins, in his official
and individual capacity; Jeffrey Whatcott, in his official and individual
capacity; and John Does I-IX in their official and individual capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
July 16, 2007
MURGUIA, District Judge court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the numerous Defendant-Appellees. The
In this civil rights action, Plaintiff-Appellant district court held that the individual officers
Afton Callahan appeals from the district were entitled to qualified immunity because
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Mr. Callahan did not establish that the
officers violated a clearly established right.
Holding that the district court was correct in
its determination that Mr. Callahan's
constitutional rights were violated, but
incorrect in its determination that these
rights were not clearly established, we
reverse in part and remand.
Background
This appeal evolves from a police raid of
Mr. Callahan's home on March 19, 2002.
Earlier in the day, a confidential
informant-who assisted the Central Utah
Narcotics Task Force after being charged
with possession of methamphetamine-saw
Mr. Callahan and discussed a potential sale
of methamphetamine later that day. The
confidential informant then informed an
officer of the task force of the conversation.
[The police officers] wired the confidential
informant, gave him a marked $ 100 bill,
and worked out a signal for him to give the
officers once the exchange was completed.
The officers then drove the confidential
informant to Mr. Callahan's home.
Inside the home, the confidential informant
asked Mr. Callahan for methamphetamine.
Mr. Callahan retrieved a quantity of drugs.
In exchange for a portion of the quantity, the
confidential informant gave Mr. Callahan
the marked bill. After the deal was
completed, the confidential informant gave a
variation of the pre-arranged signal to the
task force officers.
Hearing the signal, the officers entered Mr.
Callahan's home through a porch door.
Once inside, they ordered the confidential
informant, Mr. Callahan, and two other
individuals to the floor. During their entry,
the officers saw Mr. Callahan drop a plastic
bag, which they later confirmed contained
methamphetamine. After the four persons
were on the floor, the officers conducted a
protective sweep of the home. The Utah
Court of Appeals later determined that Mr.
Callahan consented to the protective sweep.
As a result of the search of Mr. Callahan and
his home, the officers found evidence of a
drug sale and possession. On the
confidential informant, they found a small
bag of methamphetamine. On Mr. Callahan,
they found the marked bill. In Mr.
Callahan's home, they found drug syringes.
The officers did not have an arrest or search
warrant at any time during these events.
Based on this evidence, Mr. Callahan was
charged with possession and distribution of
methamphetamine. The trial court found that
the evidence was admissible because the
existence of exigent circumstances made the
search reasonable despite the absence of a
warrant. The Utah Court of Appeals
reversed this decision and Mr. Callahan's
subsequent conviction. Notably, the Utah
Attorney General's office conceded on
appeal that no exigent circumstances
existed, instead arguing that the evidence
would have been discovered inevitably. The
court of appeals disagreed and applied the
Attorney General's concession that there
were no exigent circumstances.
Applying the ruling of the Utah Court of
Appeals, Mr. Callahan filed claims in the
United States Court for the District of Utah.
Mr. Callahan alleged that the actions of the
task force violated his constitutional rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments....
Regarding the claims against the task force,
the district court dismissed the claims
because it found that qualified immunity
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shielded the officers. In so doing, it found
that despite an assumption that the task force
violated Mr. Callahan's constitutional rights,
those constitutional rights were not clearly
established. Specifically, the district court
examined the application of the "consent-
once-removed" doctrine, finding that
although three circuit courts have upheld the
doctrine, the recent Supreme Court decision
in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103
(2006), allowed the district court to assume
Mr. Callahan's constitutional rights were
violated. On the other hand, the approval of
the doctrine by three circuit courts prevented
the district court from finding that those
rights were clearly established.
On appeal, Mr. Callahan contends that
summary judgment should not have been
granted based on qualified immunity derived
from the "consent once removed" doctrine.
This argument consists of two components.
First, from Mr. Callahan's perspective, it is
clear that the actions of the task force
violated his constitutional rights under the
Fourth Amendment. Second, Mr. Callahan
contends that because Tenth Circuit law
requires exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment be
well delineated and carefully drawn, the
adoption of the doctrine by other circuits is
irrelevant.
Discussion
When reviewing summary judgment orders
based on qualified immunity, the approach
differs from other summary judgment
decisions. Corte: v. McCauley, 478 F.3d
1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007). Once a
qualified immunity defense is asserted, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff. First, the
plaintiff must "establish that the defendant
violated a constitutional right." Id. If the
plaintiff fails to satisfy this initial
requirement, the court's inquiry ends.
Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114 ("If no
constitutional right would have been
violated were the allegations established,
there is no necessity for further inquiries
concerning qualified immunity."). If the
plaintiff establishes that a constitutional
right was violated, then the plaintiff must
also show that the violated right was clearly
established. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114.
Whether the right was clearly established is
examined under the "specific context of the
case, not as a broad general proposition." Id.
"The relevant, dispositive inquiry in
determining whether a right is clearly
established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation." Id. If reasonable
officers would not have been aware of the
clearly unlawful nature of their actions,
qualified immunity applies and summary
judgment would be appropriate. Id.
I. The Actions of the Task Force Violated
Mr. Callahan's Constitutional Rights.
The Fourth Amendment protects "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
Const. amend. IV. When examining a search
or seizure, the central question is whether
the actions were reasonable. United States v.
McCullough, 457 F.3d 1150, 1163 (10th Cir.
2006). Courts continually have viewed the
warrantless entry into a house as
presumptively unreasonable. Brigham City
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); United States
v. Walker, 474 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir.
2007) ("It is a basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable."). This
presumption results from the understanding
that "the home is entitled to the greatest
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Fourth Amendment protection." United
States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 712-13 (10th
Cir. 2006).
This presumption that a warrantless search
of a house is unreasonable can be overcome
in certain circumstances. Walker, 474 F.3d
at 1252. These circumstances require the
government actors to demonstrate that the
search "falls within one of a carefully
defined set of exceptions based on the
presence of 'exigent circumstances.' Id.
The exceptions based on exigent
circumstances adopted by the Supreme
Court include the hot pursuit of a fleeing
felon, the imminent destruction of evidence,
the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the
risk of danger to police officers or other
people inside or outside the home. United
States v. Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th
Cir. 2004). Additional factors in analyzing
the exceptions based on exigent
circumstances are that the circumstance may
not be "subject to police manipulation or
abuse," or "motivated by an intent to arrest
and seize evidence." United States v.
Zogmaister, 90 Fed. Appx. 325, 330-31
(10th Cir. 2004).
Even with these additional factors, the
central question remains whether the search
was reasonable. The focus simply shifts to
whether "'the exigencies of the situation'
make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Brigham City, 126 S. Ct. at
1947. Thus, to find that a new exception is
warranted requires a balancing of private
interests and unique public safety concerns.
Fuerschbach, 439 F.3d at 1203.
It is undisputed that the task force officers
entered Mr. Callahan's house without a
warrant. Presently, they do not argue that an
established exception based on exigent
circumstances made this entry reasonable.
Instead, the officers ask this Circuit to join
other circuits in their approval of the
''consent-once-removed" doctrine.
The "consent-once-removed" doctrine
applies when an undercover officer enters a
house at the express invitation of someone
with authority to consent, establishes
probable cause to arrest or search, and then
immediately summons other officers for
assistance. United States v. Pollard, 215
F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475,
1478 (9th Cir. 1996). The Sixth and Seventh
Circuits have broadened this doctrine to
grant informants the same capabilities as
undercover officers. See United States v.
Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 807
(6th Cir. 2005).
We find the distinctions between an officer
and an informant summoning additional
officers to be significant. Had the person
inside Mr. Callahan's home been an
undercover officer, no extension of our case
law would be necessary. Mr. Callahan
would have consented to opening his home
to the police. Consent is a well-established
method of conducting a reasonable search,
despite lacking a warrant. United States v.
Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir.
2003). Tenth Circuit precedent permits the
police to use deception to gain such consent.
See Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 802
(10th Cir. 1989). Once lawfully inside the
home, an officer may effect a warrantless
arrest that is supported by probable cause.
United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d
1260, 1269 (10th Cir. 2006). We have never
drawn a constitutional distinction between
an entry or search by an individual police
officer and an entry or search by several
police officers. Thus, the consent granted to
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the hypothetical undercover officer would
have covered additional backup officers
without any need for additional exceptions
to the warrant requirement.
On the other hand, the invitation of an
informant into a house who then in turn
invites the police, which are the present
facts, would require an expansion of the
consent exception. In this context, the
person with authority to consent never
consented to the entry of police into the
house. Other courts have overcome this
distinction by noting that a state may grant
the power to arrest to the police as well as its
citizens, and if the informant has the power
to arrest, then an informant must be capable
of summoning the police. Yoon, 398 F.3d at
810-11. This logic is unconvincing. That a
citizen has the power to arrest does not grant
the citizen all of the powers and obligations
of the police as agents of the state. Cf
United States v. Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454,
461 (7th Cir. 1975) (discussing the
differences between a private citizen's right
to make an arrest and that of a police
officer). These distinct obligations and
powers must also be reflected in a
distinction between inviting a citizen who
may be an informant into one's house and
inviting the police into one's house.
The officers also ask this court to adopt the
"consent-once-removed" doctrine based on
policy considerations. They argue that
without this doctrine law enforcement will
be severely hampered in its pursuit of drug
traffickers because the use of informants is
vital, and requiring officers to obtain a
warrant whenever an informant was in a
home would jeopardize personal safety and
cause delays. This argument fails for two
reasons. First, this contradicts the nature of
the exceptions based on exigent
circumstances requiring that the police may
not manipulate or abuse the circumstances
creating the exigency. Zogmaister, 90 Fed.
Appx. at 330. Second, as recently restated
by the Supreme Court in Georgia v.
Randolph, "[a] generalized interest in
expedient law enforcement cannot, without
more, justify a warrantless search." 547 U.S.
103 (2006); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481 ("The
warrant requirement . . . is not an
inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed'
against the claims of police efficiency.")
Thus, while our case law would support a
holding that the Fourth Amendment allows
an undercover officer to summon backup
officers within a home after that officer has
been invited with consent, neither the case
law nor a rational extension of the case law
would support including officers summoned
by an informant within a home. Based on
this, we hold that entering Mr. Callahan's
home based on the invitation of an
informant and without a warrant, direct
consent, or other exigent circumstances, the
task force officers violated Mr. Callahan's
constitutional rights under the Fourth
Amendment.
II. Mr. Callahan's Rights Were Clearly
Established
Having established that Mr. Callahan's
rights were violated, we now turn to whether
these rights were clearly established. For a
right to be clearly established, "there must
be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit
decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other circuits must
have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains." Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114-15.
This does not require a plaintiff to cite a
case holding that the specific conduct at
issue is unlawful, but rather plaintiff must
show that the unlawfulness of the action was
apparent. Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221,
1229 (10th Cir. 2005).
In this case, the relevant right is the right to
be free in one's home from unreasonable
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searches and arrests. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance of
this right, stating "[o]ver and again this
Court has emphasized that the mandate of
the Fourth Amendment requires adherence
to judicial processes . . . and that searches
conducted outside of the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Thirty
years after Katz, but before the raid on Mr.
Callahan's home, the Supreme Court again
emphasized the long history of this right.
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610-11
(1999) ("[T]he 'overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home that has been embedded
in our traditions since the origins of the
Republic' meant that absent a warrant or
exigent circumstances, police could not
enter a home to make an arrest."). Although
the Supreme Court decided Groh v. Ramirez
after the present events occurred, the Court's
analysis in rejecting another exception to the
warrant requirement is appropriate, stating
"[n]o reasonable officer could claim to be
unaware of the basic rule, well established
by our cases, that, absent consent or
exigency, a warrantless search of the home
is presumptively unconstitutional. . . .
Because not a word in any of our cases
would suggest to a reasonable officer that
this case fits within any exception to that
fundamental tenet, petitioner is asking us, in
effect, to craft a new exception. Absent any
support for such an exception in our cases,
he cannot reasonably have relied on an
expectation that we would do so." 540 U.S.
551, 564 (2004).
This Circuit has also long adopted the view
that warrantless entries into a home are per
se unreasonable unless they satisfy the
established exceptions. See e.g., Franz v.
Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 1993)
(referring to this limitation as a "cardinal
principle" of the Fourth Amendment).
Although the officers might argue that their
entry fell within the "consent" exception to
the warrant requirement, Tenth Circuit law
provides that a mere transient guest, without
a "substantial interest in or common
authority over the property," cannot consent
to the entry of others. United States v.
Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir.
1985).
The district court held that the right was not
clearly established because other circuits
have approved of the "consent-once-
removed" doctrine. From the district court's
perspective, this gave the officers a
"reasonable argument" that their actions
were justified until this Circuit or the
Supreme Court rejected the "consent-once-
removed" doctrine. This approach misreads
a plaintiff s burden in showing that a right is
clearly established. While case law from
other circuits is relevant in the analysis, it
relates to whether "the clearly established
weight of authority from other circuits must
have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains." Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114-15.
Here, the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit have clearly established that to allow
police entry into a home, the only two
exceptions to the warrant requirement are
consent and exigent circumstances. The
creation of an additional exception by
another circuit would not make the right
defined by our holdings any less clear.
Moreover, at the time of these events only
the Seventh Circuit had applied the
"consent-once-removed" doctrine to a
civilian informant. See United States v.
Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986). The
precedent of one circuit cannot rebut that the
"clearly established weight of authority" is
as the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court
have addressed it.
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Here, the officers knew (1) they had no
warrant; (2) Mr. Callahan had not consented
to their entry; and (3) his consent to the
entry of an informant could not reasonably
be interpreted to extend to them. They do
not argue on appeal that exigent
circumstances justified their entry. Thus,
"reasonable officers could [not] have
believed that" their warrantless entry into
Mr. Callahan's home "was lawful, in light of
clearly established law and the information
the officers possessed." Wilson, 526 U.S. at
615. Although other circuits might disagree,
Tenth Circuit law governed the
reasonableness of the officers' beliefs in this
case. The officers are not protected by
qualified immunity.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, AND REMANDED.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
[Restatement of the facts and procedural
history.]
On summary judgment, the district court
granted Defendants qualified immunity.
Today, the court reverses, holding that (1)
the "consent once removed" doctrine does
not justify officers' warrantless entry into a
residence, at least where the individual
gaining initial, consensual entry is a
confidential informant, and (2) the law was
clearly established that law enforcement
may not enter a residence without a warrant
in order to assist a confidential informant-
present in the home consensually and
possessing probable cause-in effectuating
an arrest. Because these holdings
unnecessarily part company with at least two
(and arguably three) of our sister circuits
and are contrary to longstanding Fourth
Amendment and qualified immunity
principles, I respectfully dissent.
In order to overcome a qualified immunity
defense, a plaintiff asserting a cause of
action under § 1983 must demonstrate that
(1) the defendant's actions violated a federal
constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the
right alleged to have been violated was
clearly established at the time of the conduct
at issue. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201.
At the highest level of abstraction, the right
at issue is the Fourth Amendment "right of
the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
Const. Amend. IV. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
require government agents to obtain a
warrant before entering a residence for
purposes of search or arrest. See Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984). The
warrant requirement, however, is nowhere
near absolute; there are exceptions, though
they are "few in number and carefully
delineated." United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
"[O]ne of the specifically established
exceptions to the requirements of both a
warrant and probable cause is a search that
is conducted pursuant to consent" freely and
voluntarily given. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). This
exception results from the recognition that
the primary purpose of the Fourth
Amendment-"protection of the privacy of
the individual, his right to be let alone,"
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582
(1946)-is forfeited when a homeowner
freely allows government agents inside.
Thus, it is abundantly clear that had one or
more members of the Task Force gained
consent to enter Mr. Callahan's home, there
would be no Fourth Amendment violation.
See United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d
1260, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2006). As the court
notes, the same would be true had the Task
Force members gained consent under the
guise of being plain-clothed citizens looking
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to purchase methamphetamine. See Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
Analogously, the confidential informant's
consensual entry was not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that Mr.
Callahan had no idea he was acting as a
government agent at the time. See United
States v. Lowe, 999 F.2d 448, 450-51 (10th
Cir. 1993).
What was unclear in this circuit, at least
until today, was whether Mr. Callahan's
consent to the confidential informant
coupled with the subsequent drug
transaction so eroded his legitimate
expectation of privacy that officers could
enter his residence without a warrant in
order to effectuate his arrest. The court
answers that question in the negative,
invalidating the consent once removed
doctrine where confidential informants,
rather than full-fledged officers, are
involved. I, however, would draw the line
elsewhere.
Under the doctrine of consent once
removed, law enforcement officials may
enter a residence without a warrant if the
following conditions are met:
The undercover agent or
informant: 1) entered at the express
invitation of someone with
authority to consent; 2) at that
point established the existence of
probable cause to effectuate an
arrest or search; and 3)
immediately summoned help from
other officers.
United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648
(6th Cir. 2000). The name "consent once
removed" is somewhat of a misnomer,
however, because the doctrine depends on
more than consent alone. See United States
v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 809-10 (6th Cir.
2005). Rather, the doctrine requires both a
valid consensual entry-which alleviates the
warrant requirement-and a concomitant
destruction of the homeowner's legitimate
expectation of privacy-which allows
officers to enter. Id.; see also United States
v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986)
("[T]he interest in the privacy of the home. .
. has been fatally compromised when the
owner admits a confidential informant and
proudly displays contraband to him.").
When one gives consent for another
individual to enter his home in order to buy
or sell narcotics, he not only assumes the
risk that the person is an undercover
government agent, but also that the
individual will later testify to his
observations, that he will attempt to
effectuate an arrest on-the-spot, or that he
will take some of the contraband and hand it
over to the police. Paul, 808 F.2d at 648.
Given the assumption of these risks, the
marginal risk that an individual will instead
invite law enforcement officials to assist in
an on-the-spot arrest "is too slight to bring
the requirement of obtaining a warrant into
play." Id.
The crucial question, then, is whether a
homeowner's legitimate expectation of
privacy is any greater when he allows a
confidential informant into his home rather
than a full-fledged officer. The court
answers that question with a resounding
"yes," but I fail to see the difference in the
two situations. The court draws the line at
police officers because "the person with
authority to consent never consented to the
entry of police into the house" when only a
confidential informant is admitted and "the
power to arrest does not grant the citizen all
of the powers and obligations of the police
as agents of the state." Ct. Op. at 12.
While it is technically correct that Mr.
Callahan never consented to the entry of
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police, no one ever consents to the entry of
police in these undercover situations; they
instead consent to the entry of someone who
might be the police (an undercover officer),
or as in this case, someone who might be a
government agent (a confidential
informant). So long as an invitation to enter
is extended to a government agent (even
unknowingly), the pertinent issue is not the
type of government agent allowed in, but the
consequence of that invitation, combined
with the subsequent sale of narcotics, on a
resident's reasonable expectation of privacy.
And the only principled resolution of that
issue is to hold that, no matter what type of
government agent is allowed in, any
previously existent legitimate expectation of
privacy is abandoned.
I am similarly unconvinced by the court's
reliance on the distinction between those
powers possessed by police officers and
those possessed by other citizens. The
confidential informant in this case was
doubtless a government agent for Fourth
Amendment purposes. "In deciding whether
a private person has become an . .. agent of
the government, two important inquiries are:
1) whether the government knew of and
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and 2)
whether the party performing the search
intended to assist law enforcement efforts or
to further his own ends." Pleasant v. Lovell,
876 F.2d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 1989). In this
case-as is the same in nearly all cases
involving undercover stings utilizing
confidential informants-law enforcement
knew of the confidential informant's
intrusive actions beforehand, and those
actions were undertaken with the purpose of
assisting the police.
Because I see no principled distinction
between police officers and other
government agents, including confidential
informants, in regard to a resident's
legitimate expectation of privacy following
consensual entry, I would join the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits in clearly extending the
consent once removed doctrine to
confidential informants. Thus, I would hold
that no constitutional violation occurred in
this case and that qualified immunity was
properly granted.
Although the extension of the consent once
removed doctrine to confidential informants
is an issue on which reasonable minds might
differ, there is no doubt that the right at issue
was not clearly established at the time the
Task Force acted. "[Tlhe affirmative defense
of qualified immunity . .. protects all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law." Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d
1124, 1127 (10th Cir. 2001). To be clearly
established, the contours of a right "must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing
violates that right." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 739 (2002). Moreover, the clearly
established law inquiry is an objective one,
see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
641 (1987), and "must be undertaken in light
of the specific context of the case, not as a
broad general proposition." Saucier, 533
U.S. at 201. A right is "clearly established"
if Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case law
exists on point or if the "clearly established
weight of authority from other circuits"
found a constitutional violation from similar
actions. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d
1238, 1251 (l0th Cir. 1999).
Properly characterized, the right at issue in
this case is not simply the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Instead, it is the right to be free from the
warrantless entry of police officers into
one's home to effectuate an arrest after one
has granted voluntary, consensual entry to a
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confidential informant and undertaken
criminal activity giving rise to probable
cause. As the district court observed, no
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision has
ever granted or even discussed that right.
The court is no more successful in
identifying such a decision. Instead, it relies
upon cases holding that a warrantless search
of a home is per se unreasonable unless
officers gain consent or exigent
circumstances exist. See Ct. Op. at 14-16
(citing Katz, Wilson, Groh, Franz, and
Falcon). The court's approach is flawed,
however, because it characterizes the right
in overly broad terms and begs the
question-what is the effect on a resident's
legitimate expectation of privacy where the
consent exception to the warrant
requirement applies? Because neither the
Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has
previously addressed this issue in the
context of a warrantless entry of officers
where a confidential informant is involved,
we must look to other circuits for guidance.
Prior to the events giving rise to this
litigation, three circuits had issued opinions
which could have led a reasonable officer to
believe that a warrantless entry was legal in
this case. First, the Seventh Circuit, in 1986,
clearly held that the consent once removed
doctrine applies equally where confidential
informants are involved, relying on a
reduced expectation of privacy. See Paul,
808 F.2d at 648. Second, the Sixth Circuit,
in 2000, applied the consent once removed
doctrine in a situation in which both an
officer and a confidential informant were
granted consent to enter and "the informant
accompanying the officer immediately
summoned the other officers for assistance."
Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648-49 (emphasis
added). Importantly, the Sixth Circuit stated
that the consent once removed doctrine
applies where "[t]he undercover agent or
informant" consensually enters a residence,
establishes probable cause, and immediately
summons help. See id. at 648 (emphasis
added). Finally, the Ninth Circuit, in 1996,
explained that the consent once removed
doctrine applies where "undercover
agent[s]" are involved, see United States v.
Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir.
1996); and a reasonable officer could have
believed the term "undercover agent[s]"
includes confidential informants acting as
government agents.
In sum, because neither the Supreme Court
nor the Tenth Circuit has heretofore
addressed the propriety of the consent once
removed doctrine as applied to confidential
informants, and the clear weight of authority
from other circuits strongly suggested that
the Task Force's actions in this case were
legal, I would hold that the right at issue was
not clearly established and would affirm the
grant of qualified immunity.
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"Justices to Weigh Search and Consent"
New York Times
March 25, 2008
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON-When an unsuspecting
drug dealer opens the door to a police
informant masquerading as a customer, is he
also opening the door for the police to come
in and conduct a search of his home without
a warrant?
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
answer that question, which has divided the
lower federal courts.
Several federal circuits have adopted what
has come to be called a consent-once-
removed exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. The
theory is that a suspect who consents to the
entry of someone who is really an agent of
the police is also, albeit unknowingly,
agreeing to let the police enter as well. The
police do not need a warrant to enter and
search a home if they have the permission of
a person authorized to give it.
The new Supreme Court case is an appeal
filed by five Utah police officers, members
of the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force,
who face paying damages to a man in whose
home they conducted a search later found to
be unconstitutional. The federal appeals
court in Denver rejected their claim of
immunity. The case presents complex
questions of constitutional law, official
immunity and the relationship between the
two.
Events in 2002 form the background to the
case. A confidential informant working with
the officers bought $100 worth of
methamphetamine from Afton D. Callahan,
inside Mr. Callahan's trailer home in
Fillmore, Utah. By prearrangement, the
officers entered the trailer as soon as
received a signal from the informant,
was wearing a wire, that the sale had
completed.
they
who
been
At Mr. Callahan's trial in state court for
possession and distribution of
methamphetamine, the judge rejected the
defense argument that the evidence should
be suppressed because the search without a
warrant was unconstitutional. Mr. Callahan
then agreed to a conditional guilty plea
while appealing the constitutional issue. A
Utah appeals court agreed with him,
declared the search unconstitutional, and
overturned the conviction.
Free of criminal liability, Mr. Callahan then
sued the officers for violating his rights
under the Fourth Amendment. In response,
the officers argued that they were immune
from suit under the doctrine of "qualified
immunity," which provides that government
officials cannot be held liable for violating a
law or constitutional principle that was not
clear at the time.
A federal district judge, Paul G. Cassell,
who later left the bench, ruled in 2006 that
even assuming the search was
unconstitutional, the police were entitled to
immunity because they could reasonably
have believed at the time that the law was on
their side. He noted that three federal
appellate circuits, although not the one that
includes Utah, had accepted the "consent-
once-removed" notion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
10th Circuit, in Denver, disagreed and
reinstated Mr. Callahan's lawsuit. The
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appeals court, declining to adopt the
consent-once-removed exception, held that
the search violated Mr. Callahan's "clearly
established" right "to be free in one's home
from unreasonable searches and arrests."
The Constitution was so clear on this point,
the appeals court said, that a reasonable
police officer would have known not to
proceed without a warrant.
In accepting the officers' appeal for
argument next November, the justices added
an issue of their own that substantially
increases the prospective importance of the
case, Pearson v. Callahan, No. 07-751. The
question is how courts are to evaluate
officials' claims of immunity from suit for
constitutional violations.
The Supreme Court last considered this
issue in a 2001 decision, Saucier v. Katz,
which required courts to consider the issue
in a precise order, first deciding what the
constitutional rule should be and whether the
Constitution was violated, and only then
deciding whether the issue had been
sufficiently unclear at the time so as to make
the defendant entitled to immunity.
The rule of Saucier v. Katz has been
severely criticized, both inside the court and
outside, for making judges do the hard work
of deciding disputed constitutional issues
that need not have been decided if, at the
end of the day, the lawsuit was going to be
dismissed on the ground of official
immunity.
The court's purpose in deciding the Saucier
case the way it did was to avoid a situation
in which the law is never clarified because
its very lack of clarity entitles defendant
after defendant to official immunity. Only
by deciding whether a constitutional right
was violated in the first place would "the
process for the law's elaboration from case
to case" be preserved, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy wrote in the Saucier majority
opinion.
But in the view of the decision's many
critics, it has not turned out that way.
Judge Pierre N. Leval of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Manhattan, said in a lecture at New York
University in 2005 that the Saucier decision
was "a puzzling misadventure," imposing on
judges "a new and mischievous rule." It was
"a blueprint for the creation of bad
constitutional law," he said, because often
the constitutional holding would not actually
matter to the parties in a case that could be
resolved more simply through a decision on
immunity.
In an opinion last year, Justice Stephen G.
Breyer called for the Saucier decision to be
overruled as a "failed experiment." His
opinion came in the "Bong Hits for Jesus"
case, in which the court struggled to decide
whether a high school principal had violated
a student's First Amendment right to free
speech by suspending him for displaying a
14-foot banner bearing those words.
The court ruled by a bare majority that the
answer was no. Justice Breyer said the entire
exercise could have been avoided if the
court, acknowledging that the question was
close, had simply granted the principal
immunity from suit.
Although Justice Breyer spoke only for
himself in that case, Morse v. Frederick, he
evidently captured his colleagues' attention.
In its order on Monday granting the appeal
in the Utah case, the justices instructed the
lawyers for both sides to brief and argue a
question that neither side had raised:
"Whether the court's decision in Saucier i.
Katz should be overruled?"
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"6th Circuit Rules Warrantless Entry Did Not
Violate Fourth Amendment"
Latyers Weekly USA
March 14, 2005
Police could forcibly enter an apartment
where an informant wearing a wire had been
invited in the residence by the defendant, the
6th Circuit has ruled in applying the
"consent-once-removed" doctrine [in U.S. v.
Yoon].
The police equipped the informant with a
wire before he entered the defendant's
apartment. Over the wire, officers heard the
informant ask about quantities of marijuana
and shipping procedures. They then forcibly
entered the apartment, where they found
large quantities of both marijuana and
cocaine.
The defendant was arrested on charges of
drug distribution. He claimed that the police
search violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.
The government relied on the doctrine of
"consent-once-removed" to argue that the
police could enter the defendant's apartment
to arrest him without a warrant because the
informant: (1) entered at the defendant's
express invitation; (2) established probable
cause for a search; and (3) immediately
summoned help from the officers.
The court agreed.
"[The defendant] has the authority to
consent to another being on the premises.
Once inside the apartment, [the informant]
observed the marijuana and immediately
notified awaiting officers as to its presence
via an audio transmitter. Notification that
marijuana was in the residence established
the necessary probable cause to effectuate an
arrest. Accordingly, all three criteria of the
'consent-once-removed' doctrine were
established," the court said.
It said it was extending the doctrine to cover
an informant unaccompanied by an
undercover officer who "enters a residence
alone, observes contraband in plain view,
and immediately summons government
agents to effectuate the arrest."
The court cited similar opinions from the 7th
and 9th Circuits.
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"Justices Give Police Latitude"
Chicago Tribune
June 19, 2001
Glen Elasser
The Supreme Court on Monday made it
easier for police officers accused of using
excessive force in arrests to avoid lawsuits.
"An officer might correctly perceive all of
the relevant facts," Justice Anthony
Kennedy said in the court's opinion, "but
have a mistaken understanding as to whether
a particular amount of force is legal in those
circumstances."
Nevertheless, he declared, as long as "the
officer's mistake as to what the law requires
is reasonable," he or she is entitled to
immunity from trial for civil damages.
The case attracted briefs from law-
enforcement organizations; officials from 27
states, including Illinois, Texas, California
and New York, supportive of the officers;
and a number of civil rights groups, which
were critical of the decision.
The case involved the arrest of an animal
rights demonstrator during a 1994 speech by
then-Vice President Al Gore at the Presidio,
an Army base in San Francisco. Gore was
there for the celebration of the base's
conversion to a national park.
Veterinarian Elliot Katz, 60, president of In
Defense of Animals, came to the event with
a banner to protest the possible use of the
base's hospital for animal experimentation.
During Gore's speech, Katz unfurled the 4-
foot-by-3-foot banner and attached it to a
fence. It read, "Please Keep Animal Torture
Out of Our National Parks." According to
the court's opinion, Katz was aware that
military regulations forbade protests and the
distribution of handbills on military bases.
Two military police officers pulled the
banner from the fence, seized Katz by his
arms and shoved him into a nearby van,
where he caught himself in time to avoid
injury.
In his suit Katz charged his constitutional
rights had been violated. Specifically, he
cited the 4th Amendment's right to be
secure against "unreasonable searches and
seizures."
Critical to Monday's decision was "the
uncontested fact" that Katz, did not suffer
"hurt or injury" when military police
arrested him and shoved him into a van.
For this reason, Kennedy said, - the
demonstrator's suit "should have been
dismissed at an early stage." The court also
noted that the police "did not know the full
extent of the threat" posed by Katz as "there
were other potential protesters in the
crowd."
Furthermore, the opinion said, the police
were required "to recognize the necessity to
protect the vice president by securing
respondent [Katz] and restoring order to the
scene."
In Katz's subsequent lawsuit seeking
damages, a federal judge held that Pvt.
Donald Saucier, one of the arresting military
police officers, must stand trial.
The U.S. appeals court affirmed the
decision.
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The Justice Department last year urged the
Supreme Court to reverse the lower court,
maintaining that if the ruling were allowed
to stand, it would subject law-enforcement
officers to frivolous lawsuits.
Gilbert Gallegos, national president of the
294,000-member Grand Lodge of the
Fraternal Order of Police, praised the ruling.
By granting immunity from being sued for
conducting a lawful arrest, Gallegos said,
the court was providing police "a zone of
protection for making the difficult, on-the-
spot decisions in their discharge of their
official duties."
But David Rudovsky, a
Pennsylvania law professor,
ruling "gives police two bites
University of
contended the
on the apple."
If an officer is found to have used excessive
force, he can still win as long as he thought
it was reasonable to use force, according to
Rudovsky, who authored a brief for the
American Civil Liberties Union, the
National Lawyers Guild, the Center for
Constitutional Rights and the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund.
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"Ruling Exposes Misuse of Search Consent"
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
December 27, 1995
David W. Gleischer
"A man's home is his castle-with certain
exceptions," paraphrasing the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
case law commentary.
One of those exceptions is consent. A
defendant always can consent to a police
search of his home, if such permission is
freely given. Courts have expanded consent
to include permissions granted by other
residents of the home, such as a spouse.
Consent was expanded yet another level
under a legal fiction called "consent-once-
removed," where consent can be given on
behalf of an unknowing defendant by an
undercover government agent or a
confidential informant.
The standards for an allowable consent-
once-removed were articulated in U.S. v.
Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987):
The agent or informant enters at the
express invitation of someone with authority
to consent.
The agent or informant establishes that
probable cause exists to effect an arrest or
search.
- The agent or informant immediately
summons help from other officers.
The agent/informant's consent is imputed to
the defendant.
The consent-once-removed doctrine was
used by the government to gather evidence
to indict Walter Jachimko for marijuana
dealing. The story began in March 1992
when convicted felon Joseph Hendrickson
volunteered his services to the Drug
Enforcement Administration to investigate a
marijuana-growing operation managed by
Robert and William Anhalt. For almost three
months, Hendrickson and DEA agents laid
the groundwork for the arrest of the Anhalts.
Finally, on June 30, 1992, the DEA was
ready, and agents equipped Hendrickson
with a buzzer to alert agents if he saw more
than 100 marijuana plants in Robert
Anhalt's apartment.
Hendrickson entered Anhalt's residence, but
did not press the buzzer. Instead, he and
Anhalt left the apartment and drove to 4900
W. Newport Ave. in Chicago. The DEA had
no idea who lived there, how many units
were in the building, or whether any crimes
were being committed at that address.
Hendrickson and Anhalt entered the
building. Twenty minutes later, the agent-
alarm buzzer sounded. The DEA officers
burst in and arrested Anhalt and Walter
Jachimko, who lived at the address and was
present at the time.
Jachimko moved to suppress the fruits of the
search, arguing that he had never given the
government the right to search his residence.
U.S. District Judge Brian Barnett Duff
granted Jachimko's motion in U.S. v. Anhalt,
814 F.Supp. 750 (1993). Duff distinguished
this case from other consent-once-removed
situations on two grounds: There had been
no previous investigation of Jachimko
before the search of his home, and this led to
an inflated importance to the testimony of
Hendrickson, a man Duff held to be a
534
perjurer as well as a convicted felon.
The government appealed to the 7th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, which overturned
Duff s order in U.S. v. Jachimko, 19 F.3d
299 (1994). That opinion held that the
distinctions Duff made between Jachimko's
case and other consents-once-removed were
irrelevant. The case was returned to Duff so
he could rule on Jachimko's motion to
suppress under the three-part standard set
out in the Diaz case.
On remand, Duff noted that Diaz requires
the existence of probable cause in
warrantless searches such as the one here.
So the question in this case was, Did the
government meet its burden of showing, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that
Hendrickson had established probable cause
inside Jachimko's apartment prior to
sounding the alarm?
Duff ruled that it had not. U.S. v. Jachimko,
No. 92 CR 538 (Nov. 22).
First, Duff dismissed the testimony of the
DEA agent on the grounds that it was
riddled with hearsay, leading questions and
lack of foundation, making it totally useless.
He strongly criticized the government for
questioning the agent in that manner.
Duff, however, saved his most withering
remarks for Hendrickson. The judge listed
10 separate aspects of Hendrickson's
testimony and biography that showed him to
be an out-and-out liar. The worst offense
was Hendrickson's admission of cocaine use
in June 1992, in violation of his probation
on an earlier conviction. That violation
hearing was prosecuted by the U.S.
attorney's office on the morning of the same
day as the hearing on the Jachimko
suppression motion-before Duff. Yet, at
the suppression hearing later that day, when
Hendrickson stated that he had not used
drugs since 1987, the government said
nothing.
Duff then reviewed the various cases
interpreting consent-once-removed. Under
Diaz, the government has the responsibility
to establish the existence of probable
cause-"a substantial probability that certain
items are the fruits, instrumentalities or
evidence of crime and that these items are
presently to be found at a certain place."
In this case, the government failed to
establish probable cause because the DEA
agent's testimony was irretrievably defective
and Hendrickson's testimony was filled with
lies. Therefore, Duff granted Jachimko's
motion to suppress the evidence the DEA
seized from his apartment.
This opinion is important to defense lawyers
in not only presenting an excellent summary
of the consent-once-removed doctrine but
also in showing how that doctrine can be
misused, and how such misuse can be fought
successfully. While this decision probably
will be appealed to the 7th Circuit, Duff was
careful to cover all the required legal and
factual bases in his 21-page opinion, making
appellate affirmation of his ruling much
more likely.
[The case was not reviewed by the Seventh
Circuit and stands as good law in the
jurisdiction.]
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"When Should Courts Address Qualified Immunity?"
New York Law Journal
March 7, 2008
Ilann Margalit Maazel
We all know the maxim: "ignorance of the
law is no defense." When the perpetrator of
an assault comes before a court, it does not
matter whether he knew that assault is a
crime. When a party breaches a contract, it
does not matter whether she understood
offer, acceptance, and consideration, much
less the intricacies of the statute of frauds or
the parol evidence rule.
A crime is a crime, and a breach is a breach.
All persons in this country are simply
presumed to know the law, whether they do
or not. Were it otherwise, cases would turn
not only on the facts and the law, but on the
understandings and backgrounds of millions
of different litigants, a plainly unacceptable
result in a nation of laws, not men.
Such is the maxim, but for every legal rule,
there is an exception, and there is one
glaring exception we discuss here: the
doctrine of qualified immunity.
What Is Qualified Immunity?
Qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense generally available in damage
actions against individual public officers
performing discretionary functions. The
Supreme Court created the qualified
immunity doctrine to serve a noble public
policy goal: encouraging citizens to work for
their government. Lawsuits against public
officers may not always be valid, but they
always create certain "social costs": "the
expenses of litigation, the diversion of
official energy from pressing public issues,
and the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office." The fear of
being sued may also "dampen the ardor of
all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible public officials, in the
unflinching discharge of their duties." At the
same time, "[in situations of abuse of
office, an action for damages may offer the
only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees."
In the overwhelming majority of civil rights
cases against public officers, the Court has
therefore created the qualified immunity
doctrine, itself a balance between absolute
immunity and no immunity.
What is qualified immunity? It is the right of
government officials performing
discretionary functions to be shielded from
liability for civil damages, even if they
violate the law, as long as they do not
violate "clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known." The court
determines whether the law was clearly
established at the time an action occurred. If
it was not, "an official could not reasonably
be expected to anticipate subsequent legal
developments, nor could he fairly be said to
'know' that the law forbade conduct not
previously identified as unlawful." But if the
law was clearly established, "the immunity
defense ordinarily should fail, since a
reasonably competent public official should
know the law governing his conduct."
Put another way, a public officer (whether a
police officer or a presidential aide) is not
liable for damages if his "mistaken
understanding" of the law was "reasonable."
For regular citizens, ignorance of the law is
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not a defense. For public officers (including
law enforcement officers), "reasonable"
ignorance of the law is a defense, at least in
civil rights actions for damages.
Timetables
When Should a Court Address Qualified
Immunity? If the defendant's alleged
conduct did not violate clearly established
law, should a court say whether the conduct
violated the law at all? In County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, the Supreme Court
held in 1998 that the "better approach" in
qualified immunity cases "is to determine
first whether the plaintiff has alleged a
deprivation of a constitutional right at all.
Normally, it is only then that a court should
ask whether the right allegedly implicated
was clearly established at the time of the
events in question." In two subsequent
cases, the Supreme Court (citing
Sacramento) clarified that courts "must"
first determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged the deprivation of a legal right, "and
if so, proceed to determine whether that
right was clearly established at the time of
the alleged violation."
The following year, however, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit resisted
the Supreme Court, focusing on
Sacramento's "better approach" language,
and minimizing the Court's subsequent
mandatory admonitions to address the
underlying constitutional question first. The
Second Circuit in Horne v. Coughlin
articulated a multifactor test for determining
the order of judicial resolution, including
whether the underlying question will
"escape federal court review over a lengthy
period" if the court only resolves the
qualified immunity issue, "the egregiousness
of the conduct that is challenged," and the
''ease of the decision" on the underlying
constitutional issue. See Horne v. Coughlin,
191 F.3d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1999).
But in 2001, the Supreme Court returned to
the issue, holding in no uncertain terms that
courts "must" first decide whether "the
officer's conduct violated a constitutional
right[.] This must be the initial inquiry." The
Court explained: "This is the process for the
law's elaboration from case to case, and it is
one reason for our insisting upon turning to
the existence or nonexistence of a
constitutional right as the first inquiry. The
law might be deprived of this explanation
were a court simply to skip ahead to the
question whether the law clearly established
that the officer's conduct was unlawful in
the circumstances of the case." Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
One might have thought this settled the
issue, but in 2002 the Second Circuit in
African Trade & Information Center Inc. v.
Abromaitis disregarded Saucier, holding that
while the "better approach" is to resolve the
underlying constitutional question first, the
court is nevertheless free to consider
qualified immunity first. Although African
Trade cited Sacramento (a 1998 case) and
Horne (a 1999 case), it did not cite Saucier
(a 2001 case). In 2003, the Second Circuit
did cite Saucier, stating that it was "bound
to implement that decision." But the court
then stated it would only apply Saucier in
the "vast majority" of qualified immunity
cases, and encouraged lower courts to "use
their good sense and limit [Saucier] to those
cases where it was meant to apply."
By its own terms, however, Saucier is
always meant to apply. "Must" means must.
In a 2004 dissent from a denial of certiorari,
Justice Antonin Scalia-while noting the
discomfort a minority of justices have with
the Saucier rule-reiterated Saucier's
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"mandatory order of priority for resolution,"
and specifically cited Horne as a case that
"mistakenly" concluded "that the
constitutional-question-first rule is
customary, not mandatory."
And last term, the Supreme Court once
again reaffirmed that courts are "required"
to resolve the underlying constitutional
question first. "This must be the initial
inquiry." If, "and only if, the court finds a
violation of a constitutional right," the court
can turn to qualified immunity. Scott v.
Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007) (citing
Saucier).
Nevertheless, a number of district courts in
this circuit, apparently unaware of the
Supreme Court's mandatory command in
Saucier and Harris, are still following the
more flexible, but erroneous, Second Circuit
approach.
Qualified Immunity
Reasons for Considering Qualified
Immunity First. It is perhaps ironic that, on
the issue of qualified immunity, the Second
Circuit has repeatedly failed to follow
clearly established Supreme Court
precedent. Why the resistance? To be sure,
there are valid reasons to consider qualified
immunity first, many set forth in a
fascinating discussion between Judge Pierre
Leval in the (since-overruled) majority
opinion in Horne, and Judge Richard J.
Cardamone in the Horne dissent. The Horne
majority first appealed to judicial restraint,
warning "against reaching out to adjudicate
constitutional matters unnecessarily." The
majority then stated that "a court's assertion
that a constitutional right exists would be
pure dictum" where there is qualified
immunity. Judges might be "insufficiently
thoughtful and cautious in uttering
pronouncements that play no role in their
adjudication," and parties "may do an
inadequate job briefing and presenting an
issue that predictably will have no effect on
the outcome of the case." Even worse, if a
lower court establishes a right but dismisses
the case on qualified immunity grounds, the
defendant (who won the case) will have no
right to appellate review. Finally, "[flor a
judiciary that is already heavily burdened
with cases it must decide, offering an
unnecessary but simple solution to an easy
problem is better justified than undertaking
unnecessarily to untangle a difficult,
complex issue."
Underlying Legal Issue
Reasons for Considering the Underlying
Legal Issue First. In dissent, Judge
Cardamone stated that the usual rule of
constitutional avoidance is "inapposite,
since even a finding of qualified immunity
with respect to an alleged constitutional
violation requires some determination about
the state of constitutional law at the time the
officer acted." As to the right of appeal,
Judge Cardamone noted that "there is no
indication that a plaintiff whose suit
is.. .dismissed [on qualified immunity
grounds] will lack incentive to appeal"; thus
the appellate court will usually have the
opportunity and the obligation to reconsider
the merits. Perhaps the more satisfying
answer, however, is Justice Scalia's: simply
give the defendant who loses on the merits
but prevails on qualified immunity the right
to appeal.
Judge Cardamone's core point, and the point
motivating the Supreme Court's repeated
command to resolve the merits first, is
simply this: what is the alternative? Were
the court not to resolve the merits first, the
"only real alternative is not to declare the
right at all, thereby leaving standards of
official conduct even more uncertain, to the
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detriment of both officials and the public."
The court would fail the fundamental "duty
of the judicial department, to say what the
law is" and "constitutional standards of
official conduct will be frozen in
uncertainty, a result at odds with
government under the rule of law."
The Home majority recognized this
possibility, but noted that qualified
immunity would not always preclude review
of the underlying legal question. Qualified
immunity, for example, is no defense in an
injunctive case, nor in a case against a
municipality, nor in a motion to suppress in
a criminal proceeding. But this is cold
comfort in the vast majority of federal civil
rights cases, certainly the vast majority of
police misconduct cases, where plaintiffs
cannot sue the municipality (because there is
no custom, practice, or policy of violating
the law, see Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)), nor sue for
injunctive relief (because of standing
requirements set forth in City ofLos Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) and its
progeny). And it is the rare case indeed
where public officials are criminally
prosecuted for civil rights violations.
Conclusion
Reasonable people can disagree whether a
court should be able in a special case to
consider qualified immunity first. But no
one can dispute the current state of the law.
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly and
in no uncertain terms that courts must first
resolve the merits, an order of decision
necessary to set forth principles which will
become the basis for a [future] holding that a
right is clearly established." The Second
Circuit is "bound to follow" Supreme Court
precedent, as is every district court within
the Second Circuit. Courts in this and other
circuits should be aware of their obligation
to follow Saucier, Harris, Wilson, and Conn,
and resolve the merits first.
Ilann Margalit Maazel is a partner at Emery
Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, which
specializes in civil rights and commercial
litigation.
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Oregon v. Ice
07-901
Ruling Below: Oregon v. Ice, 343 Ore. 248, 170 P.3d 1049 (2007), cert. granted, Oregon v. Ice,
2008 U.S. LEXIS 2387 (2008).
Thomas Eugene Ice was convicted of two counts of burglary and four counts of sexual abuse for
twice entering a tenant's apartment to abuse the tenant's 11 year old daughter. In sentencing, the
trial judge found additional facts under ORS 137.123 and imposed consecutive sentences instead
of concurrent sentences. On appeal, Ice argued that his right to a jury trial was violated because
the additional facts were not made by a jury. The Appellate Court upheld the sentence, but the
Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and remanded the case to the lower court.
Question Presented: Whether the Sixth Amendment, as construed in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), requires that facts (other
than prior convictions) necessary to imposing consecutive sentences be found by the jury or
admitted by the defendant.
State of OREGON, Respondent
V.
Thomas Eugene ICE, Petitioner
Supreme Court of Oregon
Decided October 11, 2007
GILLETTE, J.
The question in this criminal case is whether
the state or federal constitution requires that
a jury, rather than a judge, find the facts that
Oregon law requires be present before a
judge can impose consecutive sentences.
Over defendant's objection, the trial court in
the present case imposed consecutive
sentences based on its own factual findings.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment without opinion. State v.
Ice, 178 Ore. App. 415 (2001). We allowed
defendant's petition for review and now
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and the judgment of the trial court.
Defendant managed an apartment complex
where the l1-year-old victim, her mother,
and younger brother lived. On two
occasions, defendant entered into the
family's apartment at night. On each
occasion, defendant went into the victim's
bedroom and touched her breasts and then
her vagina.
Based on those acts, a grand jury indicted
defendant for committing six crimes. The
indictment alleged that defendant twice
committed first-degree burglary by entering
the victim's apartment with the intent to
commit sexual abuse. The indictment also
alleged that, during each burglary, defendant
committed two acts of first-degree sexual
abuse; specifically, the indictment alleged
that, on each occasion, defendant touched
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the victim's breasts and then her vagina.
Defendant pleaded not guilty. The case was
tried to a jury. After considering the
evidence, the jury convicted defendant of all
six charges.
Before the sentencing hearing, the parties
submitted sentencing memoranda.
Regarding the length of the sentences, the
state recommended that the trial court
impose enhanced or upward departure
sentences on the two burglary convictions
and also on the two sexual abuse convictions
based on touching the victim's vagina. It did
not argue that the court should impose
departure sentences on the two sexual abuse
convictions based on touching the victim's
breasts. With respect to the separate
question of whether the sentences should run
concurrently or consecutively, the state
contended that there were two separate
criminal episodes based on the two
burglaries and that the sentences arising out
of each of those criminal episodes should
run consecutively to each other. The state
also argued that, within each of the two
criminal episodes, the sentence for sexual
abuse based on touching the victim's vagina
should run consecutively to the sentence for
burglary. It recommended, however, that the
sentences for sexual abuse based on
touching the victim's breasts should run
concurrently with the sentences for sexual
abuse based on touching the victim's vagina.
In his sentencing memorandum, defendant
did not address whether the court should
impose departure sentences. Regarding
consecutive sentences, defendant agreed that
there were two criminal episodes and that
ORS 137.123(2) would permit the trial court
to impose the sentences arising out of the
second episode consecutively to the
sentences arising out of the first episode.
Defendant noted, however (and the state
agreed), that the trial court could impose
consecutive sentences within each episode
only if it made certain factual findings set
out in ORS 137.123(5). Defendant did not
argue, in his sentencing memorandum, that
either the state or federal constitution
required a jury to make those findings.
Defendant did argue, however, that the two
sexual abuse convictions that occurred
within each criminal episode should merge
and that, to the extent that there might be a
factual basis for finding that merger was not
appropriate, the state constitution required a
jury to make that factual finding.
After defendant filed his sentencing
memorandum but before the sentencing
hearing, the United States Supreme Court
issued its decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Defendant then
filed a supplemental memorandum bringing
that decision to the trial court's attention.
The memorandum recited the holding in that
case and then stated, "Accordingly, it is the
province of the jury to determine which
facts constitute a crime, and the jury must
also consider any factors which may result
in a sentence more severe than contemplated
by statute." Defendant's memorandum did
not purport to explain precisely how
Apprendi applied to the various sentencing
decisions before the trial court. More
specifically, defendant did not argue that
Apprendi applied to departure sentences;
that is, he did not argue that, as the United
States Supreme Court held four years later
in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004), the rule in Apprendi applied not only
to sentences that exceeded the statutory
maximum, but also to departure sentences
that exceeded guidelines sentences but
stayed within the statutory maximum.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court
noted that it had received extensive
sentencing memoranda from the parties and
asked whether either had anything to add.
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Defendant clarified one point. He argued
that, contrary to his statement in the
sentencing memorandum, the question
whether the two convictions for burglary
(and the attendant sexual abuse convictions)
arose out of separate criminal episodes
turned on a factual finding that, under the
state constitution, the jury had to make.
Having considered the parties' arguments,
the trial court rejected defendant's
arguments. The court then followed the
state's recommendations. It imposed upward
departure sentences on the two burglary
convictions and the two sexual abuse
convictions based on touching the victim's
vagina. It did not impose upward departure
sentences on the remaining two sexual abuse
convictions. It found that the first burglary
charge and the two related sexual abuse
charges occurred within a single criminal
episode, which ordinarily would require that
the sentences on those convictions be
concurrent unless the court made certain
factual findings. See ORS 137.123(5). On
that point, the court reasoned:
"[The c]ourt can impose
consecutive sentences [for offenses
that occur within a continuous and
uninterrupted course of conduct] if
the court finds [under ORS
137.123(5)] that the criminal
offense for which consecutive
sentence was contemplated was not
merely an incidental violation of a
separate statutory provision. I do
make that finding in this case, that
it was an indication of your
willingness to commit more than
one criminal offense.
"In addition, I find that in
committing sexual abuse in the
first degree that you caused or
created a risk of causing greater,
qualitatively different loss, injury
or harm to the victim than you did
in count 1. So, as I said, your
sentence on count 2 [sexual abuse
for touching the victim's vagina]
will be consecutive to the sentence
[o]n count 1 [burglary]."
The court ordered that the sentence on the
remaining sexual abuse conviction run
concurrently with the sentence on the sexual
abuse conviction for touching the victim's
vagina.
The court then found that the second
burglary was a "second separate incident"
and ordered that the sentence on that
conviction run consecutively to the other
sentences. Regarding the sexual abuse
convictions for touching the victim's vagina
and breasts during that second burglary, the
court, applying the same reasoning that it
had used in connection with the first
burglary, ordered that the sentence on the
conviction for sexual abuse based on
touching the victim's vagina run
consecutively to the sentence for the second
burglary, but that the conviction for sexual
abuse based on touching the victim's breasts
run concurrently with the other sentences.
Defendant appealed. Among other things, he
argued that the trial court violated his state
and federal constitutional rights both when it
imposed departure sentences and when it
ordered that the sentences for four of his six
convictions run consecutively rather than
concurrently. He further contended that,
even if he had failed to preserve those
issues, the Court of Appeals should reach
them under the plain error doctrine. As
noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment without opinion, and
we allowed defendant's petition for review
to consider whether either the state or
federal constitution requires that a jury
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rather than a judge find the facts necessary
to impose consecutive sentences.
[Concluding that the defendant
preserve his challenge to the
departure sentences.]
did not
upward
Defendant also argues that, under both the
state and federal constitutions, he had a right
to have the jury decide the facts on which
the court based its decision to impose
consecutive sentences. Before turning to
those arguments, we first describe ORS
137.123, which defines when courts may
impose consecutive sentences. See ORS
137.123(1). ORS 137.123 permits
consecutive sentences in two different
situations. First, ORS 137.123(2) provides
that, when a court sentences a defendant for
offenses that "do not arise from the same
continuous and uninterrupted course of
conduct" or when a court sentences a
defendant who already is serving a
previously imposed sentence, "the court may
impose a sentence concurrent with or
consecutive to the other sentence or
sentences." Second, ORS 137.123(4)
provides that, when "a defendant has been
found guilty of more than one criminal
offense arising out of a continuous and
uninterrupted course of conduct, the
sentences imposed for each resulting
conviction shall be concurrent unless the
court" finds one of two facts. If the court
finds either:
"(a) That the criminal offense for
which a consecutive sentence is
contemplated was not merely an
incidental violation of a separate
statutory provision in the course of
the commission of a more serious
crime but rather was an indication
of defendant's willingness to
commit more than one criminal
offense; or
"(b) [that t]he criminal offense for
which a consecutive sentence is
contemplated caused or created a
risk of causing greater or
qualitatively different loss, injury
or harm to the victim or caused or
created a risk of causing loss,
injury or harm to a different victim
than was caused or threatened by
the other offense or offenses
committed during a continuous and
uninterrupted course of conduct,"
then the trial court "has discretion to impose
consecutive terms of imprisonment." ORS
137.123(5).
The trial court viewed this as a case
involving both statutory bases for imposing
consecutive sentences: First, the trial court
found that the convictions for the two
burglaries (and the attendant sexual abuse
convictions) arose out of "separate
incident[s]" and, thus, did not "arise from
the same continuous and uninterrupted
course of conduct." See ORS 137.123(2)
(stating that criterion). Accordingly, the trial
court concluded that it had discretion under
ORS 137.123(2) to order that the sentences
arising out of the second burglary run
consecutively to the sentences arising out of
the first burglary. Second, the trial court
implicitly found that the three offenses (the
burglary and the two instances of sexual
abuse) that occurred during each burglary
arose out of a "continuous and uninterrupted
course of conduct." See ORS 137.123(4)
(stating that limitation). As to the latter
criterion, and before the trial court could
impose consecutive sentences on the
burglary and sexual abuse convictions, it
had to find either that the convictions for
burglary and sexual abuse reflected a
"willingness to commit more than one
criminal offense" or that the two offenses
"caused . . . greater or qualitatively different
loss, injury or harm to the victim." See ORS
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137.123(5)(a) and (b). As noted, the trial
court made both findings consistent with the
criteria in both ORS 137.123(5)(a) and (b)
before deciding that, within each criminal
episode, the sentence for one count of sexual
abuse would run consecutively to the
sentence for burglary.
[Concluding that the trial court's actions did
not violate the defendant's right to trial by
jury under Article 1, section 11 or the
Oregon Constitution.]
We turn to defendant's arguments under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Notably, the Supreme Court of
the United States has rejected, for purposes
of the Sixth Amendment, the analytical line
that this court has taken in the past (and that
we have described above) with respect to
Article I, section 11. That is, the Court has
indicated that it is wrong to allow the scope
of the right to a jury trial to depend on the
label-"element" or "sentencing factor"-
that the legislature chooses to assign to a
factual issue. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306. It
also has criticized judicial attempts to look
beneath the legislative labels in this area, as
this court did in Wedge, on the ground that
such analytical efforts are inevitably
subjective and manipulable. Id. at 307-08.
Ultimately, the court rejected the idea that
the Framers of the Sixth Amendment would
have thus
"left definition of the scope of jury
power up to a judges' intuitive
sense of how far is too far. We
think that claim [that the Sixth
Amendment should be deemed to
permit courts, rather than juries, to
decide facts that courts deem to be
mere 'sentencing factors'] not
plausible at all, because the very
reason the Framers put a jury-trial
guarantee in the Constitution is that
they were unwilling to trust
government to mark out the role of
the jury."
Id. at 308 (emphasis in original).
Thus, in a series of cases, beginning with
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999)
and ending, for the moment, with
Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856
(2007), the United States Supreme Court has
opted for a "bright line" rule when
confronted with the sort of claims that we
now are considering under the Sixth
Amendment in this case. That rule is most
succinctly stated in Apprendi: "Other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
490 (emphasis supplied). In Apprendi, the
court applied that rule in concluding that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights had
been violated when a trial court imposed a
prison term that exceeded the statutory
maximum for the crime for which the jury
had convicted the defendant, based on the
trial court's own determination that
defendant had committed the crime for
racially motivated reasons. Id. at 491.
Similarly, in Blakely, the court employed
that rule when it held that the Sixth
Amendment was violated when a trial court
imposed a sentence that exceeded the
statutory maximum for the crime-second-
degree kidnapping-that the jury had
convicted him of, based on the trial court's
own determination that the defendant had
acted with "deliberate cruelty." Blakely, 542
U.S. at 301-14.
In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
236 (2005), the Court explained its rationale
for adopting the foregoing rule. First, it
noted that, with the advent of determinate
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sentencing schemes, it had been forced to
consider "the significance of facts selected
by legislatures that . . . increased the range
of sentences possible for the underlying
crimes." Under sentencing schemes that
permitted trial judges to impose a sentence
that exceeded the statutory maximum for an
offense, based on finding certain sentencing
factors, "[i]t became the judge, not the jury,
who determined the upper limits of
sentencing, and the facts determined were
not required to be raised before trial or
proved by more than a preponderance" of
the evidence. Id. The Court then explained
that it had issued its holdings in Apprendi
and Blakely in response to this "new
sentencing practice." Id. at 237. The Court
reasoned:
"As it thus became clear that
sentencing was no longer taking
place in the tradition [of judicial
discretion in sentencing] that
Justice Breyer invokes [in his
dissenting opinion], the Court was
faced with the issue of preserving
an ancient guarantee [to trial by
jury] under a new set of
circumstances. The new sentencing
practice forced the Court to address
the question how the right of jury
trial could be preserved in a
meaningful way guaranteeing that
the jury would still stand between
the individual and the power of the
government under the new
sentencing regime. And it is the
new circumstances, not a tradition
or practice that the new
circumstances have superseded,
that have led [the Court] to the
answer first considered in Jones
and developed in Apprendi and
subsequent cases culminating with
this one."
Id. (emphasis added). We believe that the
foregoing statement from Booker makes it
inescapably clear that the rule in Apprendi
and Blakely is not directed at the traditional
discretion of judges to select a sentence
within a range that the legislature has
selected and the jury's verdict determines,
but at sentencing schemes that permit or
require judges to impose sentences that are
longer than sentences that a jury's verdict
alone would authorize.
Obviously, in the context of that concern, it
does not matter that a factual determination
is of a type that traditionally has been made
by judges in the exercise of their sentencing
discretion. The concern is with facts that
increase a defendant's sentence beyond the
prescribed maximum for the crime that the
jury determined that the defendant
committed. Under Apprendi, Blakely, and
their progeny, those facts must themselves
be decided by a jury.
Does the Apprendi rule apply to the present
circumstance, i.e., to factual findings that do
not increase the sentence for any individual
count but that authorize imposition of
consecutive sentences? The state contends
that it does not. The state notes that, as it is
stated and applied in Apprendi, Blakely, and
Booker, the rule is predicated on an increase
beyond the prescribed statutory minimum
"for a crime." It then argues:
"The relevant statutory maximum
for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence for each
separate, individual offense.
The consecutive-sentencing
determination is a quintessential
sentencing determination that
transcends each offense and only
becomes relevant when a jury has
already convicted a defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt of two
or more offenses. When a trial
court imposes consecutive
545
sentences, it imposes a sentence
that is within the statutory
maximum for each of the offenses
and then orders them to be served
consecutively. Accordingly,
consecutive sentences do not
implicate the rule from Apprendi."
We think, however, that in so arguing, the
state ignores many statements in the cases
that describe the problem in terms that are
not offense specific but that focus, instead,
on the quantum of punishment. For example,
in Apprendi, the court insisted that
"the relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect-does the
required finding expose the
defendant to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the jury's
guilty verdict."
530 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added).
More importantly, consecutive sentencing as
it occurred in the present case clearly
implicates the principles expressed in
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, even if it
does not mirror the specific circumstances in
those cases. It is important to recognize, in
that regard, that, under ORS 137.123,
consecutive sentencing in this state is not
simply a matter of judicial discretion, but
can be imposed only after the sentencing
judge has made certain legislatively required
findings. At least with respect to offenses
that arise out of the same continuous and
uninterrupted course of conduct, the jury's
issuance of multiple guilty verdicts will only
support concurrent sentences, unless the
judge makes those required findings.
As we have suggested, that arrangement
conflicts with the principles underpinning
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, if not with
the Apprendi rule itself. Under the statutes
that we just have described, the maximum
aggregate sentence that may be imposed,
based solely on the jury's verdicts and
without judicial factfinding, when a
defendant is convicted of multiple offenses,
assumes that all the sentences run
concurrently. But, under the same statutes,
additional factfinding-judicial fact-
finding-is required to justify consecutive
sentencing. Under that arrangement, a
consecutive sentence necessarily "expose[s]
the defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict,"
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, based on judicial
factfinding-and thereby violates the
principles discussed in Apprendi and
Blakely.
We acknowledge that most other courts that
have considered this question have reached a
different conclusion, usually on the ground
that Apprendi and its progeny announce a
narrow rule that should only be applied in
the circumstances in which the United States
Supreme Court heretofore has demanded its
application. See, e.g., State v. Cubias, 155
Wn. 2d 549 (2005); People v. Black, 41 Cal
4th 799 (2007); People v. Wagener, 196 Ill.
2d 269 (2001) (all to that effect). The dissent
takes the same view. However, we disagree
fundamentally with the proposition that the
Apprendi rule is a narrow one. In fact, we
think that the opposite is true-i.e., we think
that the rule of Apprendi and its progeny
establishes the right to a jury trial respecting
whatever factors a legislature has identified
as permitting the enhancement of an
otherwise statutorily limited sentence. The
fact that the Court has yet to speak
specifically to consecutive sentencing in this
respect seems to us to prove only that it has
not yet had a case on the subject. The
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker decisions all
go to great lengths to discuss the broad
principles underpinning their particular
holdings. It would be wrong for us to engage
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in an adamantine refusal to get the message.
We think that the application of the
Apprendi cases to the present problem is
obvious. In the present case, the trial court,
over defendant's objection, made a number
of findings, already identified, to support its
decision to order defendant to serve his
sentence on Count 4 (the second burglary
count) consecutively to Count 1 (the first
burglary count) and Count 2 and Count 5
(the two sexual abuse counts) consecutive to
their respective burglaries. Those findings
satisfied the requirements of ORS
137.123(2), (4) and (5) for imposition of
consecutive sentences. However, the
findings were not made by a jury, but were
used to increase defendant's punishment
beyond the aggregate statutory maximum
that the jury's verdict alone would support.
The trial court thus imposed the consecutive
sentences based on its own fact-finding and
in violation of defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights. That was error under the
rule of Apprendi and Blakely, as we
understand it. The trial court's error was
then sustained by the Court of Appeals.
That, too, was error. The case must be
remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED. The judgment of the circuit
court is REVERSED, and the case is
REMANDED to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
KISTLER, J., dissenting.
The majority holds that the rule in Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), applies
to the question whether a trial court should
impose multiple sentences concurrently or
consecutively. The majority's decision
marks an abrupt departure from years of
tradition; it converts what historically has
been an issue for trial judges into a federal
constitutional question for juries. Neither the
holding in Apprendi nor its reasoning
supports extending that decision to the
question of consecutive sentencing. Almost
every court that has considered this question
has held that Apprendi does not apply in this
context. I agree with those decisions and
respectfully dissent from the majority's
contrary holding.
Apprendi does not sweep as broadly as the
majority perceives. Rather, the Court has
been careful to explain that not "every fact
with a bearing on sentencing must be found
by a jury." Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 248. And it has not extended the reach
of Apprendi beyond the issue that gave rise
to it-the problem posed by determinate
sentencing schemes that enhance a
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory
maximum for a single offense on the basis
of facts that a judge (rather than a jury) finds
by a preponderance of the evidence (rather
than beyond a reasonable doubt). See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236-37
(2005) (explaining that problem posed by
determinate sentencing schemes gave rise to
the rule in Apprendi). The majority errs in
extending the rule in Apprendi farther than
either the holding or the reasoning in that
case warrants.
The issue before the Court in Apprendi was
narrow. In that case, and the cases that have
followed it, a trial court had enhanced a
defendant's sentence for a single offense
beyond the statutory maximum authorized
for that offense based on a fact that the court
had found during sentencing by a
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g.,
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69 (describing
the defendant's sentence). The constitutional
issue before the Court in each of those cases
was whether the sentencing factor that the
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trial court had relied on to enhance the
defendant's sentence was, in effect, an
element of the offense that a jury had to find
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Faced with that issue, the Court held in
Apprendi: "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. By its terms, the
holding in Apprendi does not extend to the
question of how a trial court should
aggregate multiple sentences. Rather, the
holding in Apprendi addresses the
procedures that a trial court must follow
when "the penalty for a crime [exceeds] the
prescribed statutory maximum" for that
crime. That is, Apprendi answers the
question what are the elements of an offense
that the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt. It does not answer the
separate question of how a trial court should
aggregate multiple sentences when a jury
has found a defendant guilty of multiple
offenses.
Were there any doubt about the scope of the
rule from Apprendi, the passage that the
majority quotes from Booker removes it. As
that passage makes clear, the rule in
Apprendi arose in response to "a new trend
in the legislative regulation of sentencing"
that the Court first recognized in 1986 in
McMillan when it "considered the
significance of facts selected by legislatures
that . . . increased the range of sentences
possible for the underlying crime." 543 U.S.
at 236. That is, the Court adopted the rule in
Apprendi to address determinate sentencing
schemes that defined the maximum sentence
for an offense but permitted a trial court to
enhance the sentence for that offense if the
trial court found certain "sentencing factors"
by a preponderance of the evidence.
The rule in Apprendi provides a means for
determining whether those "sentencing
factors" are elements of the offense that the
state has to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. It does not have a broader reach.
Indeed, the Court was careful to explain in
Booker that the rule it announced in
Apprendi was not intended to displace
traditional sentencing practices. As the
Court explained, "it is the new
circumstances [first recognized in 1986], not
a tradition or practice that the new
circumstances have superseded, that have
led [the Court] to the answer first considered
in Jones and developed in Apprendi and
subsequent cases culminating with this one."
Id. at 237. When the Court has explained, as
it did in Booker, that the rule in Apprendi
was intended to solve the problem posed by
determinate sentencing schemes, we should
be hesitant to extend Apprendi's holding
beyond the limits that the Court has
identified. That is especially true when, as in
this case, extending Apprendi displaces
authority that trial courts traditionally have
exercised-i.e., the authority to decide how
to aggregate multiple sentences.
Not only is the majority's decision today at
odds with the holdings and reasoning of the
Supreme Court's cases, but it is out of line
with the clear weight of authority. In states
that require factual findings as a predicate to
imposing consecutive sentences, almost
every court that has considered the issue has
held that Apprendi does not apply to the
decision to impose consecutive sentences.
Specifically, the courts in Colorado, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and Tennessee have held that
Apprendi does not apply to the decision
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whether to impose consecutive sentences.
To be sure, there is a split among the states
that have considered this recurring issue of
federal law-a split that the majority's
decision deepens and confirms. One other
state has held, as the majority does, that
Apprendi applies in this context, State v.
Foster, 109 Ohio St 3d 1 (2006), and
another state's decisions provide mixed
support for the majority's decision.
Compare State v. Cubias, 155 Wn 2d 549
(2005) (holding that Apprendi does not
apply to a factual prerequisite to imposing
consecutive sentences), with In re VanDefit,
158 Wn 2d 731 (2006) (holding that
Apprendi does apply to a factual prerequisite
to imposing consecutive sentences).
Although the majority can count at least one
and perhaps two states in its corner, the
overwhelming number of state courts (and
federal courts considering the
constitutionality of state sentencing statutes)
have held that Apprendi does not apply to
the decision to impose consecutive
sentences. Because I would not extend the
rule in Apprendi beyond either the issue or
the problem that the Court sought to solve in
that case, I respectfully dissent.
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"Court to Take a Look at Oregon's
Consecutive Sentencing Law"
Onthedocket.org
March 17, 2008
Onthedocket.org
The case arose in Oregon, where a state
judge sentenced landlord Thomas Eugene
Ice to 340 months in prison for twice
burglarizing a tenant's apartment and
molesting her young daughter. Over Ice's
objections, the trial judge imposed
consecutive sentences based on its own
factual findings in the case.
In 2001, the state court of appeals affirmed
the judge's decision without opinion. In
October 2007, a 5-2 Oregon Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for resentencing.
The majority held that the trial court
violated Ice's Sixth Amendment right, as set
forth by the Supreme Court in Apprendi v.
New Jersey (2000) and Blakely v.
Washington (2004), which established that
facts (other than prior convictions)
necessary to imposing consecutive sentences
must be found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant.
"The federal constitution requires that a
jury, rather than a judge, find the facts that
Oregon law requires be present before a
judge can impose consecutive sentences,"
the majority held.
The state asked the high court to intervene,
pointing to a split among the state supreme
courts on the issue.
"The majority of state courts that have
addressed the issue have concluded that the
principles of Apprendi and Blakely do not
apply to findings required for imposition of
consecutive sentences," the brief states.
"Illinois, Maine, Indiana, Tennessee,
Minnesota, Alaska and Colorado provide the
clearest examples. . . . Each state's highest
appellate court to have addressed the
question concluded, unlike the Oregon
Supreme Court, that this Court's cases were
not intended to apply to aggregate sentences,
but only to the individual sentence imposed
for each separate conviction."
The justices will hear oral arguments in the
fall [in Oregon v. Ice, Docket No. 07-901].
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"Court Ruling Cuts Prison Sentences"
The Portland Tribune
October 29, 2007
Nick Budnick
In Vancouver, a man who killed a police
dog potentially faces life in prison, while in
Portland a man found guilty in the attempted
murder of Portland Police Officer Robert
Wullbrandt was recently sentenced to just
five years behind bars.
If the punishment in the local case seems
light, the explanation lies partly in a recent
Oregon Supreme Court ruling that has sent
rumblings across the state and country-and
which has already started slicing years off
the sentences of recently convicted felons in
Multnomah County cases.
The ruling is called "State of Oregon v.
Thomas Eugene Ice," but everyone just calls
it "Ice."
"It's the talk of the courthouse," said Deputy
District Attorney Bob Leineweber. "It's the
talk of the state, actually."
In 2001, a Marion County Circuit Court
judge found Ice, a landlord, guilty of six
crimes committed while twice burglarizing a
tenant's apartment to molest her 11-year-old
daughter. The judge found that several of the
sentences should run consecutively to
amount to a stiffer sentence.
On Oct. 11, 2007, the Oregon Supreme
Court found that only a jury, not a judge,
could impose the sentences from multiple
crimes consecutively, rather than have them
run concurrently, or all at once.
The "Ice" ruling applies a number of recent
U.S. Supreme Court rulings, all based on the
Sixth Amendment's mandate that one is
entitled to a jury trial.
The Oregon ruling has thrown a wrench into
cases across the state. In Multnomah
County, Nicholas Onuskanich, found guilty
for shooting at Officer Wullbrandt in a
Trader Joe's parking lot in March, suddenly
had four years shaved off what his sentence
was likely to be.
"We were seeking a 105-month sentence,"
said the prosecutor in that case, Senior
Deputy District Attorney Don Rees. "And
based on the ruling in 'Ice,' the court found
that it could not impose a consecutive
sentence, and it could only impose a 60-
month sentence."
To avoid that outcome, either the jury in the
Onuskanich case would have to have been
kept around longer for sentencing, or a
second jury for sentencing would have
needed to be convened. But because of when
the 'Ice' ruling came out, it was too late for
Rees to rescue the longer sentence.
According to Oregon's Solicitor General,
Mary Williams, the "Ice" ruling will throw a
wrench into thousands of pending criminal
cases across Oregon, including those that
have already been adjudicated but which
still await a type of appeal called post-
conviction relief.
For those cases caught in mid-trial, the
ruling may require bringing back a second
jury for sentencing-meaning more time
and expense. "That means basically putting
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on your case again," Williams said.
And the uncertainty over how lower courts
should apply the ruling will also likely
trigger a flood of appeals. In fact, "There's
no way for that not to happen," Williams
said.
Because the case turns the traditional
concept of a judge's powers on its head, on
Tuesday, Oregon Attorney General Hardy
Myers authorized a petition to the United
States Supreme Court to hear an appeal of
"Ice."
Already, the case has generated intense
interest among "sentencing nerds" across the
country, Williams said. Myers' office has
already received inquiries from Alaska and
Pennsylvania concerning how it will react.
And judging by the reaction to the case
around the country on legal blogs, many
observers think there's a good chance the
federal Supremes will hear Myers' appeal.
Pending word on his appeal, Myers has
convened a panel of lawyers to try to
translate the "Ice" ruling into a trial
procedure for individual cases that both
works efficiently and can withstand appeal.
Williams said she is optimistic that people
on all sides of the case-defense lawyers,
judges and prosecutors-will come together
to forge a workable solution pending a U.S.
Supreme Court decision.
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"Sentencing Tsunami"
The National Law Journal
July 18, 2005
Laurie L. Levenson
Courts are still reeling from the legal
tsunami caused by the Supreme Court's
decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000). The sea change hit the
courts in a series of ground-shaking waves.
First, the court decided in Apprendi that
New Jersey's sentencing scheme violated
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
because it allowed a trial judge to increase a
defendant's sentence beyond the "statutory
maximum" without a jury finding on the
aggravating factors. Next came Blakely v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), in
which the court held that the "statutory
maximum" that triggers the right to a jury
trial is not necessarily the maximum penalty
stated in the statute for the crime; rather, it is
the "maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in
the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant." Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
Finally, the high court this term decided U.S.
v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Booker
called into question determinate sentencing
schemes and specifically held that it is
unconstitutional to use the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines as anything other
than advisory in federal sentencing
decisions.
Impact of Three Rulings Ripples Through
State Courts
The impact of these three decisions is still
rippling through the state courts. After
Blakely and Booker, state courts have been
left to determine what effect the court's
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment has
on their sentencing schemes. Although the
process is far from complete, it may be
helpful to examine how these state courts
have been interpreting their own sentencing
schemes in the post-Booker era.
For example, in People v. Black, 2005 Cal.
Lexis 6566 (June 20, 2005), the California
Supreme Court decided that the California
sentencing scheme survives the changes
brought on by Blakely and Booker.
California, like many other states, uses a
determinate sentencing law. Under that law,
the judge has the discretion to select the
upper, middle or low term in sentencing a
defendant.
In order to select the high term, the court
must identify aggravating factors, such as
the degree of cruelty displayed by the
defendant; the victim's vulnerability; the
defendant's use of a weapon or attempt to
obstruct justice, prior criminal acts and
abuse of positions of trust; and other similar
factors.
Under California law, the judge, not the
jury, makes the finding that there are
aggravating factors supporting the high term
sentence. In Black, the defendant challenged
his sentence for sexual abuse of a child. At
trial, the prosecution presented evidence that
the defendant repeatedly had sexual
intercourse with his 8-year-old stepdaughter.
The offense of continuous sexual abuse of a
child is punishable by a term of six, 12 or 16
years' imprisonment. Calif. Penal Code §
288.5. The court sentenced the defendant to
the upper term of 16 years for that offense,
selecting the high term based on the
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aggravating circumstances related to the
nature and seriousness of the crime. The
court also noted that the victim was
particularly vulnerable: Black had abused a
position of trust and confidence, and had
inflicted emotional and physical injuries on
the victim.
Under another provision of California law,
the court also imposed two indeterminate
terms of 15 years to life on separate lewd-
conduct counts that had been filed against
the defendant. After Black was convicted on
these charges, the court ordered that he serve
the additional terms consecutively.
Black challenged his sentence under Blakely
and Booker. He contended that the state's
sentencing procedure is unconstitutional
because it does not provide the defendant
with a jury trial on the aggravating factors
relied upon by the judge in imposing an
upper-term sentence or consecutive
sentences.
The California Supreme Court rejected
Black's challenge and upheld the state
sentencing scheme. For several reasons, it
held that allowing the judge instead of the
jury to determine whether there are
aggravating factors justifying a high term
does not undermine a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right. First, the court noted that
California's move to determinate sentencing
in 1977 was designed to reduce, not
increase, the length of potential sentences.
Importantly, California did not convert
elements of a crime into sentencing factors.
Jurors must still decide the key elements of
an offense.
Second, in structuring the sentencing
scheme, the legislature did not restrict the
facts that could be used to select a high term
at sentencing. The trial judge can look at a
wide variety of factors related to the
circumstances of the crime. Finally, and
most importantly, California's overall
sentencing scheme expressly provides for
jury verdicts on "sentencing enhancements"
that significantly aggravate a defendant's
sentence.
The court also held that Blakely did not bar
the California system of allowing the judge
to decide when sentences will run
consecutively. The jury's verdict authorizes
the statutory maximum sentence for each
offense; permitting a judge to decide
between concurrent and consecutive
sentences does not undermine the jury's role
in the case.
One justice, Joyce Kennard, dissented.
Although she agreed that Blakely and
Booker do not limit the power of judges to
determine whether a sentence should run
consecutively, she took the position that
judges should not be able to decide whether
there are aggravating facts justifying an
upper term. Other than aggravating factors
relating to a defendant's prior convictions,
Kennard read Blakely and Booker as
requiring a jury verdict on those issues.
California is not the only state that has had
to confront the constitutionality of its
sentencing scheme in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decisions. In People
v. Lopez, 2005 Colo. Lexis 504 (May 23,
2005), the Colorado Supreme Court rejected
a general challenge to Colorado's entire
sentencing scheme. It noted that under
Blakely, there are four kinds of acts that can
lead to an aggravated sentence: (1) facts
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt;
(2) facts admitted by the defendant; (3) facts
found by a judge after the defendant
stipulates to judicial fact-finding for
sentencing purposes; and (4) facts regarding
prior convictions. To the extent that Lopez 's
sentence was based upon facts relating to his
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prior conviction that were discussed at his
plea, the trial court had free rein to impose
the higher sentence.
The Colorado Supreme Court referred to
other courts that have been troubled by their
sentencing schemes. For example, in
Arizona, the court found that a sentence
imposed beyond the presumptive range and
in the "super-aggravated" range based on
facts found by a judge alone violate Blakely.
See State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004).
Likewise, in Indiana, the court found that
the mandatory aggravation of a sentence by
the judge alone is unconstitutional and it
therefore excised portions of the sentencing
statute. See Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679
(Ind. 2005). It refused, however, to hold that
aggravating factors that support consecutive
sentences must be found by the jury. See
Sowders v. Indiana, 2005 Ind. Lexis 538
(June 16, 2005), citing, Smylie, 823 N.E.2d
at 686.
The Minnesota, Oregon and Washington
systems have faced similar challenges. See
State v. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d 785 (Minn.
2004) (Minnesota statute requires imposition
of presumptive sentence unless court finds
"aggravating factors"); State v. Dilts, 337
Ore. 645 (Ore. 2004) (Oregon statute states
that "the sentencing judge shall impose the
presumptive sentence . . . unless the judge
finds substantial and compelling reasons to
impose a departure"); State v. Hughes, 2005
WL 851137 *5 (Wash. April 14, 2005)
(Washington statute provides matrix for
determination of sentence absent judge
finding of "substantial and compelling
reasons").
Some States Unwilling to Invalidate Their
Statutes
Although many states have statutes that are
vulnerable to constitutional challenge,
several of them, such as Oregon,
Washington and Arizona, have not been
willing to invalidate their statutes, but focus
on whether the particular sentence in that
case needs to be vacated. So long as the
judge used permissible factors to enhance
the sentence, the court did not have to strike
down the entire sentencing scheme.
Some jurisdictions go one step further. The
Maine, Colorado, Indiana and Arizona high
courts have held that even when a sentence
is unconstitutional, the courts have the
power to modify the state's sentencing
procedures to make their sentences
constitutionally viable by allowing for jury
findings on aggravating sentencing factors.
See, e.g., Maine v. Scholfield, 2005 Me. 82
*P39 (June 29, 2005). However, the
Washington and Ohio supreme courts have
rejected the argument that they may impose
a system of jury sentencing. See Hughes,
supra; State ex re. Mason v. Griffin, 819
N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ohio 2004).
States have a wide range of sentencing
schemes. Most have withstood systemic
attack. Those best situated to weather the
storm are states that use their sentencing
guidelines as only advisory. As in Booker,
the voluntary and nonbinding nature of
sentencing guidelines exempts the sentences
from the Blakely requirement that the jury
determine the critical facts the judge will use
to decide on the proper sentence.
Indeterminate sentencing systems are
unaffected by the holding in Blakely. See,
e.g., State v. Stover, 104 P.3d 969 (Idaho
2005). See also Shabazz v. Delaware, 2005
Del. Lexis 221 (June 14, 2005)
(unpublished).
The aftershocks from Blakely and Booker
continue. Even in those states where the
sentencing schemes have survived, lawyers
keep flooding the courts with challenges to
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individual sentences. Just offshore,
dissenting judges stand ready to broadly
interpret Blakely by striking down
sentencing schemes that put more power in
the hands of judges than those of the
legislatures and juries. See, e.g., People v.
Rivera, 2005 N.Y. Lexis 1214 (June 9,
2005) (unpublished).
Laurie L. Levenson is a professor of law,
William M Rains Fellow and director of the
Center for Ethical Advocacy at Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles.
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"'Sentence Enhancements' Curbed"
Los Angeles Times
June 27, 2000
David Savage
WASH INGTON-Juries, not judges, must
decide whether a defendant deserves more
prison time because his offense was a hate
crime, the Supreme Court ruled Monday.
The 5-4 decision does not affect most "hate
crime" laws in California and elsewhere.
Those statutes already put the matter in the
jury's hands.
However, the ruling limits the use of so-
called "sentence enhancements" imposed by
judges. Under these laws, judges can
increase the punishment for a convicted
criminal if his offense was motivated by
race, gender, religious or other biases.
Speaking for the court, Justice John Paul
Stevens said that the Constitution gives all
defendants facing substantially more prison
time the right to have the hate-crime charge
"submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."
Ruling May Encourage Higher Penalties
Professor Brian Levin, an expert on hate
crimes at Cal. State San Bernardino, said the
decision is not a major setback.
It will likely encourage state legislatures to
set higher maximum penalties for some
offenses, he said.
"The overwhelming majority of hate crime
sentencing enhancement laws will be
unaffected because they already require that
these issues be decided by a jury," Levin
said.
But the decision likely will knock at least
two years off a 12-year prison sentence
given to a white New Jersey man who fired
shots into the home of a black neighbor.
Charles Apprendi Jr., a 37-year-old
pharmacist from Vineland, N.J., was
drinking heavily on the night of Dec. 22,
1994. Well after midnight, he fired eight
shots into the home of the one African
American family in the area.
No one was injured and Apprendi was
immediately arrested. Under questioning, he
said that he fired the shots because his
neighbors were black.
He was indicted on several weapons charges
and pleaded guilty to offenses that could
yield a maximum 10-year prison term. At
his sentencing hearing, prosecutors cited the
state's Ethnic Intimidation Act and asked for
a stiffer sentence.
Taking the witness stand, Apprendi denied
that his crime was racially motivated and
blamed it on his drinking. But the judge
agreed with the prosecutors that, more likely
than not, Apprendi's offense reflected racial
bias. The judge imposed the 12-year term.
The Supreme Court in 1993 upheld the
constitutionality of hate crimes laws. But it
had not made clear who must decide
whether the crime was motivated by racial
bias.
In recent years, the justices have struggled to
clarify the line between so-called
"sentencing factors" and the crime itself.
A basic principle of American law is that
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defendants have a right to be tried by a jury.
Prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant committed the crime.
At the same time, judges traditionally weigh
factors about the defendant and his crimes
when deciding on a sentence.
Once again in the case (Apprendi vs. New
Jersey, 99-478), the justices found
themselves closely split. The majority said
that, because the 12-year sentence exceeded
the maximum for the gun crimes, the "racial
bias" offense was like a separate crime that
must be weighed by the jury.
Justice Stevens wrote a 32-page opinion,
and Justice Clarence Thomas added another
27-page opinion agreeing with him. Justice
Antonin Scalia filed a two-page opinion
agreeing as well. Justice David H. Souter
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the
majority.
Dissenters File Voluminous Opinions
The dissenters did not go quietly. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor wrote 33 pages to
disagree, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer
added 13 pages of his own dissent. Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist joined both
dissents and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
joined O'Connor's.
The issue figures to be a recurring one. Just
three weeks ago, the court overturned the
30-year prison terms given to survivors of
the Branch Davidian tragedy near Waco,
Texas. They were convicted by a jury on
gun charges that carried five-year prison
terms, but prosecutors had asked a judge to
impose the severe 30-year term because
their weapons were machine guns.
In the area of hate crimes, California has
both types of statutes. It is a separate crime
to "willfully injure [or] intimidate" someone
or damage their property because of the
"person's race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, disability, gender or sexual
orientation." Defendants have a right to have
a jury decide this charge.
The state's "sentence enhancement" law
allows a judge to add up to four years in
prison if a crime was motivated by illegal
bias. Monday's ruling would appear to cast
doubt on these extra sentences if they are
imposed by a judge alone.
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Herring v. United States
07-513
Ruling Below: United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2007), cert granted, Herring
v. United States, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S., Feb. 19, 2008).
While Herring was at the Coffee County Sheriffs Department, Investigator Anderson asked the
warrant clerk to check if there were any outstanding warrants for Herring's arrest. Finding no
warrants in Coffee County, the clerk then called neighboring Dale County to inquire if any
outstanding warrants existed there. The Dale County Sheriffs warrant clerk found a record in
her computer of an outstanding warrant for Herring's arrest and communicated this information
to the Coffee County clerk, who then relayed the information to Investigator Anderson.
Anderson and another deputy pursued Herring and arrested him. In their search of the defendant
and his vehicle, the officers found methamphetamine and a firearm. Meanwhile, the Dale County
Sheriffs warrant clerk, unable to find the physical warrant, phoned the Dale County Clerk's
Office, at which point she was informed that the warrant had been recalled. A clerical error had
prevented this information from being entered into the warrant clerk's computer. She
immediately phoned Coffee County to inform them that the warrant was no longer valid, but the
arrest had already taken place. The Defendant's motions to suppress the evidence of the drugs
and the firearm as illegally obtained without a warrant were denied at trial and by the Eleventh
Circuit. The defendant appeals.
Question Presented: Whether the Fourth Amendment requires the suppression of evidence
seized incident to a warrantless arrest for which there was no probably cause, conducted in sole
reliance on an inaccurate report from other law enforcement personnel regarding the existence of
an outstanding warrant.
Bennie Dean HERRING, Appellant,
V.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Decided July 17, 2007
CARNES, Circuit Judge.
The facts of this case present an interesting
issue involving whether to apply the
exclusionary rule. Officers in one
jurisdiction check with employees of a law
enforcement agency in another jurisdiction
and are told that there is an outstanding
warrant for an individual. Acting in good
faith on that information the officers arrest
the person and find contraband. It turns out
the warrant had been recalled. The
erroneous information that led to the arrest
and search is the result of a good faith
mistake by an employee of the agency in the
other jurisdiction. Does the exclusionary
rule require that evidence of the contraband
be suppressed, or does the good faith
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exception to the rule permit use of the
evidence?
I.
On a July afternoon in 2004, Bennie Dean
Herring drove his pickup truck to the Coffee
County, Alabama Sheriffs Department to
check on another of his trucks, which was
impounded in the Department's lot. As
Herring was preparing to leave the Sheriffs
Department, Coffee County Investigator
Mark Anderson arrived at work. Anderson
knew Herring and had reason to suspect that
there might be an outstanding warrant for
his arrest. Anderson asked Sandy Pope, the
warrant clerk for the Coffee County
Sheriffs Department, to check the county
database. She did and told Anderson that she
saw no active warrants for Herring in Coffee
County.
Investigator Anderson asked Pope to call the
Sheriffs Department in neighboring Dale
County to see if there were any outstanding
warrants for Herring there. Pope telephoned
Sharon Morgan, the Dale County warrant
clerk, who checked her database and told
Pope that there was an active warrant in that
county charging Herring with failure to
appear on a felony charge. Pope relayed that
information to Anderson.
Acting quickly on the information,
Investigator Anderson and a Coffee County
deputy sheriff followed Herring as he drove
away from the Sheriff s Department. They
pulled Herring over and arrested him
pursuant to the Dale County warrant, and
they searched both his person and the truck
incident to the arrest. The search turned up
some methamphetamine in Herring's pocket
and a pistol under the front seat of his truck.
All of that happened in Coffee County.
Meanwhile back in Dale County, Warrant
Clerk Morgan was trying in vain to locate a
copy of the actual warrant for Herring's
arrest. After she could not find one, she
checked with the Dale County Clerk's
Office, which informed her that the warrant
had been recalled. Morgan immediately
called Pope, her counterpart in Coffee
County, to relay this information, and Pope
transmitted it to the two Coffee County
arresting officers. Only ten to fifteen
minutes had elapsed between the time that
Morgan in Dale County had told Pope that
an active warrant existed and the time that
Morgan called her back to correct that
statement. In that short interval, however,
the Coffee County officers had acted on the
initial information by arresting Herring and
carrying out the searches incident to that
arrest.
As a result of the contraband found during
the searches, Herring was indicted on
charges of possessing methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to
suppress any evidence of the
methamphetamine and firearm on grounds
that the searches that turned them up were
not incident to a lawful arrest, because the
arrest warrant on which the officers acted
had been rescinded.
The magistrate judge recommended denying
the motion to suppress. He found that the
arresting officers conducted their search in a
good faith belief that the arrest warrant was
still outstanding, and that they had found the
drugs and firearm before learning the
warrant had been recalled. The magistrate
judge concluded that there was "simply no
reason to believe that application of the
exclusionary rule here would deter the
occurrence of any future mistakes." The
district court adopted the magistrate judge's
recommendation and made the additional
finding that the erroneous warrant
information appeared to be the fault of Dale
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County Sheriffs Department personnel
instead of anyone in Coffee County.
A jury convicted Herring of both counts, and
he was sentenced to 27 months
imprisonment. His sole contention on appeal
is that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the drugs and firearm
that were found during the search of his
truck.
II.
The parties agree on the central facts. The
Coffee County officers made the arrest and
carried out the searches incident to it based
on their good faith, reasonable belief that
there was an outstanding warrant for Herring
in Dade County. They found the drugs and
firearm before learning that the warrant had
been recalled. The erroneous information
about the warrant resulted from the
negligence of someone in the Dale County
Sheriffs Department, and no one in Coffee
County contributed to the mistake. The only
dispute is whether, under these facts, the
exclusionary rule requires the suppression of
the firearm and drugs.
A.
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." United
States Const. Amend. IV. The searches of
Herring's person and truck cannot be
justified as incident to a lawful arrest
because the arrest was not lawful. There was
no probable cause for the arrest and the
warrant had been rescinded. That means the
searches violated Herring's Fourth
Amendment rights, but it does not mean that
the evidence obtained through them must be
suppressed. As the Supreme Court has told
us on more than one occasion, whether to
apply the exclusionary rule is "an issue
separate from the question [of] whether the
Fourth Amendment rights of the party
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by
police conduct." United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 906 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 223 (1983)).
The Leon case is the premier example of the
distinction between finding a constitutional
violation and excluding evidence based on
that violation. Leon held that the
exclusionary rule does not bar the use of
evidence obtained by officers acting in good
faith reliance on a warrant which is later
found not to be supported by probable cause.
Id. at 922. The Court's analysis of whether
the exclusionary rule should be applied to
constitutional violations stemming from
mistakes by judicial officers carried out by
law enforcement officers proceeded in two
steps. First, the Court considered whether
the rule should be applied because it might
improve the performance of judges and
magistrate judges, and the Court concluded
that was not a good enough reason for
applying it. See id. at 916-17 ("[T]he
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police
misconduct rather than to punish the errors
of judges and magistrates."); see also
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987).
Second, the Court considered whether, and
if so how much, application of the
exclusionary rule in that circumstance might
be expected to improve the behavior of law
enforcement officers, and it concluded that
any slight deterrent benefit provided by
applying the rule would be outweighed by
the heavy costs of excluding relevant and
material evidence. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-22
("We conclude that the marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively
reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the
substantial costs of exclusion."); see also
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Krull, 480 U.S. at 348; United States v.
Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir.
1985) (characterizing Leon as establishing
that the exclusionary rule "remains viable
only as a deterrent to police misconduct").
A decade later, in Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1 (1995), the Court extended Leon's
"good faith exception" to the exclusionary
rule to circumstances in which officers rely
in good faith on a court employee's
representation that a valid warrant existed
when, in fact, the warrant has previously
been quashed. Id. at 14. The government
contends that Evans involved essentially the
same situation as this case and that the
Evans decision standing alone justifies the
admission of the illegally obtained evidence
here. We think, however, that this effort by
the government to justify its capture of
Herring red-handed relies on a red herring.
The Supreme Court in Evans expressly
declined to address whether the exclusionary
rule should be applied when police
personnel rather than court employees are
the source of the error, id. at 15 n.5, thereby
disavowing any decision on the issue the
government argues the Court decided.
For guidance on this issue we return to
Leon. The opinion in that case instructs us
that "[w]hether the exclusionary sanction
is appropriately imposed in a particular case
... must be resolved by weighing the costs
and benefits of preventing the use in the
prosecution's case in chief of inherently
trustworthy tangible evidence." 468 U.S. at
906. A rule that denies the jury access to
probative evidence "must be carefully
limited to the circumstances in which it will
pay its way by deterring official
lawlessness." Gates, 462 U.S. at 257-58.
That means the exclusionary rule should
only be applied to a category of cases if it
will "result in appreciable deterrence."
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454
(1976). Application of the rule is
unwarranted where "[a]ny incremental
deterrent effect . . . is uncertain at best."
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
351 (1974).
The possibility that application of the
exclusionary rule in a situation may deter
Fourth Amendment violations to some
extent is not enough. Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); see Leon, 468
U.S. at 910. Instead, the test for extending
the exclusionary rule is whether the costs of
doing so are outweighed by the deterrent
benefits. Leon, 468 U.S. at 910.
The "substantial social costs exacted by the
exclusionary rule" are well known. Id. at
907. The Supreme Court has "consistently
recognized that unbending application of the
exclusionary sanction . . . would impede
unacceptably the truth-finding functions of
judge and jury," United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980), and it has
"repeatedly emphasized that the rule's
'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law
enforcement objectives presents a high
obstacle for those urging [its] application."
Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S.
357, 364-65 (1998). For that reason,
suppression of evidence has always been a
last resort, not a first impulse. Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
Unlike the costs of applying the
exclusionary rule, the benefits of doing so
are hard to gauge because empirical
evidence of the rule's deterrent effect is
difficult, if not impossible, to come by. See
Janis, 428 U.S. at 449-53. Even if we could
measure or approximate any deterrent effect
that the exclusionary rule produces, in order
to value that effect we must identify the
intended target of the deterrence. Id. at 448,
("In evaluating the need for a deterrent
sanction, one must first identify those who
562
are to be deterred."). It is this question that
the first part of Leon and nearly all of Evans
addresses. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-17;
Evans, 514 U.S. at 11-17. The answer that
both cases give is that the exclusionary rule
is designed to deter police misconduct,
rather than to punish the errors of others (in
those cases, judicial magistrates and court
clerks). Leon, 468 U.S. at 916; Evans, 514
U.S. at 11. Our decisions give the same
answer. See, e.g., United States v. Martin,
297 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2002);
Accardo, 749 F.2d at 1480. Misconduct by
other actors is a proper target of the
exclusionary rule only insofar as those
others are "adjuncts to the law enforcement
team." Evans, 514 U.S. at 15.
To sum up, our review of Leon identifies
three conditions that must occur to warrant
application of the exclusionary rule. First,
there must be misconduct by the police or by
adjuncts to the law enforcement team. Id. at
913-17. Second, application of the rule must
result in appreciable deterrence of that
misconduct. Id. at 909. Finally, the benefits
of the rule's application must not outweigh
its costs. Id. at 910.
B.
As for the first condition, "[t]he deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily
assumes that the police have engaged in
willful, or at the very least negligent,
conduct which has deprived the defendant of
some right." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 447 (1974). The conduct in question in
this case is the failure of someone inside the
Dale County Sheriff s Office to record in
that department's records the fact that the
arrest warrant for Herring had been recalled
or rescinded by the court or by the clerk's
office. That failure to bring the records up to
date is "at the very least negligent." See id.
We will assume for present purposes that the
negligent actor, who is unidentified in the
record, is an adjunct to law enforcement in
Dale County and is to be treated for
purposes of the exclusionary rule as a police
officer.
As for the second consideration in deciding
whether to apply the exclusionary rule to
these circumstances, doing so will not deter
bad record keeping to any appreciable
extent, if at all. There are several reasons for
this. For one thing, the conduct in question
is a negligent failure to act, not a deliberate
or tactical choice to act. There is no reason
to believe that anyone in the Dale County
Sheriffs Office weighed the possible
ramifications of being negligent and decided
to be careless in record keeping. Deterrents
work best where the targeted conduct results
from conscious decision making, because
only if the decision maker considers the
possible results of her actions can she be
deterred.
Another reason that excluding evidence
resulting from the negligent failure to update
records is unlikely to reduce to any
significant extent that type of negligence is
that there are already abundant incentives
for keeping records current. First, there is
the inherent value of accurate record-
keeping to effective police investigation.
Inaccurate and outdated information in
police files is just as likely, if not more
likely, to hinder police investigations as it is
to aid them. Second, and related to the first
reason, there is the possibility of reprimand
or other job discipline for carelessness in
record keeping. Third, there is the possibility
of civil liability if the failure to keep records
updated results in illegal arrests or other
injury. Fourth, there is the risk that the
department where the records are not kept
up to date will have relevant evidence
excluded from one of its own cases as a
result.
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There is also the unique circumstance here
that the exclusionary sanction would be
levied not in a case brought by officers of
the department that was guilty of the
negligent record keeping, but instead it
would scuttle a case brought by officers of a
different department in another county, one
whose officers and personnel were entirely
innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness.
We do not mean to suggest that Dale County
law enforcement agencies are not interested
in the successful prosecution of crime
throughout the state, but their primary
responsibility and interest lies in their own
cases. Hoping to gain a beneficial deterrent
effect on Dale County personnel by
excluding evidence in a case brought by
Coffee County officers would be like telling
a student that if he skips school one of his
classmates will be punished. The student
may not exactly relish the prospect of
causing another to suffer, but human nature
being what it is, he is unlikely to fear that
prospect as much as he would his own
suffering. For all of these reasons, we are
convinced that this is one of those situations
where "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect
which might be achieved by extending the
rule ... is uncertain at best," Calandra, 414
U.S. at 348, where the benefits of
suppression would be "marginal or
nonexistent," Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-22, and
where the exclusionary rule would not "pay
its way by deterring official lawlessness,"
Gates, 462 U.S. at 257-58.
Turning to the third Leon condition, any
minimal deterrence that might result from
applying the exclusionary rule in these
circumstances would not outweigh the
heavy cost of excluding otherwise
admissible and highly probative evidence.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 910.
In closing, we note, as the Supreme Court
did in Leon, that the test for reasonable
police conduct is objective. 468 U.S. at 919
n.20. The district court found that "there
[was] no credible evidence of routine
problems with disposing of recalled
warrants" and updating records in Dale
County, and Herring does not contest that
finding. If faulty record-keeping were to
become endemic in that county, however,
officers in Coffee County might have a
difficult time establishing that their reliance
on records from their neighboring county
was objectively reasonable. The good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule does not
shelter evidence that was obtained in an
unconstitutional arrest or search that was
based on objectively unreliable information.
See Evans, 514 U.S. at 17 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
AFFIRMED.
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"Evidence Rule to Be Reviewed"
Los Angeles Times
February 20, 2008
David Savage
The Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to
reconsider the reach of the "exclusionary
rule," a doctrine that has been controversial
since the 1960s because it requires judges to
throw out evidence if it was obtained
improperly by the police.
Several of the court's conservatives,
including Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
and Justice Antonin Scalia, have signaled
they would like to rein in this rule.
Every day, police officers stop cars or make
arrests by relying on information in the files
or on the computers of a police department.
On occasion, the information is outdated or
inaccurate. What should be done, then, if the
officer finds drugs or guns in a stopped car,
only to learn later that he relied on faulty
information when he stopped the vehicle?
Judges have been divided on that question.
Some have said the evidence is tainted and
should be suppressed. Others have said the
evidence should be used if the officer was
not to blame for the error.
The high court said it would hear next fall a
drug case from Alabama, Herring vs.
United States, to decide the question.
In July 2004, Bennie D. Herring went to a
police station to retrieve several items from
an impounded car. Investigator Mark
Anderson saw him and began calling around
to see if there were any outstanding warrants
against Herring.
A police employee from a neighboring
county said there was such a warrant, and
then Anderson and another officer set off in
pursuit of Herring. They pulled him over,
arrested him and found methamphetamine in
his pocket and a gun in his car. Minutes
later, the police employee called back to say
there was a mistake. The warrant against
Herring had been revoked, but the entry in
the computer file had not been updated.
When Herring went to trial on federal drug
charges, a judge refused to suppress the
evidence against him. The U.S. Court of
Appeals in Atlanta agreed, saying it made no
sense "to scuttle a case" when the arresting
officer was "entirely innocent of any
wrongdoing or carelessness."
Two Stanford law professors appealed on
Herring's behalf. They argued that the court
should not allow arrests and prosecutions
that were triggered by computer errors and
faulty record-keeping by the police.
The high court first announced the
exclusionary rule in a 1914 case involving a
federal prosecution for illegally sending
lottery tickets in the mail. The rule was
meant to enforce the 4th Amendment's ban
on "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Its aim was to deter officers from breaking
the law to obtain evidence.
It gained wide attention only after 1961
when the court extended the rule to cover
state troopers and local police.
The rule has always had its share of
skeptics. As Benjamin N. Cardozo, then a
New York state judge, famously put it: "The
criminal goes free because the constable has
blundered."
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"In Alabama Drug Case, a Question of Timing"
Legal Times
February 11, 2008
Tom Goldstein
In the 1995 case Arizona v. Evans, the
Supreme Court, by a vote of 7-2, upheld the
search of a motorist mistakenly arrested
after the local courthouse failed to inform
the sheriffs department that a previous
arrest warrant had been quashed.
In a concurring opinion, however, three
justices-Sandra Day O'Connor, David
Souter and Stephen Breyer-reserved the
question of whether the "exclusionary rule"
should apply if a mistaken arrest occurs due
to the negligence of law enforcement, rather
than judicial, personnel.
Nearly 13 years later, the justices have the
opportunity to take up that question when
they convene for their private conference on
Feb. 15. The Court could announce a
decision as soon as Feb. 19. (The petition is
No. 07-513, Herring v. United States.
Disclosure: Tom Goldstein is co-counsel to
the petitioner.)
The arrest in question occurred in Alabama
in July 2004, shortly after Bennie Herring
left the Coffee County sheriffs department,
where he had gone to retrieve personal items
from an impounded vehicle. As Herring was
about to leave, a county investigator named
Mark Anderson arrived for work.
On a hunch, Anderson, who had a
contentious history with Herring, asked a
fellow employee to check whether Herring
had any outstanding arrest warrants in the
county. He had none. At Anderson's
request, the employee next called to see if
Herring had outstanding warrants in
neighboring Dale County. By phone, an
employee in the Dale County sheriffs
department said computer records showed
that Herring was in fact wanted for failing to
appear on a felony charge.
Anderson and a deputy sheriff immediately
left in pursuit of Herring. They pulled him
over and, over Herring's protest, placed him
in custody. Conducting a search incident to
the arrest, the officers discovered
methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a
gun under the front seat.
Minutes later, after being unable to find a
physical copy of the arrest warrant, the Dale
County employee called back to say she had
been mistaken. Herring's warrant had been
recalled five months prior, but the sheriffs
department had failed to update its computer
records.
At trial in the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama, the judge
denied Herring's motion to suppress the
evidence and, following conviction by a
jury, sentenced him to 27 months in prison.
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
11th Circuit unanimously affirmed.
Noting that the exclusionary rule was
created to deter police misconduct, rather
than to remedy victims of unlawful searches,
the panel found that courts should only
suppress illegally obtained evidence when
doing so could "result in appreciable
deterrence" of future police misconduct.
While conceding that Herring's arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment, the panel
concluded that law enforcement already has
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sufficient incentives to keep criminal
databases accurate. As examples, the panel
listed authorities' interests in avoiding
internal reprimands, civil liability for
wrongful arrests, and the potential hindering
of one of their own probes. The panel also
reasoned that suppressing the evidence
against Herring would foil the work of the
department that made the arrest, not the one
that provided the faulty data.
Herring's petition for certiorari, filed by
Jeffrey Fisher of the Stanford Law School
Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, maintains
that courts have been divided over the
question since even before the Court left it
unanswered in Evans.
According to Fisher, some courts have
found that the "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule should apply to all
inadvertent clerical errors, while others have
suppressed evidence from searches made
due to law enforcement negligence. Pointing
to a factually similar case decided by the
Arkansas Supreme Court, Fisher asserts that
suppression would further "the need to deter
'defective recordkeeping' by law
enforcement as a whole."
Fisher also questions the assumptions
underlying the 11th Circuit's ruling. The
petition says that it's unclear whether the
responsible employees were disciplined for
Herring's mistaken arrest, that officers
acting on misinformation would likely
receive qualified immunity in a civil lawsuit,
and that negligent record-keeping is not
itself grounds for suit. Also, Fisher
contends, the 1Ith Circuit's ruling actually
gives authorities an incentive not to remove
individuals from databases if arrest warrants
are recalled. By contrast, the petition says, if
prosecutors were "[f]aced with the
possibility of exclusion, police departments
[could] reasonably be expected to step up
their efforts to keep computer records up-to-
date and accurate."
Opposing certiorari, the federal government
maintains that the 11th Circuit's ruling
extends not to all negligent errors committed
by police personnel, but only to those where
law enforcement agencies that normally
maintain accurate records inadvertently
provide erroneous information to another
agency. In such narrow circumstances,
Solicitor General Paul Clement contends,
courts may justifiably conclude that the
costs of excluding illegally obtained
evidence outweigh the benefits.
Clement maintains that arrests made under
invalid warrants waste resources, and that
police departments, like private employers,
uniformly insist upon proper record-
keeping. As for civil liability, the
government contends that police officers are
never guaranteed to receive qualified
immunity, and municipalities may in fact
face suit when errors result from official
policies. In any event, punishing one law
enforcement agency for the mistake of
another would hardly serve as an effective
deterrent for future errors, Clement says.
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"Federal Appeals Court Rules on Case
Involving Coffee, Dale Counties"
Dothan Eagle
July 18, 2007
Lance Griffin
A legal issue involving Coffee and Dale
counties has made it all the way to the U.S.
11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court was faced with two issues
involving a 2004 incident in Coffee County.
Can a citizen be pulled over by the police
based on simply the belief that a warrant
exists for his/her arrest? And, can the
evidence gained from a subsequent search
be used in court to convict on separate
offenses?
The appeals court ruled Tuesday that a
Coffee County investigator's stop of a man
he believed had an outstanding warrant, and
the resulting search, was valid.
The case stems from a 2004 incident in
which Bennie Dean Herring drove to the
Coffee County Sheriffs Department to
check on another vehicle that had been
impounded there. About that time, Coffee
County Investigator Mark Anderson arrived
at the department and saw Herring, and
thought there may be outstanding warrants
for his arrest. After a check of Coffee
County records revealed no warrants for
Herring's arrest, Anderson asked the warrant
clerk to check with Dale County to see if the
sheriffs department there had warrants for
his arrest.
The warrant clerk in Dale County advised
Coffee County that there was an outstanding
warrant for failure to appear in court on a
felony charge. Anderson and another deputy
followed Herring from the sheriffs office
and pulled him over moments later on the
Dale County warrant. They then searched
him and his truck, finding methamphetamine
in his pocket and a pistol under the front
seat.
But back in Dale County, the warrant clerk
was unable to find the paper copy of the
warrant for Herring. The clerk made a quick
call to the Dale County clerk's office and
learned the warrant had been recalled. The
clerk immediately called Coffee County to
relay the information and the information
was quickly transmitted to Anderson and the
other deputy, but Herring had already been
stopped, searched and arrested. Only 10 to
15 minutes elapsed between the time the
Dale County warrant clerk told Coffee
County there was an outstanding warrant,
then called back to correct the information.
As a result of the search, Herring was
charged with possessing methamphetamine
and being a felon in possession of a firearm.
He was indicted, convicted and sentenced to
27 months in prison. Herring appealed,
citing the "exclusionary rule" a legal
principle holding that evidence collected or
analyzed in violation of the U.S.
Constitution is inadmissable. In this case,
Herring argued that Coffee County
conducted a warrantless search and that the
evidence resulting from the search should
have been suppressed.
A federal district court judge ruled that the
arresting officers conducted their search in a
good faith belief that the arrest warrant was
still outstanding, and that they had found the
drugs and firearm before learning the
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warrant had been recalled.
The appeals court upheld the district court
ruling, relying on a U.S. Supreme Court case
that states evidence gained during a search
does not have to be suppressed when
officers are acting in good faith reliance on a
warrant which is later found not to be
supported by probable cause. In other words,
Anderson and the deputy had a good-faith
reason to stop Herring because they believed
a warrant existed for his arrest.
Also, the appeals court ruled that even
though Dale County may have erred by
failing to update the recall of Herring's
warrant, Coffee County should not be
punished, nor would it effectively deter Dale
"Hoping to gain a beneficial deterrent effect
on Dale County personnel by excluding
evidence in a case brought by Coffee
County officers would be like telling a
student that if he skips school one of his
classmates will be punished," the court
wrote. "The student may not exactly relish
the prospect of causing another to suffer, but
human nature being what it is, he is unlikely
to fear that prospect as much as he would his
own suffering. For all of these reasons, we
are convinced that this is one of those
situations where any incremental deterrent
effect which might be achieved by extending
the (exclusionary) rule . . . is uncertain at
best."
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County from future errors.
"Justices Validate Seizure Based on Error on Warrant"
New York Times
March 2, 1995
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled today that
evidence seized by police officers who had
relied on the erroneous computer report of a
valid arrest warrant could be used in court,
as long as the computer error was made by a
court employee and not by a law-
enforcement official.
The 7-to-2 decision overturned a ruling by
the Arizona Supreme Court, which held that
the rule requiring the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence must apply to computer
errors to protect against the "potential for
Orwellian mischief' in government's
increasing use of computers.
But while reversing that decision, the
Supreme Court's approach in this early
encounter with law enforcement in the
computer age was tempered and narrowly
confined- surprisingly so, given the
Court's sympathy these days for prosecution
interests in most criminal cases.
The majority opinion by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist stopped notably short
of endorsing a broad exclusionary rule for
any computer error that led the police to
make an invalid search or arrest. While a
broad ruling might well have been his
preference, it was clear from the concurring
opinions filed by three Justices who voted
with him that the Chief Justice could not
have held a majority of the Court for such a
sweeping ruling.
In the case today, the police in Phoenix
stopped a man who was driving the wrong
way on a one-way street. A check by the
squad car's computer showed there was a
warrant for the driver's arrest; so the man
was arrested, and in the process the police
found marijuana. But it was later learned
that the misdemeanor warrant was quashed
17 days earlier, with the record remaining in
the computer system through a clerk's error.
Chief Justice Rehnquist saw the case as
fitting comfortably within the Court's 1984
ruling in United States v. Leon, which held
that evidence seized by the police in good
faith reliance on a warrant that turned out to
be faulty could be admitted at trial. But three
members of his majority were not so certain.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, David H. Souter and Stephen G.
Breyer said that while the police could not
necessarily be held accountable for clerical
errors made elsewhere in the system, they
nonetheless had to be held to standards of
reasonableness in relying on an error-filled
record-keeping system.
"With the benefits of more efficient law-
enforcement mechanisms comes the burden
of corresponding constitutional
responsibilities," the three said in the
concurring opinion, which was written by
Justice O'Connor. The police are entitled to
the benefits of computer technology, the
opinion said, but "they may not, however,
rely on it blindly."
Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M.
Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas joined the
majority opinion, Arizona v. Evans, No. 93-
1660, without reservation. Justices John
Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
dissented.
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Justice Stevens said, "The offense to the
dignity of the citizen who is arrested,
handcuffed and searched on a public street
simply because some bureaucrat has failed
to maintain an accurate computer data base"
was "outrageous."
The case did not address the broader
exclusionary rule issue raised by the
Republican-sponsored crime package that
passed the House last month. One provision
would go beyond existing Supreme Court
precedent and permit the prosecution to use
evidence seized by the police without a
warrant but in the "objectively reasonable"
belief that the search was consistent with the
Constitution.
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Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
07-591
Ruling Below: Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 (Mass. App. Ct.
2007), review denied by Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 449 Mass. 1113 (2007), cert. granted
Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2537 (2008).
Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing and trafficking cocaine. He is appealing on the
ground that the state has violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause that was established
in Crawiford v. Washington.
Question Presented: Whether a state forensic analyst's laboratory report prepared for use in a
criminal prosecution is "testimonial" evidence subject to the demands of the Confrontation
Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Commonwealth of MASSACHUSETTS,
V.
Luis E. MELENDEZ-DIAZ.
Appeals Court of Massachusetts
Decided July 31, 2007
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
MEMORANDUM AND
PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
ORDER
On appeal from judgments on guilty verdicts
returned by a jury on indictments charging
him with distributing and trafficking in
cocaine, the defendant argues that: (1) he
was entitled to required findings of not
guilty; (2) the admission in evidence of the
drug analysis certificates was inconsistent
with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004), and violated Commonwealth v.
Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994); and (3) his
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file
a motion to suppress evidence and to point
out to the jury the packaging of the seized
cocaine. We affirm the judgments.
1. The evidence. At trial, evidence was
presented establishing that on five or six
occasions over a three month period in the
fall of 2001, the loss prevention manager
(manager) of a K-Mart store (store) located
in Dorchester observed Thomas Wright, the
store's human resource manager, make and
receive external telephone calls, that is,
telephone calls neither placed to nor
received from persons within the store.
Immediately after receiving each of these
calls, Wright would walk outside and stand
by the front entrance to the store. He would
then get into a blue, four-door Mercury
Sable sedan driven by a Hispanic male and
sometimes carrying a passenger. The car
would drive away and return about ten
minutes later, with Wright exiting the car
and going back into the store.
At about 2:30 P.M., on November 15, 2001,
the manager reported his observations of
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Wright's activities to Boston police
Detective Robert Pieroway, who
immediately went to the store and set up
surveillance of the front outside area of the
store. It was about 3:00 P.M. when Pieroway
saw Wright come out of the store, stand on
the sidewalk looking around the parking lot,
and after a few minutes, go back into the
store. Pieroway next saw a blue Mercury
Sable sedan drive past the store, make a U-
turn, and drive back to the front of the store,
and stop. The driver, codefendant Ellis
Montero, was talking on a cell phone and
the defendant was in the front passenger
seat. Just as Montero arrived at the front of
the store, Wright came out and got into the
back seat of the car. The manager also saw
this activity, which was consistent with what
he had seen on prior occasions and had
reported to the police.
Once Wright was in the car, Montero drove
slowly through the parking lot. A few
seconds later, the car was within ten feet of
Pieroway, who could see Wright leaning
forward between the two individuals in the
front seats. When Wright leaned back,
Montero stopped, Wright got out of the car
and walked back toward the store. Outside
the store, Pieroway stopped Wright, who
told Pieroway that he had four bags of
cocaine on his person. Pieroway then
searched Wright and retrieved from his front
pant pocket a plastic bag in which there
were four clear white plastic bags containing
a total quantity of 4.75 grams of cocaine
having a value of about $320 to $400.
Pieroway immediately advised Boston
police Officers Ryan and Anderson,
stationed in a cruiser in the parking lot, to
arrest the two men in the blue car that was
driving away.
Ryan and Anderson stopped the car, arrested
Montero and his passenger, the defendant,
and frisked them for weapons. In
compliance with police procedure, the
officers did not search either of the men or
the car for contraband as they were only
assisting with the stop. A search of the car
for contraband would be conducted by drug
unit officers. Ryan and Anderson placed the
defendant and Montero in the backseat of
their cruiser, positioning the defendant
directly behind the front passenger seat and
Montero behind the driver. The officers then
drove to the front of the store where Wright
was also placed in the back of the cruiser.
The three men were seated with their hands
cuffed behind their backs. Montero was
directly behind the driver, the defendant in
the middle, and Wright behind the front
passenger. During the less than eight minute
trip to the police station, the defendant and
Montero were "speaking in Spanish,"
"fidgeting," "making furtive movements in
the back," and leaning various ways to
create space between them, while Wright
made no unusual movements and did
"nothing." Through the rear-view mirror,
Ryan saw Montero and the defendant
"jumping around" and felt them kicking the
back of the front seats. At one point during
the trip, Ryan told them to "knock it off, quit
moving around."
During the booking process at the police
station, the police recovered two cellular
phones and $301 from Montero and a pager
and $157 from the defendant. Meanwhile,
Anderson returned to the cruiser in which
the three men had been transported. He was
motivated to do so because of the actions
and movements of the defendant and
Montero during the trip to the station.
Anderson found a fold of money totaling
$320 on the ground next to the door used by
Montero and the defendant in getting out of
the cruiser. Looking in the back area of the
cruiser, Anderson found a plastic bag
573
containing nineteen plastic bags of cocaine
on the floor in a recess in the partition
between the front and back seats on the
driver's side of the cruiser.
No one was in the parking lot when Ryan
and Anderson arrived at the police station
with the three men. Nor was anyone in the
lot when Anderson returned to the cruiser
and found the money and drugs. Soon after
his discovery of the money and the bag
containing nineteen other bags, Anderson
was joined in the parking lot by Pieroway,
who took possession of the nineteen bags
which were thereafter analyzed and found to
contain a total of 22.16 grams of cocaine.
According to Pieroway, the nineteen bags
retrieved from the cruiser "appeared to be
the same size and same packaging, same
look[ ], everything as the four that [he]
recovered from . . . Wright ." Pieroway also
testified that the $320 found by Anderson
was the same amount that Wright had paid
for his purchase of the four bags of cocaine
retrieved from him.
There was also evidence establishing that
prior to leaving the police station on the
morning of November 15, 2001, Ryan had
inspected the cruiser to make certain that
there was no contraband on the front or back
seats. and that the cruiser was in the
possession of only Ryan and Anderson for
the entire day. In addition, on that day no
one had been in the backseat of the cruiser
other than Montero, the defendant, and
Wright.
2. The sufficiency of the evidence. In
contending that he was entitled to a required
finding of not guilty on each of the
indictments against him, the defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to
show that a drug transaction had taken place
on the afternoon of November 15, 2001, or
that he was a joint venturer in such a
transaction.
We begin our analysis of the defendant's
argument with Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 439 Mass. 688, 694 (2003), in
which the Supreme Judicial Court stated:
[T]o prove the defendant guilty as
a joint venturer, the
Commonwealth was required to
prove that he was present at the
scene of the crime, had knowledge
that another intended to commit the
crime and shared the intent to
commit the crime, and by
agreement was willing and
available to help the other if
necessary. Commonwealth v.
Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 700[-701]
(2003). ... [Additionally], to prove
the defendant guilty of trafficking
on a joint venture theory, the
Commonwealth must prove (1)
that the underlying crime of
trafficking in cocaine was
committed and (2) that the
elements of joint venture defined
above were satisfied.
See Rendon-Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 437
Mass. 40, 44-45 (2002).
In considering whether the Commonwealth
met its burden of proof, we take the
evidence and the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth.
There can be no real question concerning the
sufficiency of the Commonwealth's
evidence, i.e., the testimony of the manager,
Pieroway, Ryan, and Anderson, the
surveillance photos taken at the time of the
crime, and the similarity of the packaging of
the drugs retrieved from Wright and those
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taken by Anderson from the back of the
cruiser, to put to the jury the question of
whether the defendant was a willing
participant in the distribution of cocaine to
Wright. The evidence allows for the
reasonable inference that the defendant
knew Montero intended to sell drugs to
Wright, who had purchased drugs on prior
occasions while in the car. The defendant's
reliance upon Commonwealth v. Deagle, 10
Mass. App. Ct. 563 (1980), Commonwealth
v. Saez, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 408 (1986), and
Commonwealth v. McKay, 50 Mass. App.
Ct. 604 (2000), is misplaced as those cases
are factually inapposite.
Based upon the evidence presented in the
instant matter, a juror could reasonably infer
that neither Montero nor Wright, especially
Wright, would engage in a criminal
transaction in the presence of one
"unconnected to the business being
conducted." Commonwealth v. Fernandez,
57 Mass. App. Ct. 562, 567 (2003). The
defendant also possessed a pager, a
"traditional accouterment of the illegal drug
trade." Commonwealth v. Gollman, 436
Mass. 111, 116 (2002). In addition, as
earlier related, there was evidence to show
that during the ride to the station, Montero
and the defendant were seated next to each
other conversing in Spanish while
"fidgeting," 'jumping around," leaning
towards opposite windows, and "kicking
under the seat." Although, and as the
defendant argued before us, such activity
could be thought to have been caused by
discomfort attributable to their hands being
cuffed behind their backs, we think a sinister
inference was also reasonably available, that
is, the actions of the men were attributable
to their attempts to remove contraband and
money from their persons. Such an inference
is almost inescapable in view of the
testimony of Ryan, Anderson, and Pieroway
that the money found on the ground next to
the door used by Montero in getting out of
the cruiser matched the amount paid by
Wright for the cocaine found on him, and
that the drugs found in the cruiser were
packaged in a manner resembling those
found on Wright at the time of his arrest.
Based on all the evidence, including the
drug analysis certificates concerning the
substances taken from Wright and the back
of the cruiser . .. we conclude that the judge
did not err in denying the defendant's
motion for required findings of not guilty on
the indictments charging him with
distributing and trafficking in cocaine.
Judgments affirmed.
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"A 'Sleeper' Mass. Case Takes an Unlikely
Path to the Supreme Court"
Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly
March 31, 2008
David Frank
When John P. Moss Jr. stood before a
Suffolk Superior Court jury in 2004, the last
thing on the Cambridge lawyer's mind was
that, one day, his client's case might be
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.
But that's exactly where the otherwise
garden-variety cocaine-trafficking matter-
which didn't even merit a published decision
from the Appeals Court-is currently
headed.
Although Moss has since handed over the
reins to a team of law professors and
appellate attorneys, the matter made national
headlines earlier this month when the high
court granted certiorari on a hearsay issue
certain to impact thousands of other cases
across the country.
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the
Supreme Court will decide whether a state
forensic-lab report prepared for use in a
criminal case is testimonial evidence subject
to the demands of the Confrontation Clause
as set forth in the landmark 2004 Crawford
v. Washington decision.
If the court rules in the defendant's favor
after oral arguments this fall, prosecutors in
Massachusetts who frequently rely on such
reports in drunk-driving, fingerprint, DNA,
drug and firearm cases will no longer be
allowed to present such evidence without
first calling live witnesses.
"These reports are offered substantively
everyday in courts throughout
Massachusetts," says one state prosecutor
who asks not to be identified. "There's no
question that this is a big deal. With the
sheer number of cases out there, it's just not
feasible for the court to expect us to bring a
live witness in every time. If the court all of
a sudden rules that we have to, you're
talking about some major resource
problems."
In his brief, James J. Arguin of the Attorney
General's Office says that only a handful of
courts in the country have adopted the
bright-line rule urged by the defendant,
which would deem all lab reports prepared
for use at trial as testimonial.
"This interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause would impose enormous burdens in
countless criminal cases by needlessly
requiring live testimony from laboratory
technicians who are unlikely to have any
independent recollection of one-out of the
thousands--of tests they routinely perform,"
Arguin writes.
'Huge Question'
But Salem lawyer Mary T. Rogers, who
represents the defendant in Melendez-Diaz
along with Jeffrey L. Fisher of Stanford Law
School, counters that the Supreme Court has
previously shot down such arguments.
"The right to confrontation is a lot more
important than a resource problem, which is
a point the Supreme Court has already made
in Crawford," she says. "The question
presented here isn't just about drug
certifications. The issues at play go to
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forensic testing in general, and the way in
which evidence is introduced in all kinds of
cases."
Although Crawford-a case argued by
Fisher-held that a defendant's right to
confrontation was implicated whenever the
prosecution introduced testimonial evidence,
Rogers says the court never expressly said
whether lab reports are included in that
definition.
"[Fisher] called me between the time of the
Appeals Court decision and the application
for further appellate review and said this
was the only case pending in the country at
the time that was in the right posture to go to
the Supreme Court," Rogers says. "I didn't
expect to see a Rule 1:28 decision end up
there, but there is a huge question about
what the word testimonial meant in
Crawford. The Supreme Court hasn't gone
very far-perhaps until now-in defining
exactly what it means."
Despite the Crawford ruling, which created
much uncertainty among judges and lawyers
over the admissibility of hearsay evidence,
Rogers says that Massachusetts courts have
continued to admit such reports by relying
on several state statutes and the 2005
Supreme Judicial Court ruling of
Commonwealth v. Verde.
In Verde, which the defense is seeking to
overturn, the SJC responded to Crawford by
holding that drug certificates are "non-
testimonial" statements akin to business
records.
"Despite what the SJC found in Verde,
we're confident that Crawford clearly says
these kinds of reports are hearsay," says
Rogers. "A lot of us understand that a ruling
in our favor will mean that whenever the
prosecution wants to introduce the
information contained in these lab reports
substantively, they will have to bring
someone in."
She adds that Massachusetts is one of 44
states that currently permit trial judges to
substantively admit forensic reports on drug
cases, even when the chemists themselves
are not called to testify.
Brownlow M. Speer of the Committee for
Public Counsel Services says the disparity is
one of the reasons the Supreme Court
granted cert.
"Even though it's an unpublished decision, I
wasn't surprised they took the case because
you've got that split among the jurisdictions,
and you've got the factual incompatibility of
the practice with the literal language of the
Crawford ruling," Speer comments.
Until the issue is
advises lawyers
admissibility of all
offered at trial.
resolved, Speer says he
to challenge the
gun and drug certificates
"In addition to future cases, anyone who
raised an objection at trial stands to benefit
from a ruling in the defendant's favor," he
notes. "This case has wide applicability
because it is an example of a common
factual occurrence that appears to run afoul
of the Crawford rule."
Percolation in Lower Courts
In his brief, Arguin writes that the
defendant's case is a poor vehicle to resolve
what he refers to as "the important
constitutional question presented."
Where the underlying ruling is an
unpublished Rule 1:28 decision with no
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precedential value, he says the court should
not grant cert.
"Although not all courts agree with Verde 's
reasoning, [the defendant] exaggerates the
scope and depth of the conflict that exists,"
he writes. "The majority of courts, like
Verde, have followed a case-by-case
approach to determining whether a
particular statement is testimonial or
nontestimonial."
Arguin notes that where only two years have
passed since the Supreme Court clarified
Crawford's distinction between testimonial
and non-testimonial statements in the 2006
Davis v. Washington ruling, more time is
needed to properly assess the question.
"The passage of time and opportunity for
further percolation in the lower courts will
assist the Court in assessing the far-reaching
consequences that a decision in this case
might have on criminal prosecutions
throughout the country," he writes.
Contrary to the defendant's argument,
Arguin adds that the lab reports were
properly admitted by Rouse under the
business records exception to hearsay.
He further notes that the Department of
Public Health analysts are "state officials
simply recording the 'results of a well-
recognized scientific test' that the law
requires them to perform in the ordinary
course of the department's business."
Bad Ball Game
But Jeffrey T. Green of Northwestern
University, who authored an amicus brief
signed by several organizations, including
MACDL and CPCS, argues that
Massachusetts law currently deprives
defendants of important constitutional
rights.
"[The current system] eviscerates the
protections of the Confrontation Clause, and
makes the prosecutor the only functional
'gatekeeper' against the admission of
unreliable evidence," he writes. "By
removing the defendant's opportunity to
confront, before the fact-finder, the
presentation of forensic evidence to prove an
essential element of the crime, the
certification system robs the adversarial
system of many of the incentives that
promote the truth-finding function of a
criminal trial."
Such statutes, Green adds, virtually
eliminate judicial inquiry into the reliability
of scientific testing.
"In effect, the prosecutor becomes the
,referee' in a game that he has an interest in
winning, and thus has every incentive to use
,shortcuts to the process of proof,"' he says.
Unless the defense can cross-examine
forensic witnesses on the stand, Green
writes, they will continue having difficulty
challenging scientific evidence.
"This Court's constitutional holding in
Crawford means little in practice if States
can avoid that holding by simply
categorizing vital prosecution evidence . . .
'non-testimonial."'
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"Not so Perfect Together: Municipal
Courts and Hearsay"
New Jersey Lawyer
July 23, 2007
Ken Vercammen
Prior to 2004, in municipal court and
criminal cases, statements and documents
could often be introduced into evidence over
defense counsel's objection. In the landmark
decision of Crawford v. Washington 541
U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled testimonial hearsay
may not be admitted against a defendant at
trial unless the declarant is unavailable and
the defendant has had a prior opportunity for
cross examination.
Crawford
In Crawford the Supreme Court addressed
the protections afforded by the
Confrontation Clause. The defendant in
Crawford was charged with assault and
attempted murder, and convicted of assault.
The trial judge admitted a tape-recorded
statement of the defendant's wife, given to
police while she was herself a suspect, after
the judge found the statement reliable. The
court held that "[admitting] statements
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally
at odds with the right of confrontation....
Dispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty."
The court reversed defendant's conviction.
Note the court's express holding applied
only to "testimonial" evidence:
Where non-testimonial hearsay is at
issue, it is wholly consistent with
the Framers' design to afford the
States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law . . . as
would an approach that exempted
such statements from Confrontation
Clause scrutiny altogether.
Where testimonial evidence is at
issue, however, the Sixth
Amendment demands what the
common law required:
unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.
We leave for another day any effort
to spell out a comprehensive
definition of "testimonial."
Confrontation Clause
As accurately summarized by the 2007
Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of
Evidence,
the United States Supreme Court
sharply departed from its prior
view of how hearsay exceptions
could be reconciled with the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. The Confrontation
Clause provides that "[In] all
criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to be
confronted with the witnesses
against him." Before Crawford, the
Supreme Court had held that
hearsay did not offend the
Confrontation Clause if the out-of-
court statement fell within a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception"
or bore "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66,
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100 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (1980).
Now, under Crawford, testimonial
statements made by witnesses absent from
trial may be "admitted only where the
declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine." In Crawford, the court did
not precisely define "testimonial
statements," but it provided this guidance:
"Whatever else the term [testimonial]
covers, it applies at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a
grand jury, or at a former trial, and to police
interrogations."
In 2006 the U.S. Supreme Court had its next
opportunity to look at the hearsay issue,
deciding if 911 calls are admissible if the
witness will not come to court.
Testimonial Statements
In Davis v. Washington 126 S. Ct. 2266
(2006) the court held 911 calls sometimes
admissible and not hearsay, elaborating on
the meaning of "testimonial":
Statements are non-testimonial
when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
On March 6, 2006, the New Jersey appellate
courts had previously determined that
eyewitness 911 call to report attack was
admissible as an excited utterance. State in
the Interest of J.A 385 NJ Super. 544 (App.
Div. 2006).
In this adjudication of delinquency, the non-
testifying eyewitness's description of an
assailant-made to the police by phone
while he witnessed the attack and pursued
the fleeing suspect-was a present sense
impression under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(1) and an
excited utterance under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2),
and its admission into evidence did not
violate the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford. Certification has been granted by
the New Jersey Supreme Court.
In State v Buda, 389 NJ Super. 241 (App.
Div. 2006) the court found an excited
utterance made by a three year old child
abuse victim to a DYFS worker at a
hospital, although admissible under state
evidence law, is inadmissible in this case as
a result of evolving federal constitutional
jurisprudence under Crawford and Davis.
Certification to the N.J. Supreme Court was
also granted on May 21, 2007.
Caselaw Since 1985
In State v. Berezansky 386 NJ Super. 84
(App. Div. 2006) there was a challenge to
chemist testimony required in a DWI blood
case.
A lab certificate was admitted in a drug and
DWI cases as a business record under
N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) and as a public record
under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(8). Based on
Crawford, the Appellate Division
determined a conviction for driving while
intoxicated based on a blood test had to be
reversed and remanded for a new trial
because the defendant's right of
confrontation was violated by admitting into
evidence a lab certificate attesting to his
blood alcohol content without giving him
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the opportunity to cross-examine the
chemist who analyzed his blood sample and
prepared the certificate. Crawford requires
the state introduce live testimony by the
chemist in blood cases.
The court rejected the state's reliance on the
business record and government record
exceptions to the hearsay rule to permit the
admission of the lab certificate. The
rationale for those exceptions is that such a
document is likely to be reliable because it
was prepared and preserved in the ordinary
course of the operation of a business or
governmental entity, not created primarily as
evidence for trial. See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6);
Biunno, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence,
comment 1 to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6); comment
2 to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(8) (2005). The
certificate at issue is not a record prepared or
maintained in the ordinary course of
government business; it was prepared
specifically in order to prove an element of
the crime and offered in lieu of producing
the qualified individual who actually
performed the test. Here, defendant not only
was denied his constitutional right to
confront the certificate's preparer, he was
not even afforded an adequate opportunity to
challenge the certificate's reliability because
the state failed to provide requested
documentation regarding the laboratory
analysis of the blood.
The court also noted by analogy, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-19c, which requires the prosecutor
provide a defendant with all documentation
relating to a proffered lab certificate as a
condition for admission of that certificate
attesting to the identification of a controlled
dangerous substance. Certification has been
granted in Berezansky.
In State v. Renshaw 390 NJ Super. 456
(App. Div. 2007), the state introduced a
certificate signed by a nurse who drew
blood. The court held that the admission in
evidence of the Uniform Certification for
Bodily Specimens Taken in a Medically
Acceptable Manner, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2A:62A-11, without the opportunity for
cross-examination of the nurse who drew the
blood, and over the objection of defendant
runs afoul of the right of confrontation
protected both by the United States and the
New Jersey Constitutions.
Another case where the court ruled a
defendant can contest DWI blood lab reports
as hearsay was State v. Kent 391 NJ Super.
352 (App. Div. 2007).
In Kent, defendant was convicted of DWI
following a single-car rollover accident, and
the Law Division affirmed his conviction.
At the municipal trial, the state placed into
evidence, among other proofs, (1) a blood
sample certificate pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2A:62A-1 1 from a private hospital
employee who had extracted blood from
defendant, and (2) reports from a state police
laboratory that had tested the blood samples.
The authors of those hearsay documents did
not appear at trial.
The court reaffirmed the holdings in
Renshaw and Berezansky, concluding that
the hearsay documents are "testimonial"
under Crawford and the defendant thus
deprived of his right of confrontation under
the Sixth Amendment.
However, the court also noted that unless
our Supreme Court determines otherwise,
the confrontation clause of Article I,
Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution
does not appear to independently require
such cross-examination beyond current
federal precedents interpreting the Sixth
Amendment. Additionally, the court
recommended that legislative and/or rule-
making initiatives be pursued to avoid
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placing undue testimonial burdens on health
care workers and law enforcement personnel
who may create documents relevant to drunk
driving prosecutions.
Defendant's DWI conviction was affirmed
on independent grounds, based upon the
arresting officer's numerous observations
indicative of defendant's intoxication, and
defendant's admission of drinking.
For decades, DWI breathalyzer certificates
in DWI cases were admitted as an exception
to hearsay rules. And in a breathalyzer
appeal case, State v. Dorman, 393 NJ Super.
28 (App. Div., 2007), the court held that
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
holding in Crawford, a breathalyzer machine
certificate of operability offered by the state
to meet its burden of proof under State v.
Garthe, 1 N.J. 1 (1996), remains admissible
as a business record under N.J.R.E.
803(c)(6).
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"Supreme Court Roundup: Court Alters Rule
on Statements of Unavailable Witnesses"
New York Times
March 9, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
In a decision that could prove highly
favorable for many criminal defendants, the
Supreme Court on Monday made it more
difficult for prosecutors to introduce
statements at trial from absent witnesses
who are not available for cross-examination
by the defense.
The court's 9-to-0 decision addressed a
situation that typically arises when a witness
who has given a statement to the police later
claims a privilege against testifying at trial,
or when a co-defendant who has pleaded
guilty has made incriminating statements
during plea negotiations.
The basis for the court's decision was the
Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause,
which gives a criminal defendant the right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." In an opinion by Justice Antonin
Scalia, the court overturned a 24-year-old
precedent under which a statement from a
witness who was not available for cross-
examination could nonetheless be used at
trial if the judge found it to be reliable.
Justice Scalia said the requirement of
reliability was too subjective, amorphous
and "malleable" to comport with the intent
of the Constitution's framers, for whom the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses
was essential. The right was firmly
established in English common law at the
time the Constitution was adopted, he noted.
"Admitting statements deemed reliable by a
judge is fundamentally at odds with the right
of confrontation," Justice Scalia said,
adding: "Dispensing with confrontation
because testimony is obviously reliable is
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not
what the Sixth Amendment prescribes."
The decision, Crawford v. Washington, No.
02-9410, overturned an assault conviction
that had been upheld by the Washington
Supreme Court. Michael D. Crawford
stabbed a man who, he believed, had tried to
rape his wife. His defense was self-defense,
and the question at trial was whether the
victim was reaching for a weapon when he
was stabbed. Mr. Crawford's wife, Sylvia,
who was present at the time, had given the
police a statement suggesting that there was
no weapon. Invoking the marital privilege,
she did not testify at her husband's trial, but
the judge permitted the prosecution to
introduce her taped statement.
Under the rule the Supreme Court
established Monday, the prosecution may
introduce statements only from absent
witnesses who had previously been cross-
examined by the defense, such as at a
deposition or at a previous trial. So the rule
will not hamper prosecutors in putting on
evidence at a new trial following a mistrial,
for example.
One criminal law expert, Prof. Richard D.
Friedman of the University of Michigan
Law School, said the decision was a
"wonderful development" that could bring
significant changes in the conduct of
criminal trials. If prosecutors have any doubt
about the ultimate availability of their
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witnesses, they will have to give the defense
a chance at cross-examination before trial,
he said.
"The court is saying that the confrontation
clause is not a matter of weighing and
judging, but that it means what it says,"
Professor Friedman said.
While all nine justices voted to overturn Mr.
Crawford's conviction, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor did not sign Justice Scalia's
opinion establishing the new rule. They said
the statement in the Washington case did not
even meet the 1980 rule's test of reliability,
so there was no occasion to overrule that
decision, Ohio v. Roberts.
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Kennedy v. Louisiana
"Court to Explore Rehearing in Death Case"
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
September 8, 2008The Supreme Court on
Monday called for new legal briefs on
possible rehearing-and, maybe, revision-
of its ruling striking down the death penalty
for the crime of child rape. In an order in
Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court sought
briefs from lawyers for both sides in the
case, as well as from the federal
government. The new briefing in 07-343 is
to be completed by Sept. 24-in advance of
the Court's first Conference of the new
Term, on Monday, Sept. 29.
The briefs are to discuss two issues,
according to the order: first, whether to grant
rehearing of the June 25 decision, and
second, what action-if any-the Court
should take if it does reopen the case. Here
is the way the Court phrased its inquiries:
"whether rehearing should be granted" and
"the merits of the issue raised in the petition
for rehearing" filed by the state of Louisiana
on July 21.
That issue, of course, is whether the Court
should modify or expand the substance of its
ruling in the case because the decision did
not take account of a federal law authorizing
a death sentence for child rape as part of the
military justice system. This embraces
several other related issues: Will the Court
rethink its conclusion that there is a
"national consensus" against the penalty for
that crime? Will it clarify whether one basis
for its decision (the absence of a "national
consensus") was more important than the
second basis (the Court's independent view
that the punishment was excessive for the
crime)? Will it make clear whether rulings
under the Eighth Amendment apply to the
same degree in the military justice system as
in civilian courts? Will it comment in any
way on the constitutionality of the military
justice provision for the death penalty for
child rape?
In Monday's order, the Justices sought a
supplemental brief of up to 4,500 words
from attorneys for Patrick Kennedy, the
death-row inmate at the center of the case,
with that brief due on Sept. 17. The U.S.
Solicitor General's office is to file a brief of
up to 2,500 words, due at the same time, on
the federal government's views. The state
of Louisisana is to file a brief of up to 4,500
words, dealing not only with its plea for
rehearing, but also "the merits of the issue
raised in the petition for rehearing." That
final brief is due Sept. 24.
Under the Court's Rules, a decided case will
not be reheard unless a majority of the Court
votes to do so, and the majority includes at
least one Justice who voted for the result in
the case. Since the Kennedy case was
decided by a 5-4 vote, at least one of those
in the majority of five would have to cast a
vote for rehearing.
Louisiana, with the support of the Solicitor
General's office, has contended that the
Court's decision was flawed because of the
omission of any reference to a provision
enacted by Congress in a Pentagon budget
bill two years ago. Both Louisisna and the
Solicitor General's office have said it was an
error for them not to bring that law to the
Court's attention but that, nevertheless, the
Court should reopen the case and consider
now what impact, if any, that might have on
the result.
In the Court's decision, the Court first made
a survey of trends in state legislatures, in
Congress, and in the courts-a survey
leading to the conclusion that there was a
national consensus against the penalty for
the crime. In that part of the Court opinion,
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that
there was no federal law directly on point.
That is the part of the ruling that Louisiana
and the federal government have attacked
most aggressively.
In the second part of the decision, the Court,
exercising what it called its own
"independent judgment," concluded that the
death penalty would not be proportional for
the crime of raping a child. In its rehearing
petition, Louisiana said that the Court did
not "quantify which factor, if any,
predominated" in reaching its result-
national consensus, or the Court's
"independent judgment."
If the existence of the military provision
"calls into question the national consensus
found by this Court," Louisiana added, "the
question arises whether the second factor,
standing alone, justifies an Eighth
Amendment holding that supplants the will
of not only the several States, but of the
Federal Government as well."
The "independent judgment" part of the
decision, Louisiana added, "was not fully
informed" because the Court "was not
presented with all of the evidence of recent
legislative enactments."
The Solicitor General's office, in asking the
Court on July 28 to allow it to file a brief
supporting rehearing, said that the Kennedy
decision "is grounded on a materially
erroneous understanding of federal law.
Contrary to statements in the opinion, both
Congress and the President have recently
determined that a maximum sentence of
death is appropriate and proportionate for
cases involving the extraordinariliy grave
crime of child rape."
The Solicitor's prepared brief suggested that
"the categorical nature of the Court's
decision is particularly problematic." It
noted that the Court "has yet to resolve
whether the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition" applies differently in military
capital cases. But the Kennedy decision
rules out "across the board" the death
penalty for child rape. That raised "grave
doubt" about the validity of the 2006 law,
the brief added.
Before Monday, the Court had taken no
action on the Solicitor's motion to allow the
government to file a brief on rehearing-a
brief that does not appear to be allowed
under the Court's Rules. But Monday's
order extending the invitation to the
Solicitor to file a new brief makes the
motion irrelevant now.
